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SECTION A

The Law of Trade Secrets
Todd H. Bailey, Esq.
Intellectual Property Department
Frost Brown Todd LLC
Phone (513) 651-6950
Fax (513) 651-6981
E-mail tbailey@fbtlaw.com
INTRODUCTION
"Man has risen so far above all other species that he competes in
ways unique in nature. He fights by means of complicated
weapons; he fights for ends remote in time."
Charles A. Lindbergh, "The Reefs Of Biak."
Autobiography of Values (1978)
"Nothing is so burdensome as a secret."
French Proverb
"He that communicates his secret to another makes himself that
other's slave."
Baltasar Gracian, The Art of Worldly Wisdom
(1647),237, Tr. Joseph Jacobs
"Many a deep secret that cannot be pried out by curiosity can be
drawn out by ind,ifference."
Sydney J. Harris, On The Contrary (1962), 7
"It always hurts when you lose a secret."
Elie Wiesel, The Testament (1981), Tr.
Marion Wiesel
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I. TRADE SECRETS
A. PHILOSOPHY
1. Policies of trade secret protection are the maintenance of standards of
commercial ethics, good faith and honest fair dealing, the encouragement
of invention, and protection of substantial investment in proprietary
information.
2. Even though a discovery may not be patentable, its value is not destroyed
to one who makes it, or advantage the competitor who by unfair means, or
as the beneficiary of a broken faith, obtains the desired knowledge without
paying the price in labor, money or machines expended by the discoverer.
3. Trade secrets promote subsidization and encouragement of research and
development and increased economic efficiency.
4. The theme of trade secret protection is "promotion of commercial ethics."
B. DEFINITIONS AND NATURE OF TRADE SECRETS
1. The protection accorded a trade secret holder is for an indefinite period of
time.
2. Definitions
There are two different, but closely related, definitions of a trade secret:
a) Uniform Act-K.R.S. 365.880 et seq.
(1) Trade secret means information, including the whole or
any portion or phase of any scientific or technical
information, design, process, procedure, formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or
improvement, or any business information or plans,.
financial information, or listing of names, addresses, or
telephone numbers," that satisfies both of the following:
(a) it derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use.
(b) it is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under
the circumstances to maintain its secrecy."
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(i) There is no presumption that any particular
idea imparted to or acquired from an
employee is a trade secret unless the
possessor takes active steps to maintain its
secrecy.
(2) Improper means includes theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a
duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic
or other means."
(3) Misappropriation means any of the following:
(a) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person
who knows or has reason to know that the trade
secret was acquired by improper means;
(b) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without
the express or implied consent of the other person
by a person who did any of the following:
(i) used improper means to acquire knowledge
of the trade secret;
(ii) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had
reason to know that the knowledge of the
trade secret that the person acquired was
derived from or through a person who had
utilized improper means to acquire it, was
acquired under circumstances giving rise to
a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use,
or was derived from or through a person
who owed a duty to the person seeking relief
to maintain its secrecy or limit its use;
(iii) before a material change of their position,
knew or had reason to know that it was a
trade secret and that knowledge of it had
been acquired by accident or mistake."
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b) Prior law
(1) RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b definition: "a
trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one's business,
and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a
formula for a chemical compound, a process of
manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern
for a machine or other device, or a list of customers."
(2) "Trade secret" means the whole or any portion or phase of
any scientific or technical information, design, process,
procedure, formula, or improvement, or any business plans,
financial information, or listing of names, addresses, or
telephone numbers, which has not been published or
otherwise become a matter of general public knowledge.
(3) "A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in
the operation of the business. Generally it relates to the
production of goods, as, for example, a machine or formula
for the production of an article. It may, however, relate to
the sale of goods or to other operations in the business,
such as a code for determining discounts, rebates or other
concessions in a price list or catalogue, or a list of
specialized customers, or a method of bookkeeping or other
office management."
c) The Uniform Act replaces all conflicting civil state law regarding
misappropriation of trade secrets except for those relating to
contractual remedies.
C. EFFECT OF UNIFORM ACT
1. Over forty states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
Most co~prehensiveand recent discussion of Kentucky Uniform Trade
Secret Act is in Auto Channel, Inc. vs. Speedvision Network LLC, 144 F
Supp. 2d 784 (~D. Ky, 2001). This decision will be widely cited in all
future Kentucky trade secret litigation. The decision should be read
carefully both because of its precedential value and for its value in
advising clients in their business dealings.
A-4
D. SUBJECT MATTER OF TRADE SECRETS
1. A trade secret is almost anything and everything useful or advantageous in
business activity that is not generally known or easily or immediately
ascertainable to members of the trade.
2. There is no specific subject matter criterion for a trade secret. As long as
the definitional elements are met, virtually any type of information can be
a trade secret.
3. Trade secret laws are not those of property but the equitable principles of
good faith applicable to confidential relationships. The employer who has
discovered or developed trade secrets is protected against unauthorized
disclosure or use, not because he has a property interest in the trade secrets
but because the trade secrets were made known to the employee in a
confidential relationship.
E. REQUIREMENTS FOR TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
1. Whether particular knowledge is a trade secret is a question of fact.
2. The maintenance of secrecy requirement:
a) The information must be the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
b) Absolute secrecy is not required.
(1) Only relative secrecy is required.
c) The test is "one of reasonable efforts under the circumstances."
d) "Reasonable measures" must be taken to protect confidential
information.
e) T~e subject of a trade secret must be secret, and must not be of
public knowledge or of general knowledge in the trade or business.
f) Uniform Act requires the information be not generally known or
readily ascertainable to the public.
(1) Information is "readily ascertainable" if it is available in
trade journals, reference books or published materials.
g) A trade secret must be "secret" in the sense that it is known only to
the employer and his employees, is unique in the trade, gives the
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employer a competitive advantage, and is protected by substantial
security measures.
h) Factors showing requisite secrecy
(1) Factors to be considered in recognizing a trade secret
include (1) the extent to which the information is known
outside the business, (2) the extent to which the information
is known to those inside the business (i.e. to employees),
(3) the precautions taken to guard the secrecy of the
information; (4) the savings effected and the value to the
holder in having the information as against competitors, (5)
the amount of effort or money expended in obtaining and
developing the information, and (6) the amount of time and
expense it would take for others to acquire and duplicate
the information.
(2) Information is presumed to be secret when the owner takes
measures designed to prevent it, in the ordinary course of
business, from being available to persons other than those
selected by the owner to have access thereto for limited
purposes.
(a) A business or possessor of a potential trade secret
must take some active steps to maintain its secrecy
in order to enjoy presumptive trade secret status.
(3) Secrecy is not lost if the trade secret is revealed to another
in confidence and under an implied obligation not to use or
disclose it.
(4) Secrecy is not lost if information is known by other
employees involved with using the information on behalf of
the employer.
(5) Secrecy is not lost if supplier given access to trade secret to
better fill purchaser's needs; disclosure deemed to be in
confidence and implied duty by supplier not to disclose or
use information.
(a) Secrecy is lost if information disclosed to potential
or actual customers without confidential agreement.
(6) If trade secret patented, there is no further right to secrecy,
even if patent subsequently declared invalid.
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(7) Measures constituting internal and external controls on
information
(a) Include (1) business security devices; (2) visitor
screening procedures; (3) exclusion of general
public and competitors from business; (4) control of
dissemination of sensitive drawings to suppliers; (5)
dissemination of drawings to employees having
need to know; (6) proprietary restrictive disclosure
markings on drawings; (7) shredders for destroying
old computer printol:lts and pricing sheets; (8)
nondisclosure agreements for key employees.
(b) Include denial of plant access to employees,
limiting plant admittance, maintaining files in
locked and secure area, restricting use and
disclosure to outsiders, proprietary markings on
information, periodic discussions and reminders of
confidentiality, and a system of document retrieval.
3. The independent economic value requirement:
a) Uniform Act requires that the information have an independent
economic value, either to the trade secret owner or a competitor.
4. The competitive advantage requirement:
a) A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it.
5. The continuous use in the operation of the business requirement:
a) A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the
operation of the business.
b) The "ephemeral event" limitation
(1) Information related to a single, ephemeral event in the
conduct of a business does not meet the requirement that a
trade secret be "a process or device for continuous use in
the operation of the business."
c) However, there is protection for "negative experience," i.e. ideas
that did not work.
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6. Novelty
a) Novelty in the patent law sense is not required, although some
minimum novelty is required since that which does not possess
novelty is usually known.
7. The misappropriation requirement:
Protection is against disclosure or use when knowledge gained not by
owner's voluntary act but by some improper means, e.g. theft, wiretapping
or aerial reconnaissance.
F. SCOPE OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
1. An employer is only entitled to restrain former employee from disclosing
and using confidential information developed as result of employer's
initiative and investment and which employee learned as result of
employment relationship.
2. A trade secret does not offer protection from discovery by fair and honest
means, such as (1) independent development or invention; (2) accidental
disclosure; (3) "reverse engineering" (starting with the known product and
working backwards to divine the process which aided in its development
or manufacture) where the product was acquired honestly such as purchase
on the open market; (4) discovery under license from trade secret owner;
(5) observation of the item in public use or on display; or (6) obtaining
trade secret from published literature.
3. Reverse engineering
a) Duplication of design features through reverse engineering in
absence of confidential relationship will not support trade secret
misappropriation claim.
b) Once product is purchased on open market, reverse engineering
m'ay be undertaken with impunity.
4. Confidential relationship
a) Trade secret law can only prevent dissemination that has been
revealed in a confidential employer-employee relationship under
substantial measures of security.
A-8
b) A confidential relationship may be implied where trade secret is
disclosed in order to promote a particular relationship, e.g. to a
prospective purchaser to enable appraisal of value of secret.
5. Threat of future use or disclosure of trade secrets
(1) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.
(2) Court may restrain continued and future use, or threatened
use, of misappropriated trade secrets.
G. EXAMPLES OF PROTECTED RELATIONSHIPS
1. Licensees.
2. Former employees.
3. Employer/employee.
4. Franchisor/franchisee.
5. Existing/prospective customers/suppliers (assuming that effective
contracts with confidentiality, nondisclosure agreements are in place.)
II. CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS
A. PHILOSOPHY
1. Kentucky recognizes the enforceability of covenants not to disclose
confidential information.
a) No absolute need for nondisclosure covenants, but clearly
beneficial to have them
b) In.evitability doctrine - eight elements are:
• Is the new employer a competitor?
• What is the scope of the defendant's new job?
• Has the employee been less than candid about his new
position?
• Has the plaintiff clearly identified the trade secrets that are
at risk?
• Has the actual trade secret misappropriation already
occurred?
• Did the employee sign a nondisclosure and/or non-
competition agreement?
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• Does the new employer have a policy against use of others'
trade secrets?
• Is it possible to "sanitize" the new position?
See, Maxium Med., Inc. vs. Michelson 51 F. Supp 2d.773
(S.D. Tex, 1999)
B. REMEDIES
1. Injunctions
a) Injunction is available to prevent disclosure of confidential and/or
trade secret information.
cJUniform Act
b) Court may fashion a noncompete injunction conditioned upon
payment of compensation to employee of inevitable disclosure
cJUniform Act
c) Periodic affidavits confirming compliance with injunction-"self
policing" and continuing jurisdiction by Court for term of
injunction
2. Compensatory damages
a) Lost profits of former employer.
b) A reasonable royalty imposed for use of trade secret in future
years.
3. Requirement of Bond
a) If injunctions are sought/obtained, Rule 65 will require posting of
adequate bond (requiring a high bond can be used defensively by
new employer.)
c. LIABILITY OF NEW EMPLOYER
New employer may be liable for tortious interference of contract if the new
employer knows of restrictive agreement and intentionally participates in use of
confidential information of former employer
1. Have new employee sign acknowledgment with new employer that no
proprietary information of former employer is to be used or disclosed. (See
proposed employee acknowledgment at Attachment A)
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2. New employer must enforce the standard of conduct contained in the
acknowledgment.
III. TRADE SECRET PROGRAMS
A. Organized, comprehensive company program for identifying and protecting its
trade secrets.
1. Why?
a. Protects trade secrets (which are, by definition, commercially
valuable)
b. Increases employee awareness of trade secrets (employees tend to
work with them every day - don't always appreciate what they are
or their importance to company)
c. Demonstrates to Court that company believes information to be
important and protects it (remember the Uniform Act definition of
trade secret)
2. Must be formal - must be institutionalized - must be followed
B. Key elements
1. Know and understand which company information constitutes trade
secrets
a. Must be confidential and commercially valuable
b. Be realistic
c. Periodic inventories of business/technical information
2. Mark trade secret information as confidential
a. Use a "confidential" stamp (beware of paper with a pre-printed
confidentiality notice)
b. Can have different levels of confidentiality - different levels of
access based on "need to know"
c. Don't mark public information as confidential
3. Limit access to trade secret information
a. "Need to know" - key concept
b. Policies re locking desks, file cabinets and offices
c. Policies re documents - clean desk policy - shredding documents
d. Policies re taking information home - certain information must
be signed out
e. Policies re discussion of company information in public places
(airplanes, airports, business trips)
f. Access to information on computers (security levels, changing
passwords)
4. Limit visitors' access
a. Employee ill badges
b. Receptionist to screen visitors
c. Visitor sign-in/visitor badges
d. Visitors must be escorted
e. Visitors can only be in certain areas
f. Visitors never taken through certain areas of the plant
g. Conference rooms in reception area
5. Policies regarding new employees
6. Policies r~garding departing employees
7. Controlling outside disclosures of company information
a. Loss of control when you disclose to outside parties
b. Discussions with suppliers
(1) Particularly troublesome - they speak with your
competitors, too
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(2) How many times has a supplier told you interesting
information about your competitor? - What do you think
they say about you?
c. Disclosures at technical or trade association meetings
d. Require business and/or legal approval prior to disclosure
e. Use of confidentiality agreements
(1) provides legal remedies, if breached (BUT if this comes
into play, the damage has already been done)
(2) emphasizes confidentiality of information to recipient
(3) comprehensive form (see Attachment B) - use this as a
"template" for discussions/negotiations with prospective
joint venture partners, etc.
(4) simple form (see Attachment C) - use this as a "template"
for discussions/negotiations with prospective joint venture
partners, etc.
f. BASIC RULE - disclose only the minimum information required
to achieve business objective - no gratuitous disclosures
8. Technical information - best protected by patent or trade secret? - depends
on facts of particular case
9. Periodic reminders to employees - inadvertent disclosures are as costly as
intentional disclosures (company newsletters, video)
10. Periodic compliance audits
C. Sample outline of a very comprehensive corporate policies manual for combined
"in-house" trade secrets and intellectual property program - see Attachment D.
IV. NEW EMPLOYEES
A. Treatment of confidential information/trade secrets should be part of new
employee orientation
1. Discuss policy re: proper treatment of confidential information (trade
secrets)
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2. Discuss policy re: inventions
3. Employee Handbook is a handy way to provide such policies and other
useful information to employee. If there is a handbook, provide a copy to
employee and point out relevant portions - discuss trade secret policies,
don't rely only on the handbook
B. Issue employee ID badge
C. Employment Agreement
1. Some companies have them; some don't
Employer/employee relationship implies confidentiality relationship
2. Spells out basic rules governing employment
a. Describe job - was employee hired to invent?
b. Terms of employment (at will, salary, specific term, etc.)
c. Policy re: absences, holidays (incorporate Employee Handbook?)
d. Policy re: confidential and trade secret information
e. Policy re: ownership of inventions
f. Policy re: termination of employment
g. Covenant not to compete
3. Consideration =employment
4. If no employment agreement, consider a simple confidentiality agreement.
If no agreement at all, consider signed statement that employee has read
and understands policies re: trade secrets and confidentiality.
5. Employee should read and sign - keep duplicate copy
v. CURRENT EMPLOYEES
A. Consistent application of company's trade secret/confidential information policy
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B. Periodic reminders/reviews of policy for all employees (company newsletters,
video)
VI. OTHER POTENTIAL THEORIES FOR PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS
IN LITIGATION
All of these alternative theories are evaluated in Auto Channel, supra.
1. Unfair competition.
2. Idea misappropriation.
3. Express and/or implied contract
4. Covenant of good faith and fair dealing
5. Promissory estoppel
6. Fraud
7. Misrepresentation
8. Breach of fiduciary relationship
A-I5
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Mr./Ms. _
Dear _
This letter will serve to advise you as to our policy concerning the use or disclosure by
you of any confidential or proprietary information or data you may possess by reason of your
previous employment.
We have asked you to join our company because of your general skill and competence to
perform the responsibilities which you will be assuming and not because of any knowledge you
may have of a previous employer's confidential information. You shall maintain in confidence
all matters to which you become exposed during your employment by this company. You shall
likewise respect your obligations to previous employers not to utilize or disclose any matter you
may have learned in confidence during such previous employment. Accordingly, you shall
return to your previous employer any documentary material which you may have in your
possession which such employer might regard as confidential, and shall not utilize or disclose to
us any confidential matter relating to the business of your prior employer of which you may have
knowledge.
Cordially,
I acknowledge receipt of a copy of the foregoing letter and confirm that I will act in
accordance with the terms of the letter.
Date Employee
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A-IS
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT
___ DRAFT FORM
December, 2000
TIDS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this __ day of , 200_ by and
between ("__"), a corporation and a subsidiary of , on behalf of _
("__"), with's main office at , and _
_ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~_,a oorpomtio~wllh~mainoffire~
____________________ ("Company").
Recitals
WHEREAS, and Company wish to discuss with one another a possible business
transaction, which may include a joint venture, buy-sell arrangement, manufacturing or supply
arrangement, or any other business alliance (the "Proposed Transaction").
WHEREAS, in order to further these discussions, it may be necessary for and Company
each to disclose certain Confidential Information, as that term is hereinafter defined, to the other.
WHEREAS, and Company desire and mutually intend to maintain the proprietary or
trade secret status of the Confidential Information.
Now Therefore:
The parties mutually agree to the following terms and conditions for the disclosure, control and
protection of the Confidential Information:
1. Definitions.
a. "Confidential Information" shall mean any and all information regarding a
Disclosing Party or any of its affiliates, including but not limited to any product,
design, specification or other technical information, manufacturing or other
process information, financial information, customer information, general
business information, or market information, received or obtained before, on or
after the date hereof, whether or not marked or designated as "Confidential,"
"Proprietary" or the like, in any form, whether written, oral or otherwise,
including electronic or optical data storage and retrieval mechanisms, and all
forms of communication. "Confidential Information" shall include, but not be
limited to, information of a Disclosing Party disclosed or observed in connection
with physical demonstrations, in-person conversations or telephone conversations,
and other means of information transfer such as facility tours. "Confidential
Information" shall include all of the foregoing, regardless of whether any such
information is protected by applicable trade secret or similar laws, and any
analyses, compilations, reports, memoranda, notes or studies with respect to such
information, prepared by or on behalf of a Receiving Party or its Representatives.
b. The "Disclosing Party" shall mean either __ or Company when disclosing or
revealing its Confidential Information to the other.
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c. The "Receiving Party" shall mean either __ or Company when observing or
receiving the Confidential Information of the other.
d. "Representatives" means any directors, officers, employees, agents, independent
contractors, representatives, or advisors of a party to this Agreement, or any
affiliate thereof, with affiliate including any entity controlling, controlled by, or
under direct or indirect common control with such party.
2. Upon the transmission, disclosure, observation or receipt of Confidential Information by, for
or to any party hereto:
a. A confidential relationship with respect to the Confidential Information will
immediately be established between and Company;
b. The Receiving Party will not disclose or release the Confidential Information to
any third party, except with the Disclosing Party's prior written authorization and
consent, and except to the Receiving Party's Representatives whose duties include
evaluating the Proposed Transaction and who need to know the Confidential
Information in order to evaluate the Proposed Transaction, and then only if those
Representatives are subject to a legally enforceable obligation to maintain the
Confidential Information according to the terms of this Agreement;
c. The Receiving Party shall be responsible for any disclosure of Confidential
Information by its Representatives in violation of this Agreement and shall
enforce confidentiality obligations against its Representatives with respect to
Confidential Information to the fullest extent possible; and
d. Except with the Disclosing Party's prior written authorization and consent, the
Receiving Party will not use any Confidential Information of the Disclosing Party
for its own benefit or for the benefit of others, in any manner whatsoever, other
than to evaluate and negotiate the terms of the Proposed Transaction.
3. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, any Confidential Information given or received
under the terms of this Agreement shall be considered to be the sole property, proprietary
information and/or trade secret of the Disclosing Party.
4. This Agreement shall not apply to any Confidential Information which is described in
subparagraphs a. through f. below:
a. The Receiving Party demonstrates through the use of business records that the
Receiving Party possessed the Confidential Information prior to the date of
disclosure hereunder;
b. The Confidential Information is or becomes available to the general public
otherwise than through any act of the Receiving Party constituting a material
breach of this Agreement or any other agreement, provided that the source is not,
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to the knowledge of the Receiving Party, bound by a confidentiality agreement
with, or other legal or fiduciary or other obligation of secrecy or confidentiality
to, the Disclosing Party or another party with respect to such information;
c. The Confidential Information has been lawfully obtained by the Receiving Party
or its Representatives from a third party who is not, to the knowledge of the
Receiving Party, bound by a confidentiality agreement with, or other legal or
fiduciary or other obligation of secrecy or confidentiality to, the Disclosing Party
or another party with respect to such information;
d. The Confidential Information is independently developed by the Receiving Party, as
clearly and specifically demonstrated by business records prepared and maintained
in the ordinary course of business;
e. The Confidential Information is approved in writing for release by the Disclosing
Party; or
f. The Receiving Party is obligated to disclose the Confidential Information under an
order of a court of competent jurisdiction, provided that the Receiving Party first
gives the Disclosing Party thirty (30) days' notice of the Receiving Party's obligation
under the court order, and the Disclosing-Party shall be given an opportunity to
oppose any such disclosure. In the event the court order does not allow for thirty
(30) days' notice, the Receiving Party shall give the Disclosing Party as much notice
as may be reasonably practical. If disclosure is required despite efforts to prevent it,
the Receiving Party shall disclose only that portion of the Confidential Information
which, in the opinion of its counsel, is required by law to be disclosed.
5. Upon the termination of this Agreement, or earlier at the written request of the Disclosing
Party, the Receiving Party shall return to the Disclosing Party all documents, records, notes,
computer media, and any other evidence of Confidential Information provided to the
Receiving Party by the Disclosing Party, or observed by the Receiving Party, or otherwise in
its possession or control, and which is in any tangible form, including all copies. At the
same time, the Receiving Party shall also destroy any documents or other materials created
by the Receiving Party that contain any reference to any Confidential Information which in
their own right could be viewed as confidential, and the Receiving Party shall certify such
destruction in writing to the Disclosing Party within fifteen (15) days of its completion.
6. The Receiving Party acknowledges and agrees that in the event of any breach or
threatened breach of this Agreement by the Receiving Party or its Representatives, the
Disclosing Party shall be entitled to specific performance and injunctive relief as a
remedy for any such breach or threatened breach hereof without necessity of posting
bond or other security, the requirement for which is expressly waived. The Receiving
Party and its Representatives, as applicable, agree not to raise and hereby waive any
defense to injunctive relief based on lack of irreparable harm or the insufficiency of
monetary damages. Such remedy shall not be deemed to be the exclusive remedy for any
breach of this Agreement, but shall be in addition to all other remedies available to the
Disclosing Party at law or in equity. The Receiving Party hereby agrees to indemnify the
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Disclosing Party for all reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred
by it in enforcing this Agreement with respect to any such breach.
7. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State
of , without regard to any conflicts of law provisions. The Receiving Party
consents and agrees that all disputes arising out of or related to this Agreement, if brought
by the Receiving Party, shall be heard and determined exclusively by federal or state trial
courts located in County, or any appellate courts having
jurisdiction over such trial courts. The parties agree that the Disclosing Party shall have the
right to proceed against the Receiving Party in or in any other courts having
jurisdiction.
8. Nothing in this Agreement will be deemed by implication or otherwise to convey to the
Receiving Party any right or license under any patent, patent application, invention,
copyright, trademark, trade name or other proprietary interest owned by the Disclosing
Party; nor will this Agreement be deemed to provide a commitment of any kind by any party
to enter into any further agreement with the other party.
9. This document contains the entire and complete Agreement between the parties, and no
terms have been agreed upon except those expressly set forth herein. Any changes to this
Agreement must be in writing, signed by both parties. This Agreement shall be binding on
the parties, and upon their respective successors, assigns, agents and representatives.
10. The term of this Agreement shall be for __ (_) years from the date first set forth above.
After the term has expired, or following termination of this Agreement for any reason, all
Confidential Information received by either party during the term of this Agreement shall
remain subject to the confidentiality and non-use provisions of this Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement on the date first set
forth above.
(Name of Company)
By: _
Print
Name:-----------
Title: _
Date: _
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By: _
Print
Name: _
Title: _
Date: _
Re: Confidential Disclosure Agreement
Dear _
The purpose of this letter is to record the terms of a Confidential Disclosure Agreement
between XYZ Company (hereinafter, together with its affiliates, referred to as "XYZ") and
____________ (hereinafter, together with its affiliates, referred to as
"Recipient").
XYZ and Recipient are interested in holding discussions regarding _
__________________. ~thecourseofthosediscussions,hm~be
necessary for XYZ to disclose to Recipient technical and business information which XYZ
considers proprietary and confidential. Such information which may be disclosed by XYZ will
hereinafter be referred to as "Information". Said ~formation includes, but is not limited to,
________[e.g., technology; equipment; equipment and component plans, specifications
and prototypes; processes; methods of use; methods of manufacturing; trademarks; proposed
trademarks; and business plans].
I. XYZ agrees to disclose ~formation to Recipient upon the following conditions which are
understood to be acceptable to both parties:
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(a) the disclosed Information will be received and held in confidence by Recipient;
(b) Recipient will take such steps as may be reasonably necessary to prevent the
disclosure of Information to others; and
(c) Recipient will not commercially utilize Information without first having obtained
the written consent of XYZ.
II. The commitments set forth in I(a), (b), and (c) above, shall not extend to any portion of
Information:
(a) which is known (as demonstrated by prior written record) to Recipient prior to
disclosure by XYZ, or is generally available to the public; or
(b) which, hereafter, through no act on the part of Recipient, becomes generally
available to the public; or
(c) which corresponds in substance to that furnished to Recipient by any third party
having a bona fide right to do so and not having any confidential obligation, direct
or indirect, to XYZ with respect to the same; or
(d) which corresponds to that furnished by XYZ to any third party on a non-
confidential basis; or
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(e) which Recipient can demonstrate was developed independently of the disclosure
of Information by XYZ.
ill. Moreover, such commitments shall promptly and automatically terminate in their entirety
upon the lapse of a period ·of (5) years commencing on the date of disclosure. Following
termination of the commitments set forth in I(a), (b), and (c), above, with respect to the
whole of the Information or upon termination thereof in connection with specific portions
of the Information by operation of any of items II(a) through II(e), above, Recipient shall
be completely free of any express or implied obligations hereof restricting disclosure and
use of Information, subject to the patent or other intellectual property rights of XYZ.
IV. This agreement shall not carry with it any express or implied license under any patent,
trademark or oth~r intellectual property rights of XYZ or any obligation to negotiate any
future agreements, nor does it obligate either party to purchase or supply equipment,
materials, or services from the other party.
V. In this agreement, the term "affiliates" shall include any company, or other entity,
controlling, controlled by, or under common control with Recipient or XYZ, respectively,
including control through stock ownership, direct or indirect, and joint ventures.
If you are in agreement with the foregoing, please have a duly authorized member of
___________ management sign both copies hereof, and return one to me.
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ACCEPTED:
By: _
Printed Name _
Title _
Date _
Very truly yours,
XYZCOMPANY
By
Date:
A-26
XYZ
CORPORATE POLICIES MANUAL
Effective Date: , 2000
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COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETEI
A. INTRODUCTION
Covenants not to compete, non-compete agreements and non-solicitation
agreements (collectively referred to as "restrictive covenants"), under any name, restrain
trade. Johnson v. Stumbo, 126 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1938). A non-compete agreement and a
non-solicitation agreement serve the same general purpose, but in a slightly different
way. A non-compete agreement restricts the covenantor from competing with
covenantee (e.g., former employer) in any way, while a non-solicitation agreement
permits competition, but prevents covenantor from contacting clients of the covenantee.
Restrictive covenants are most often seen in employment contracts. These
provisions may also appear in connection with the sale of business and between investors
or shareholders of closely held companies or partners in a partnership, as well as
distribution or sales agreements. No matter where these agreements arise, the goal is to
protect the intangible assets of a business enterprise.
1 This paper is presented for educational purposes only, to contribute to the understanding of this particular
area of law. Neither the author, Frost Brown Todd, nor their present or future clients can be bound by the
comments and interpretations expressed herein.
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B. LIMITED ENFORCEMENT -
IMPORTANT PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Restrictive covenants are "not favorites of the law and will not be enforced where
they imperil individual rights which our fundamental laws have declared to be
inalienable" Calhoun v. Everman, 242 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Ky. 1951). Although early
cases were reluctant to restrain trade, they recognized that restrictive covenants could
serve a legitimate purpose. Restrictive covenants "are sustained where the purpose is to
prevent unfair competition by the employee or his subsequent employer, and the restraint
of trade is no greater than reasonably necessary to secure the protection." Crowell v.
Woodruff, 245 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Ky. 1952) (emphasis added). A restrictive covenant is
reasonable if it does not interfere with the public's interests or impose undue hardship on
the covenantee. Ceresia v. Mitchell, 242 S.W.2d 359, 364 (Ky. 1951); Hammons v. Big
Sandy Claims Services, Inc., 567 S.W.2d 313,315 (Ky.App. 1978).
There is no hard and fast rule as to what is reasonable. Rather, the determination
is made on an individual case by case basis and may turn on anyone of many facts or
circumstances. "Reasonableness is to be determined generally by the nature of the
business or profession and employment, and the scope of the restrictions with respect to
the character, duration, and territorial extent." Hall, 471 S.W.2d at 317. Restrictive
covenants that do not define their duration or geographic scope, however, are not
enforceable. Calhoun, 242 S.W.2d at 102. As will be discussed, however, courts may
define the duration or scope.
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C. FACTORS To BE CONSIDERED
The general rule of thumb is that a restrictive covenant will be enforced if it
serves to protect the legitimate business interest of the covenantor. In other words, a
restrictive covenant is enforceable to the extent it prevents unfair competition, and should
not be enforced if it serves only to prevent the covenantor from earning a living. This
naturally requires a review of the covenantee's business and the current business
activities of the covenantor to determine if they are "competing." If the two are not truly
competing, then the activities of the covenantor will be protected.
Whether competition is occurring is often a difficult and subtle question that
requires counsel to become an instant expert in the area of business involved. For
example, if a car salesman signs a restrictive covenant with a luxury car dealer, leaves his
job and begins to sell used economy cars, is he competing with the former employer?
Although lost in many of the cases in Kentucky, the analysis is one of equity and balance.
Nevertheless, Kentucky courts have addressed certain issues that aid attorneys in their
efforts to counsel clients.
1. Type of Employee
Restrictive covenants are not appropriate for all employees. Courts are more
likely to enforce covenants involving professionals, or other highly trained employees
with greater employment opportunities, than those that restrict an unskilled or semiskilled
employee's right to earn a living. Calhoun v. Everman, S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1951), and
Crowell v. Woodruff, Ky., 245 S.W.2d 447 (Ky. 1952). In Calhoun and Crowell the
employees had a very limited capacity to compete in the labor market, and it was
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considered unconscionable to deprive them of their livelihood merely to protect the
comparatively insignificant interest of the employers who had required restrictive
covenants of the employees. See also Lareau v. o 'Nan, 355 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Ky.
1962); Hall v. Willard and Woolsey, 471 S.W.2d 316,318 (Ky. 1971).
2. Duration
Many restrictive covenants include a term of 1 or 2 years. Higdon Food Services
v. Walker & Kesterson Meat Co., 641 S.W.2d 750 (Ky. 1982), Hammons Central
Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram Associates, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Ky.Ct.App.
1981). Nevertheless, Kentucky courts have enforced restrictive covenants that include a
term of 5 years (Martin v. Ratliff Furniture Co., 264 S.W.2d 273 (Ky. 1954» and 10
years (Ceresia, 242 S.W.2d at 361; Johnson v. Stumbo, 126 S.W.2nd 165, 168 (Ky.
1939), Durham v. Lewis, 21 S.W.2d 1004 (Ky. 1929). The reasonableness of the
duration depends on the business circumstances, but the longer the duration, the greater
the burden on the covenantee to prove that the restriction is reasonable and necessary to
protect its legitimate business interests.
3. Geographic Scope
Kentucky cases have enforced restrictive covenants that include a geographic
scope of 50 - 200 miles from the covenatee's place of business. Hammons, 567 S.W.2d
at 313 and Hall, 471 S.W.2d at 316. Again, however, the scope must be reasonable in the
light of all relevant circumstances.
Courts will enforce agreements on a nationwide, even a worldwide basis if the
covenantee can demonstrate that it does business on such a broad scope. To be
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successful, the covenantee must also demonstrate that the covenantor could compete on
such a basis, or in other words, that the covenator poses some threat of unfair competition
on a nationwide or worldwide basis. Some courts will limit the geographic scope of the
restrictive covenant to the area in which the covenantee worked or to the customers with
whom goodwill was developed. Again, the general principle is that the restrictive
covenant must be limited to the protection of the covenantee's legitimate business
interests. The restrictive covenant must be clear and unambiguous. The court in Calhoun
refused to enforce an oral agreement that was not specific as to duration or geographic
limitation.
4. Restriction on Customer Contact
In Lieu of Defined Geographic Scope
Kentucky courts will enforce a restrictive covenant if a geographic scope is
defined as a restriction on soliciting the covenantee's customers. In Higdon Food
Services v. Walker & Kesterson Meat Co., 641 S.W.2d 750 (Ky. 1982), the court
enforced an agreement that restricted the former employee from calling upon or accepting
inquiries and sales opportunities from the customers of the plaintiff-former employer.
A non-solicitation agreement often has a better chance of enforcement because it
is more narrowly defined and is focused more on protecting the covenantee's customer
goodwill. A careful reading of a non-solicitation provision may often reveal a loophole.
On occasion, a non-solicitation agreement will restrict the covenantor from soliciting
business from the covenantee's customers, but will not restrict acceptance of business
from them. In that case, if the customer seeks out the covenantor, the covenantor may be
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in a position to accept it without violating the non-solicitation agreement. This can be a
very troublesome area for the covenator's counsel, as discussed below.
5. Consideration
The continuation of employment, even at will employment, may be sufficient to
constitute consideration. The continued employment must be for an "appreciable" length
of time after the covenant is signed and in cases where the covenantor terminates the
relationship with the covenantee. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram Associates,
Inc., 622 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Ky.Ct.App. 1981). Neither Ingram nor any other published
Kentucky case has addressed the situation where the restrictive covenant is signed after
employment begins and the employer terminates the relationship.
6. Assignment
Assignment of a restrictive covenant was raised by the parties In Choate v.
Koorsen Protective Servs., Inc., 929 S.W.2d 184 (Ky. 1996). In that case, the Jefferson
Circuit Court enforced a restrictive covenant on behalf of an assignee. The employee
appealed and the Kentucky Appellate Court affirmed, in an unpublished opinion. By the
time the matter reached the Kentucky Supreme Court, the duration of the restrictive
covenant had expired and the matter was moot.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue in Managed Health Care
Assoc., Inc. v. Kethan, 209 F.3d 923 (6th Cir. 2000). In that case, the Sixth Circuit
reversed the district court and permitted the assignee to enforce the restrictive covenant.
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that many other jurisdictions permit restrictive covenants to
be assigned. Since the purpose of the restrictive covenant is to protect a business
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enterprise's legitimate interests, it follows that the restrictive covenant should be assigned
to a purchaser. One legitimate business purpose of a restrictive covenant is to protect key
employees and the trade secrets they possess to maximize the value of the business for
sale. To hold that the restrictive covenant cannot be assigned would defeat that
legitimate purpose. See In Re Vison, 2001 WL 1097741 (U.S. Bky. Sept. 12, 2001).
7. Alteration of Covenant
In the event that a Kentucky court finds that restrictive covenant is not
enforceable as written, it may alter the terms to make it reasonable. In Cersia, the court
concluded that a restrictive covenant that made no reference to duration or geographic
scope was unreasonable. Rather that declare the agreement void, the court affirmed the
trial's court's injunction which limited the restriction to 10 years. In Hodges v. Todd, 698
S.W.2d 317 (Ky.Ct. App. 1985), the Appellate Court remanded the matter to the trial
court to determine a reasonable geographic scope. In Calhoun, however, the court
determined that the alleged oral agreement lacked the necessary specificity to justify the
remedy of specific performance and so the court refused to impose any restriction.
This leaves open the door for Kentucky courts to restrict or, in certain
circumstances, expand the terms of a restrictive covenant. Most, if not all restrictive
covenants in employment agreements state that the restricted period begins to run when
the employment ends. If the covenantor violates the restrictive covenant simultaneously
with the end of employment, an argument can be made that the covenantee is entitled to
the benefit of the bargain, and the covenator should be enjoined from violating the
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restrictive covenant for the stated duration term beginning on the date an injunction is
entered.
This appears to be the law in neighboring Ohio. The Supreme Court of Ohio
granted trial courts the discretion to give injunctive relief for a period of time that is
reasonable and necessary to protect a complaining parties' legitimate interest, even if it
extends beyond the precise terms of the agreement between the parties. In Raimond v.
Van Vlerah (1975), 42 Oh. St.2d 21, 28, 325 N.E.2d 544, 548, the Supreme Court of
Ohio reviewed a trial court's entry of an injunction that lasted three years from the date of
entry. The defendant employee appealed arguing that the plaintiff was limited to its
prayer for relief and the terms of the contract which provides for injunction for three
years from the date the employment relationship ended.
The Ohio Supreme Court rejected such a restriction on the plaintiff stating,
Because this court holds, for the first time, that a trial court may enforce a
covenant 'to the extent necessary to protect an employer's legitimate
interest,' we direct that this cause be remanded to the Court of Common
Pleas, so that the Court may ascertain if its initial findings conforms with
the test established today. That Court is now specifically empowered to
construct a reasonable covenant between the parties, and to grant
injunctive relief, if appropriate, for a period of time to which the
appellant may be entitled.
Id., 42 Oh. St.2d at 28, 325 N.E.2d at 548-49. (emphasis added) The Ohio Supreme
Court granted trial courts the discretion to grant injunctive relief sufficient to protect the
legitimate business interest of the employer, even beyond the terms of the agreement
between the parties.
The Ohio Supreme Court took similar steps more recently in Rogers v. Run/ola &
Associates, Inc. (1991) 57 Oh. St.3d, 565 N.E.2d 540. The original Non-Compete
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Agreement included a duration term of two years, which would have expired before the
Supreme Court entered its Order. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Ohio saw fit to
grant injunctive relief despite the expiration of the agreement on its terms. In Rogers, the
trial court determined that the terms of the covenant not to compete and the result and
hardships on the former employees exceeded that which was reasonable to protect the
plaintiff's legitimate business interest. The trial court, therefore, refused to enforce the
Agreement or to grant the plaintiff injunctive relief. Soon after the trial court's decision,
the defendants started their competing business, which remained in operation during the
course of the appeal.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the covenants not to
compete were unreasonable and unenforceable, nevertheless the Supreme Court of Ohio
granted the injunctive relief. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court relied on its
previous decision in Raimonde and enjoined the defendants from certain activities for a
period of time and in a geographic area shorter and smaller than the terms stated in the
original Agreement. The Supreme Court stated that the injunction would begin as of the
date of the Order, and continue one year thereafter.
Therefore, in Ohio, the Court may toll the running of a restrictive covenant during
the time of violation by the covenantor. Although there are no such published decisions
in Kentucky, because Kentucky generally permits courts to fashion reasonable
restrictions, Kentucky law may permit the same result.
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8. Enforceability Against Employees Fired Without Cause
There is some support that a restrictive covenant cannot be enforced against an at-
will employee who is terminated by the employer. Kentucky's highest Court stated in
Crowell:
The instant covenant is of dubious quality. There seems to be a lack of
mutuality, for there is no corresponding or fair reciprocal obligation on the
part of the employer. He did not bind himself to continue Crowell in his
employment longer than thirty days, yet the employee bound himself to
surrender his life trade in his home community for a period of one year.
245 S.W.2d at 449. The issue would be fact specific and would turn on the equities of
the situation. Certainly, if the employee possessed confidential information or had
developed strong ties to the employer's customers at the employer's expense, the Court
may be persuaded that enforcement of the restrictive covenant would be inappropriate.
Citing Crowell, the Western District of Kentucky refused to enforce a restrictive
covenant against a news reporter who was terminated just after a year.
The enforceability of a restrictive covenant depends on the language of the
covenant. For example, the covenant in Daniel Boone Clinic, P.S. C. v. Dahhan, 734
S.W.2d 488, 490 (Ky.Ct.App 1987) stated that the employee doctor could not compete
with his employer for one and a half years "following the termination of employment"
and the employee doctor argued that the restriction did not apply because his employment
ended by expiration of his employment commitment, and not by any termination. 734
S.W.2d at 490. The Kentucky Court of Appeals concluded, however, after reviewing the
contract as a whole, that "termination" simply meant any ending of employment, whether
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that ending came as a result of expiration of the contract, any action by the employer, or
any action by the employee. Id.
In Bates v. Aaron, 317 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1958), however, Kentucky's highest
court concluded that a covenant that precluded a doctor from certain competition with a
clinic if he should "withdraw" from the clinic, only precluded competition after a
voluntary termination of employment, and did not preclude employment following an
involuntary dismissal. Id. at 482. Because the doctor had left his employment as a result
of a dispute over bonus payment, his termination was construed to be involuntary -- so
that the restrictive covenant did not apply.
9. Restrictive Covenants in The Corporate Setting
In Ceresia v. Mitchell, 242 S.W.2d 359, 364 (Ky. 1951), the Kentucky
Supreme Court recognized the value of goodwill. In that case, the Court found that the
agreement was unenforceable but nevertheless imposed a reasonable restriction because
the purchaser was entitled to benefit of his bargain. Generally, courts are less strict in
their enforcement of restrictive covenants executed in connection with the sale of a
business. Kentucky courts will seek to enforce the intention of the parties at the time of
the sale contract. Hodges v. Todd, 698 S.W.2d 317 (Ky.App. 1985).
D. LAw IN OTHER STATES
1. Choice of Law
Choice of law provisions can be very important and be a major factor in the
advice given to the client, whether a covenantee or covenantor. Some courts will be
reluctant to enforce the law of another state to enjoin an employee. If the client is the
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covenantee and the covenantor is in another state, any injunction received in Kentucky
must be registered in the covenantor's state for enforcement. The registration process
may cause some delay. If the law of the selected state is more restrictive than Kentucky,
a Kentucky covenantor may consider filing a complaint for declaratory injunction in
Kentucky and force the covenantee to come to Kentucky to defend the restrictive
covenant. In the declaratory injunction action, the covenantor should argue that the more
restrictive law of the other state violates Kentucky public policy and, for that reason, the
choice of law provision should not be enforced.
2. Ohio
The law in Ohio is very similar to that of Kentucky. A restrictive covenant is
enforceable if it is ancillary to an employment contract and is reasonable. Briggs v.
Butler, 140 Ohio St. 499 (1942). Courts may fashion a reasonable covenant between the
parties if the restrictive covenants as originally agreed to between the parties is
unreasonable. Rogers v. Runfola & Assoc., Inc. 57 OhioSt. 3d 5, 8 (1991). The
restrictive covenant should be reasonable in duration and geographic scope, Raimonde v.
Van Vlerach, 42 OhioSt.21, 25 (1975), and supported by adequate consideration, Copeco,
Inc. v. Caley, 91 Ohio App. 3d 474,477 (Stark Co. 1992).
3. Tennessee
Tennessee will enforce restrictive covenants to protect the legitimate business
interests of the covenantee. Powell v. McDonnell Ins. , Inc., 1997 WL 589232 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1997). Covenantee's entitled to protect their investment in the specialized or
unique skills or training of its employee, protect confidential information, and customer
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relationships. CAM Inter'!. L.P. v. Turner, 1992 WL 74567 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)
(Tennessee courts should first determine whether the employer has a legitimate business
interest entitled to protection and then whether the restrictive covenant goes beyond what
is reasonably required to protect the employer's interests); AmeriGas Propane, Inc.
Crook, 844 F.Supp. 379 (M.D.Tenn. 1993). Like Ohio, Tennessee has adopted the rule
of reasonableness and courts will modify restrictive covenants to make them reasonable.
CAM Int'!.
E. APPLICATION TO INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
This question has not been addressed in Kentucky. The legal and equitable
considerations would be the same for an independent contract as with an employee.
Many states have enforced restrictive covenants against independent contractors.
Hamilton Insurance Services, Inc. v. Nationwide Insurance Companies, 714 N.E.2d 898
(Oh.Sup..Ct.1999); Zellner v.Stephen D. Conrad, M.D., P.C., 589 N.Y.2d 903
(N.Y.Ct.App. 1992); White v. Lance H. Herndon, Inc., 417 N.E.2d 383 (Ga.Ct. App.
1992); Renal Treatment Centers - Missouri, Inc. v. Braxton, 945 S.W.2d 557
(Mo.Ct.App. 1997); and Fraser v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 135 F.Supp.2d 623
(E.D.Penn.2001).
F. OTHER RESTRICTIONS
Confidentiality agreements usually accompany restrictive covenants. The
simplest and often most effective confidentiality agreement prevents the employee from
using confidential information gained from the employer for any reason other than the
benefit of the employer. The confidential information to be protected must be worthy of
B -13
protection and the restrictions must not unreasonably restrict the activities of the
employee.
An employer can also protect its business by including a non-solicitation of
employees clause in employment agreement. This type of non-solicitation agreement, or
anti-raiding agreement, precludes an employee form leaving and trying to take other
employees as well. See also Glenn v. Diabetes Treatment Centers of America, Inc., 116
F.Supp. 1098 (S.D.Ia. 2000).
Another effective tool for protecting trade secrets is arbitration. Despite
protective orders, there is always the risk that confidential information produced in a
lawsuit will end up in the wrong hands. This risk is reduced in arbitration. Additionally,
the more limited discovery procedures of arbitration can prevent information from ever
being disclosed.
G. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE EMPLOYER
1. Alternatives to the Restrictive Covenant
For the highly trained employee, the employer can take steps to recover some of
its investment if the employee leaves prematurely. Employment agreements can include
provisions that require an employee to pay a percentage of the cost of training or
education in the event they leave. Most often, the amount to be repaid is reduced after
each year of employment. These "repayment" provisions are common between new
brokers and their broker-dealer.
Whenever an employee departs, an exit interview should be conducted. The
interview should require the return of all property and a discussion of the terms of the
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restrictive covenant. The employer should carefully catalog that information and files
that are returned and be careful to receive keys, identification badges and any other items
relating to security. The company's information services department should take steps to
make sure that the former employee cannot access information from out of the office. An
exit interview should be conducted to determine that all information has been returned
and to remind the employee about any obligations under a restrictive covenant or
confidentiality agreement.
2. Hiring an Employee Subject to a Restrictive Covenant
a) The Client Knows of the Restrictive Covenant Before
Hiring the Employee
The chance of a claim of tortious interference with contract and misappropriation
of trade secrets should be a real concern. The client must understand that their interest in
the potential new employee cannot be based on its desire to receive their competitor's
confidential information, to capitalize on the competitor's special training of the potential
new employee, or the potential new employee's relationships with the competitor's
clients.
The new employee should be told up front that consideration for the position does
not include the possibility of anything that could be interpreted as gaining an unfair
competitive advantage. The new employee's agreement (and employee manual) should
include direct instructions that employees are not to use the trade secrets or confidential
information of a competitor,and are certainly should not bring any documents or
computer files of any competitor into the clients offices.
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b) The New Employer Learns of a Restrictive Covenant
After New Employee Has Started Work/Old Employer
Considering Filing Suit
Again, a tortious interference claim may be coming. This is a very difficult
situation. The actions of the company and the new employee will be carefully scrutinized
in any subsequent litigation. Of course, the safest course of action would be to pull the
new employee from working until all issues can be resolved. Often, clients are reluctant
IICW CIIIVIUYCC IlUlll WUl.l\.lllt; UIIll1 (111 l~~UCi~ "",all VCi lCi~V.1VCiU. \J.1l~.11, \...r.1.1\..tJ.IlLt aJ.\..t J.\..tJ.u\..tlau.l.
to take such action and, at the same time, want an assessment of their risk.
The analysis should focus on whether the old and new employers are competing
and whether the new employee is giving the new employee an unfair competitive
advantage through the use of confidential information or trade secrets. The new
employee should be instructed not to use any documents or information that could in any
way be considered the property of the former employer. If your engagement does not
include the employee as a client, your conversations and instructions to the employee
may be discoverable in any subsequent litigation. For that reason, be very careful what
instructions are given to whom and what instructions are put in writing. Further, remind
your client that conversations between officers of the new employer and the new
employee may be discoverable as well.
3. Avoid Raiding
In December 1999, the National Association of Securities Dealers awarded
Kinnard Investments $16.3 million against Dain Rauscher for raiding employees. The
evidence also showed that some employees took substantial steps to compete before
resigning from Kinnard. Dain recruited about 20% of Kinnard's brokers in a two year
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period and caused a corresponding drop in retail sales. Kinnard alleged the loss of so
many brokers caused substantial morale problems and attributed for many of the
problems it had suffered. The award consisted of $9.2 million in compensatory and $7.1
in punitive damages. The arbitration panel also awarded nearly $350,000 in Kinnard's
legal fees.
4. Focus on Servicing Customers
Restrictive covenants designed to protect relationships between a business and its
customer do not always reach the desired result. If a customer desires the services of the
employee, then the customer may be alienated forever if the employer makes the
customer relationship the subject of litigation. Customer's brought into court to testify
will usually blame those responsible for the invasion. Under certain circumstances, a
liquidated damages provision (along with a confidentiality agreement) may rescue some
profits from customer's that would otherwise be lost forever.
H. ADVIsING THE EMPLOYEE
Advising the exiting employee can be filled with traps and pitfalls for counsel. If
the wrong advice is given, claims of aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty or
misappropriation of trade secrets may be made against the attorney. In the worst case, a
lawyer may be charged with a crime for the theft of a trade secret. For example, a lawyer
should never advise a departing employee to take documents or computer files with them.
There is advice that the lawyer can give the departing employee.
1. Do Not Discuss Intention To Leave With Other Employees
a) Do not solicit other employees to join you;
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b) . Do not solicit input or advice from other employees
c) Do not solicit assistance from other employees
2. Do Not Remove Employers Information
a) Make sure that your replacement will not be handicapped
because of anything you did
b) Absolutely do not delete computer files or destroy
documents belonging to your employer
3. Take Only Limited Steps to Prepare to Leave
a) Do not hold customer orders to be directed to your new
operation once you leave
b) Advise customers you are leaving - speak in terms of
hypothetical if at all
4. Do not Disparage Your Current Employer Either During or
After You Exit
5. Fulfill All Your Job Responsibilities
a) Continue to make best efforts
b) Continue current schedule
6. Give Reasonable Notice of Intention to Leave
7. Do Not Disclose Confidential Information
a) Document file with new employer that job offer was based
on experience and background
b) Document that you do not intend to share confidential
information with new employer
c) Do not compromise customers confidential information
8. Exit Interview
a) Provide resignation letter directing old employer to contact
counsel with questions
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b) Do not hide intentions but do not volunteer any
information.
c) Confirm that you have returned all confidential information
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I. Measures of recovery in trade secret cases
A. Fair market value to plaintiffs
B. Plaintiffs' lost profits
C. Defendants' economic gain
D. Reasonable royalty
II. Fair Market Value to Plaintiffs
A. When applicable
Precision Plating & M. Fin., Inc. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 435 F.2d 1262 (5th Cir.
1970). Subcontractor sued contractor for destruction of a trade secret. The
Plaintiff sought damages for the value of the process at the time of destruction.
The trial court stated:
There is no established market value in the present case in the sense that there
were a number of transactions of the same or similar article, the consensus of
which reflects the price at which lvilling buyers and sellers would act. Fair
market value here is synonymous with the investment value of the trade
secret; that is, what an investor judges he should pay for the return he foresees
by virtue ofowning the process, taking into account the facts, circumstances
and information which is available at the time. Id. at 1263.
Universit11 Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.
1974). The Defendants paid an employee of the Plaintiff $2,500 to induce him to
steal Plaintiff's copy of a computer system, and deliver the tapes and documents
comprising that system to an employee of the Defendant.
In some instances courts have attempted to measure the loss suffered by the plnintifJ.
While as a conceptual matter this seetns to be a proper approach, in most cases the
defendant has utilized the secret to his advantage with no obvious effect on the plaintiff
save for the relative differences in their subsequent conlpetitive positions. Largely as a
result of this practical dilemnla, normally the value of the secret to the plnintiff is an
appropriate measure ofdamages only when the defendant has in SOlne way destroyed the
value of the secret. The most obvious way this is done is through publication, so that no
secret remains. VVhere the plaintiffretains the use of tlte secret, as here, and where there
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has been no effective disclosure of the secret thraugh publication, the total value of the
secret to the plaintiffis an inappropriate 1neasure. Id. at 535.
B. Approaches to valuation:
1. Cost approach - seeks to measure the future benefits of ownership by
quantifying the amount of money that would be required to replace the
future service capability of the subject property. The assumption
underlying this approach is that the price of new property is
commensurate with the economic value of the service that the property
can provide during its life. See Valuation of Intellectual Property and
Intangible Assets, 2nd Edition, Gordon V. Smith and Russell L. Parr, John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1994, p. 153.
2. Income approach - steps away from the cost of constructing or creating a
new property and focuses on a consideration of the income-producing
capability of the property. The underlying theory is that the value of
property can be measured by the present worth of the net economic
benefit (case receipts less cash outlays) to be received over the life of the
property. Id. at 154.
3. Market approach - measures the present value of future benefits by
obtaining a consensus of what others in the marketplace have judged it to
be. There are two requisites: 1) an active, public market and 2) an
exchange of comparable properties. Id. at 160.
C. Discovery issues
1. People to interview:
a. Plaintiffs' research and development personnel
b. Plaintiffs' operations managers
c. Plaintiffs' financial personnel
2. Relevant records:
a. Plaintiffs' research and development project cost records
b. Plaintiffs' monthly operating cost reports
III. Plaintiffs' Lost Profits
A. When applicable
Sperry Rand Corporation v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387 (Va. 1971)
Action by former employer against former employees and their subsequent
employer to recover for misappropriation of trade secrets and bidding data.
The two basic nlethods for assessing danmges for nlisappropriation oftrade secrets are: (1)
the damages sustained by the victinl (the tradition of com1non law re1nedy), and (2) the
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profits earned by the wrongdoer by the use of tile misappropriated material (an equitable
remedy which treats the wrongdoer as trustee ex 11Ullefido for the victim of the
wrongdoer's gains from his wrongdoing); ordinarily, a plaintiff may recover either, but
not both, because to allow both wOf-lld pennit double recovery. Id. at 1392.
Since the objective in allowing dJlmages for nlisappropriation of trade secrets is to
compensate plaintiff for the difference in his position before and after the
misappropriation, his probable 1055 may be the more significant measuring rod than the
misappropriator's actulll gain. Id. at 1393.
B. State statutes
Illinois - Damages may include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation
and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into
account in computing actual loss.
Indiana - In addition to or in lieu of injunctive relief, a complainant may recover
damages for the actual loss caused by misappropriation. A complainant also may
recover for the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken
into account in computing actual loss.
Kentucky - Damages may include both the actual loss caused by
misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is
not taken into account in computing actual loss.
Ohio - Damages may include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation
and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into
account in computing actual loss.
c. Lost sales volume and lost sales revenue
1. Factors impacting plaintiffs' sales volume and revenue
2. Relevant case law
Mangren Research & Development v. National Chemical Co., 87 F.3d 937 (7th Cir.
1996). Mangren, a manufacturer of mold-release agents, filed suit for
misappropriation of customer lists and other things after sales of its mold release
agent markedly declined in the three previous years.
Mangren sought to recooer the prOfits it lost . .. including prOfits lost through sales of
PTFE-based mold release agents by defendants and Bash, and prOfits lost when Mangren
lowered its prices to meet defendJlnts' competition. Id. at 941. Mangren presented
evidence at trial of the profits it lost on account of defendant'S misappropriation,
including profits lost when defendants and Bash sold their nlold release agents to
Masonite and others, ·and prOfits lost when Mangren lowered its prices to meet the
competition from defendJlnts. The jury accepted Mangren's evidence, whicJI included
$133,418 in profits lost due to sales by Bash. Id. at 945.
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lackson v. Hammer, 653 N.E.2d 809 (ID. App., 1995).
Buyer of hobby shop brought action against sellers and related party for using
store's customer list.
Damages, however, to be recoverable, nlust not be merely speculative. Here, plaintiff
offered only slight evidence concerning damages from the September 1989 mailing.
Plaintiff noted that Mark Hamnler did not keep complete records ofsales at the Decatur
store so it was possible that persons on the Whistle Post custonler list who received the
September 1989 flyer did go to the Decatur store and make purchases. In addition,
plaintiff testified as to one instance where a person on the Whistle Post customer list had
received Hammer's Septenlber 1989 flyer and told plaintiffthat he subsequently had gone
to the Decatur store and purchased itetns where within the troo-year non-compete period.
Plaintiff offered neither further evidence of damtlges, nor evidence of how much money
this one customer spent. Thus, the trial court's dedsion against plaintiffwas not against
the manifest weight ofthe evidence. Id. at 814.
Harry R. Defier Co. v. Kleeman, 243 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1963). Action against former
employees for injunction and damages arising from conspiracy to exploit, in
competition with plaintiff, confidential information disclosed to them for
purposes of their employment.
The accounting justice should detennine lvhat the plaintiffs margin ofnet prOfit lvould
have been if it had retained the business which the defendants diverted. With respect to
determining sales whiclt the plaintiff could reasonably have expected to make but for
defendant's disloyalties, there is in this case "a causal relation not wholly unsubstantial
and imaginanJ, between the gains of the aggressor and those diverted from his victinl. II
Id. at 937.
D. Collateral Sales
Sperry Rand Corporation v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387 (VA. 1971).
Action by former employer against former employees and their subsequent
employer to recover for misappropriation of bidding data.
Additionally, there was evidence that Sperry Rand could reasonably have expected a 25%
follow-on spares order to supplel11ent the basic contract. Id. at 1394.
E. Incremental Profits
1. Cost definitions
a. Fixed costs
b. Variable costs
c. Incremental costs
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2. Examples of costs typically considered incremental
3. Relevant case law
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die, 407 N.E.2d 319 (Mass.
1980) Plaintiff brought action to recover damages for defendant's
misappropriation of aircraft supplies drawings.
This court has recognized three acceptable methods of nzeaS1J.ring damages in
cases involving business torts such as the misappropriation of trade secrets: the
defendant's prOfits realized from his tortuous conduct, tile plaintiffs lost profits,
or a reasonable royalty. Because Curtiss-Wright claimed a specifiC loss of such
items as direct lost profits, loss of recoverable overhead and general
administrative expenses, the appropriate measure ofdatnages is this case was the
greater oftheplflintiffs lost prOfits or the defendant's gain.
Sperry Rand Corporation v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387 (VA. 1971)
Action by former employer against former employees and their
subsequent employer to recover for misappropriation of bidding data.
. . . after contputing the expected reVenl-leS and estimated costs derived from the
follow-on spares order that it wOl-lld have realized, additional prOfit of $23,989,
reC(JlJery of additional general and administrative expenses of $19,648 and
material (JlJerhead of$2,564. These six itenls total $231,012.00. Id. at 1394.
F. Increased Operating Costs
Dotor Agency, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 218 A.2d 583 (Pa. 1966)
Insurance agency filed suit against former employee and insurance company to
enjoin them from using records taken from agency by former employee.
The out-ofpocket expenses sustained by the plaintiff company as a result of the
defendant's inlproper conduct was clearly testified to by John Cooney, treasurer of the
company, and amounted to $23,996.45. This sum included expenses for postage-
printing, paper and special sales expenses incurred to reinstate the former policy holders
and protect other policies; it included also the proportionate salary paid to certain
employees while engaged in ~fforts to reinstate and protect policies carried btJ the plaintiff
company. These figt,/,res 10ere obtained from original records of the plaintiff conlpany
produced in court. Id. at 585.
G. Discovery Issues
1. People to interview:
a. Plaintiff and defendant sales representatives and sales managers
b. Defendant's customers (survey)
c. Plaintiffs' financial personnel
2. Relevant records:
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a. Plaintiff and defendant customer lists
b. Plaintiff and defendant sales records by invoice, date, customer
c. Planntiffs'fnnancialstatements
d. Planntiffs' manufacturing records and capacity reports
e. Planntiff and defendant product literature
IV. Defendant's Economic Gain
A. Rationale/Theory
Carter Products, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Company, 214 F. Supp. 383 (D. Md.
1963). In violation of an employment agreement, Fnne revealed to Colgate a
formula which enabled Colgate to produce various brands of shavnng cream.
A misappropriation of trade secrets entitles the injured party not only to a reasonable
royalty, but also to an award ofprofits on the basis of "unjust enrichnrent", because it is
a "breach ofconfidence", a "species offraud". In effect, the courts treat the wrongdoer as
a trustee who must be nzade to hand over the proceeds ofhis wrong. As Justice Holmes
said in a case ofunfair con1petition involving the improper use ofa trademark: "To call
the infringer an agent or trnstee is not to state a fact btlt merely to indicate a mode or
approach and an imperfect analogy by which the wrongdoer will be made to hand over the
proceeds ofhis wrong." L. P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. William Wrigle1J, Jr., Co. Id. at 394.
let Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 385 N.E.2d 1349 (Ma. 1979).
Planntiff sued former employees who entered into competnng busnness allegedly
using employer's trade secrets.
Ofcourse, a plaintiffis not entitled to both the profits made by the defendant and his own
lost profits. However, while a plaintiff is not entitled to a double recovery, "the plaintiff
is entitled to tile profit he would have tllade had 11is secret not been unlawfully used, but
not less than the monetary gain which tlte defendant reaped from his itllproper acts." ...
Only in this way can we ensure that an unfair competitor will not be encouraged to
proceed with his unfair nlethods in the hope "that his profits might exceed the injured
party's losses." . .. Therefore, a plaintiff in an action involving the misappropriation of
trade secrets may proceed in the alternative to determine whetller tile defendant's
wrongful profits exceed the plaintiff's losses cat-lsed by the misuse of the plaintiffs trade
secrets. Id. at 1356 -1357.
B. When applicable
Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., Inc., 378 F.Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
The Plaintiff sued Defendant for misappropriation of a trade secret concerning
mouth-guards made of thermoplastic material worn by athletes for the
protection of their teeth.
There are two basic methods for assessing dllmages for nlisappropriation of trade secrets:
one, the damages sustained btJ the victim (the tradition ofconlmon law remedy), and the
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other, the profits earned by the wrongdoer by the use of the misappropriated nzaterial (an
equitable remedy which treats the wrongdoer as trustee ex nzalefido for the victitn of the
wrongdoer's gains from his wrongdoing). Id. at 816 - 817.
An accounting of Safe-Play's profits frotn its mis'use of plaintiffs trade secret is
appropriate here. Plaintiffs have not proved the actual danzages tltey have suffered as a
result ofdefendants' misappropriation and tnisuse oftheir secret flavoring method. Proof
ofactual losses sustained btJ the plaintiff is frequently difficult and speculative in trade
secret cases; it is nearly inlpossible here. Id. at 817.
Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Associates, 278 N.W.2d.81 (Mt. 1979).
Employer brought action against former employees seeking permanent
injunction and damages for breaching terms of employment agreement.
Defendants argue that the trial court's use of defendants' profits, rather than plaintiffs
loss, as a measure ofdamages was improper. Although damages for breach ofcontract are
traditionally measured by the non-breaching party's 1055 of expected benefits under the
contract, where an employee wrongfully prOfits from the use ofinfonl'Ultion obtained from
his emplOlJer, the measure of damnges nzay be the employee's gain. Also, this court has
spedfically found that the violator of a covenant not to compete may be required to
account for his profits, and such illegal prOfits may properly nleasure the damages. Id. at
94- 95.
c. State Statutes
Illinois - Danzages may include botll the actuoJ loss caused by misappropriation and the
unjust enrichment caused by ntisappropriation that is not taken into account in
computing actual loss.
Indiana - In addition to or in lieu of injunctive relief, a complainant nlay recover
damages for the actual loss caused by nlisappropriation. A complainant also may recover
for the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in
computing actual loss.
Kentucky - Datnages may include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and
the unjust enrichnlent caused by misapprapriation that is not taken into account in
computing actual loss.
Ohio - Dalnages may include both the actual loss mused En} misappropriation and the
unjust enrichtnent cau.sed by misappropriation tlzat is not taken into account in
computing achmlloss.
D. Types of Economic Gain
1. Increased revenue from
a. Increased unit sales
b. Increased price per unit
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2. Reduced operating costs
3. Reduced research and development costs
E. Increased revenue from the sale of accused and collateral products
1. Plaintiffs' burden of proof
2. Accused products
Fremont Oil Company v. Marathon Oil Company, 192 N.E.2d 123 (C.P.
Ohio, 1963). Former employer brought action for conspiracy of former
employees and new employer to commit certain acts of unfair
competition. Plaintiff sought an injunction and an accounting of profits.
[The] Exhibit indicates clearly how delivery by Marathon rose to unprecedented
heights and deliveries by Fremont plulnmeted to l-lnusual lows between March
4tl1 and March 8th• The rise in deliveries for Fremont and the fall in deliveries for
Marathon after March 8th was due to the temporary restraining order issued by
this Court. Id. at 128.
3. Collateral products
Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corporation, 139 A.2d 281
(N.J. 1958). Plaintiff instituted an action against its former employee and
others for trade secret misappropriation. Plaintiff sought an injunction
and an accounting. The judgment provided that Defendants account for
/Iall avails or profits" received by them in the manufacture and sale of
machines embodying the plaintiff's secrets.
The evidence discloses that in connection with the sale 'of the machines, which
enlbodied some ofplaintiffs trade secrets, the defendant, as ancillary to and. part
of the sale of the machines or subseql-lent to but in connection with the seroidng
ofsaid machines also furnished the customer with type, ink, and solvents. While,
strictly speaking, the sales of type, ink and solvents were not found by the court
to be an infringement of the plaintiffs rights, thetJ were so intilnately connected
with the defendant's illegal activities and ancillary thereto, that I feel that the
defendant must also pay over to the plaintiff not only the prOfits on the sales of
the illegally rnanufactured machines, bt-lt also the prOfit on the type, ink and
solvents sold. Id. at 284 - 285.
F. Apportionment
1. Defendants' Burden of Proof
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604
(1912). Pre-Aro patent infringement suit. Plaintiff sought recovery of
Defendant's economic gain.
"The role of law and eq-uihj is strict and severe on such occasion. .. . All the
inconveniences of the confusion is tl1rown upon the party WllO produces it, and it
is for him to distinguish his own property or lose it.". .. It may be argued that,
in its last analysis, that is but another way of saying tlzat the burden ofproof is
on the defendant. Al1d no doubt S1~ch, in the end, will be the practical result in
many cases. But such burden is not imposed by law; nor is it so shifted until
after the plaintiff has provided the existence of prOfits attributable to his
invention, and demonstrated that they are il-npossible ofaccurate or approximate
apportionment. If then the burden 0.(separation is cast on the defendant, it is one
which justly should be borne by hinl, as he wrought the confusion. Id. at 621 -
622.
Carter Products, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Company, 214 F. Supp. 383
(D. Md. 1963). In violation of an employment agreement, Fine revealed to
Colgate a formula which enabled Colgate to produce various brands of
shaving cream.
... the 12(c) secret formu,la was a fundamental ele1nent which penneated the
product and made it saleable. Id. at 395. . .. In other words, Colgate so
commingled tIle elements that it was impossible for plaintiffs to 1nake an
apportion1nent, and Colgate failed to meet the burden which then shifted to it
under the fourth Westinghouse rule to introduce evidence of a proper
apportionment. Id. at 398.
When a case of confusion does appear - when it is impossible to nwke a
mathematical or approximate apportionment - then from the very necessity ofthe
case one party or the other must secure the entire fund. It ml~st be kept by the
infringer, or it must be awarded, by law, to the patentee. On established
principles of equity, and on the plainest principles of justice, the glJ,ilty trustee
cannot take advantage ofhis own wrong. The fact that he may lose something of
his own is a misforllJ,ne lvhich he has brol~ght upon himself. Id. at 397.
let Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 385 N.E.2d 1349 (Mass. 1979). Plaintiff
sued former employees who entered into competing business allegedly
using employer's trade secrets.
Once the plaintiffs de1nonstrate that the defendants have made prOfits from sales
of products incorporating the misappropriated trade secrets, the burden shifts to
the defendants to demonstrate the portion of their prOfits which is not
attributable to the trade secret. Id. at 1358, fn 14.
G. The Relevant Time Period
1. The "Head Start" Rule
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Kilbarr Corp. v. Business Systems, Inc. B.V. , 679 F.Supp. 42 (D.N.]. 1988).
A trade secret misappropriation claim was filed as an adversary
proceeding in a bankruptcy case.
Regardless ofwhen defendants might have been able to develap the secret process
for manufacturing an electromechanical typewriter by legitilnate business means
such as reverse engineering or independent research, they learned them front its
knowing misappropriation of plaintiffs trade secrets. Accordingly, the Court
determines as a matter of law that head start is not available to these defendants
on the facts in this case. Id. at 425.
let Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 385 N.E.2d 1349 (Mass. 1979).
Plaintiff brought suit against former employees who entered into
competing business allegedly using plaintiff's trade secrets.
Generally, the "head start rule" has been applied in cases where the plaintiffs
product, including the trade secret, has been marketed. The marketing of the
product gives competitors a legitimate opportunity to study the product and to
learn the principles of the trade secret through reverse engineering or similar
procedures. . . . In a petition for injunctive relief, we have indimted that the
time necessary to engineer in reverse is one factor to be considered in
determining the propriety of the duration of injunctive relief We have not
applied this theory in an action for damages. Id. at 1357, fn 11.
2. Defendants' burden of proof
Carboline Company v. E. larboe, 454 S.W.2d 540 (Mo. 1970).
Plaintiff brought action for misappropriation of trade secrets concerning
processes for manufacturing numerous products used as non-eorrosive
protective coatings principally for steel, iron and concrete.
[Defendant] suggests that the injunction should not be made penllanent, but
should be limited in time by applimtion of the "head start" rule: "That period of
time which would have been required btJ defendants to reproduce plaintiffs
products without wrongful apprapriation." It was indicated . .. that this state
would apply the "head start" rule . .. which. precludes a defendant from using a
misappropriated trade secret only for such tilne as it is not make public. Id. at
552.
[The Defendi1nt] should be given the opportunity to establish the "head start"
time as to these products, and the injunction should be limited to that period of
time ifshown. . .. Ifupon further proceedings the time within which [defendant]
could have . . . by independent analyses determined Carboline's ingredients in
the five-product series is establisJled, damages, being [defendants] net prOfits
from sales ofthe items, should be limited to such tilne. Id. at 553.
H. Cost Deductions
1. Incremental cost approach
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Carboline Companl1 v. E. larboe, 454 S.W.2d 540 (Mo. 1970)
Briefly, the incremental profit method nleans that no costs which tile
organization is already saddled with sh01-lld be allocated to the new product. This
is a widely-accepted theory that's used in ntanagement, by management, and in
introducing new products, and I believe it would be the proper method to be
followed here, also." ... To the extent that such expenses were already on-going
at the time the product was introduced, they should not be alloazted to the new
product, only the increase in such expenses that can be related to the new product
should be allocated to the new product. . .. The general and administrative
expenses (officer'S salaries, rent, utilities, insurance, travel, legal and accounting,
etc.) in existence when [Defendant] decided to produce the products should not
be used to alloazte costs proportionately to sales. Id. at 554.
Carter Products, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Companl/, 214 F. Supp. 383
(D. Md. 1963). In violation of an employment agreement, Fine revealed to
Colgate a formula which enabled Colgate to produce various brands of
shaving cream.
If the manufacture and marketing of the infringing goods causes no increase in
the general expense, no part of it is to be alloazted to them, even though such a
practice would be bad from the point of view of cost accounting or business
POliClJ. Only when the manufacture or marketing of the infringing goods
increases the joint expenses is it proper to allocate a part of them to these goods.
If the role were othenuise, the defendant would be permitted to retain gains made
by his own wrongdoing. The apportionment ofjoint expenses in the absence of
such an increase would reduce the cost of the non-infringing goods and would
thus permit gain for the defendant from his tortuous conduct. Id. at 401.
2. Defendants' burden of proof
3. Examples of incremental expenses
L. P. Larson, 1r., Company v. William Wrigley, 1r., Company, 277 U.S. 800
(1928) Trade dress case. Plaintiff sought defendant's profits from the sale
of accused products. Defendant deducted its Federal income tax expense
from the accused revenue and Plaintiff appealed.
Even if the only relief that the Wrigley Company can get is a deduction from
gross income when the amount of its liability is finally determined, the l.Jlrson
Contpany will have to pay a tax on the Wrigley prOfits lohen it receives them,
and in a case ofwhat has been found to have been one ofconscio'us and deliberate
wrongdoing, we think it just that the further dedl-lction should not be allowed. Id.
at 801.
let Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 385 N.E.2d 1349 (Mass. 1979)
Plaintiff brought suit against former employees who entered into
competing business allegedly using plaintiff's trade secrets.
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An accounting of tlte defendant's profits is designed to strip them of their
impennissible gains. Where a defendaltt has suffered bad debts resulting from
sales of prOdll-cts which he has mtlnufactured, the defendant has incurred
manufacturing expenses and has reaped no profits. He should not be required to
pay over as profits funds never received. Id. at 1360.
We think that the judge correctly allowed tIle defendant to deduct the salaries and
fees in question from gross prOfits on the basis of the judge's conclusion that
"there are no findings that the salaries or consultant's fees were excessive or a
disguised distribution of earnings or that the corporate defendant to whom the
services were rendered was a sham." The question ofwhether corporate officers
are named as individual defendants should not determine whether their salaries
may be deducted frOtll a corporate defendant's profits. The determinative
question should be wllether their salaries and fees are reasonable in light of their
positions as officers of the corporation /Iengaged in the conduct of the business
and in the production ofprofits." Id. at 1360 - 1361.
I. Set-off
1. Same products, different time periods
Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corporation, 139 A.2d 281
(N.J. 1958). Plaintiff instituted an action against its former employee and
others for trade secret misappropriation. Plaintiff sought an injunction
and an accounting. The judgment provided that Defendants account for
"all avails or profits" received by them in the manufacture and sale of
machines embodying the plaintiff's secrets.
An innocent plaintiff seeking an aCCOtlnting fronz a defendant wrongdoer is
confronted with serious practical difficulties in establishing undisclosed as well
as disclosed profits, particularly where tnanipulative devices such as family
corporations are involved, and it effectively urges that where, as here, the
defendant uJrongdoer has submitted calendtlr year figures ofprofits and losses, it
is just and equitable that the plaintiff be permitted to accept the profitable years
while rejecting the others. Id. at 287. See Cardozo, J., in Duplate Coryoration v.
Triplex Safety Glass Co.
Carter Products, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Company, 214 F.Supp. 383 (D.
Md. 1963). In violation of an employment agreement, Fine revealed to
Colgate a formula which enabled Colgate to produce various brands of
shaving cream.
The general mle that a plaintiff in an accounting for prOfits may pick and choose
among accounting periods, and select those which are profitable, is subject to an
important limitation: He may do so only if the periods or transactions with
respect to a particular product are independent ofeach otller. Id at 407.
2. Same time periods, different products
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Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corporation, 139 A.2d 281
(N.J. 1958). Plaintiff instituted an action against its former employee and
others for trade secret misappropriation. Plaintiff sought an injunction
and an accounting. The judgment provided that Defendants account for
/Iall avails or profits" received by them in the manufacture and sale of
machines embodying the plaintiff's secrets.
And the Restatement . .. § 747, comment (d), sets forth that a sale resulting in a
loss may not generally be offset by an infringer against another and independent
sale resulting in a gain, but it expressly recognizes that an offset nmy be allowed
where the unprofitable sale was merely a necessary preliminary to the profitable
sales. The burden ofestablishing that he is entitled to the offset for losses is on the
wrongdoer and it is eqlJ.itable that doubts be resolved against him; this is
acknowledged by both the primary and secondary authorities. Id. at 286 - 287.
J. Reduced operating costs
International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1957).
Plaintiff compiled an economic study of the factors to be considered in the water
transportation of liquefied petroleum gas, and possessed plans and specifications
for the conversion of a dry cargo vessel into one that might be used in the
transportation of the liquid gas. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant appropriated
the trade secrets when disclosed to it under circumstances creating a confidential
relationship.
The advantage enjoyed by defendant is to be l1leasured by the standnrd of comparison
method. This method contemplates the cOl1lparison ofthe cost oftransportation by means
of the use ofthe trade secret with a method ofaccomplishing th.e same result which would
have been open to defendnnt had he not appropriated the trade secret. Id. at 699.
The attempted distinction between profits and savings is wholly without nzerit. The
recooery in trade secret or infringement cases is denominated profits. Where the thing
appropriated or infringed is a process rather than a nzanufactured article, the profits are
simply measured by the savings determined by the standard of comparison computation.
Id. at 702.
The interest on the capital the appropriator invests in his endeavor is allowed in an effort
to arrive at a realistic deternzination of the actual costs in the standilrd of comparison
analysis. This is a practical business problem to be solved by a method as accurate as
possible, and tile disallowance of interest would merely distort the actualities of the
money expended. Id. at 702.
K. Reduced R&D costs
Salsbury Laboratories, Inc. v. Merieux Laboratories, Inc., 908 F.2d 706 (11th Cir.
Georgia 1990). Poultry vaccine manufacturer brought action against competitor
and two former employees for misappropriation of trade secrets. Initially the
trial court awarded damages for plaintiff's lost profits, but later amended its
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order, instead basing the measure of damages on the $52,000 gain to Merieux. In
addition, the district court found that Salsbury had spent over $1 million
researching and developing MG-BAC and more than $2 million marketing and
advertising the vaccine, for a total of $3 million. Of that amount, the court
awarded Salsbury $1 million, representing the savings in research, development
and marketing Marieux enjoyed as a result of misappropriating Salsbury's trade
secrets.
On appeal, the appellate court vacated the $52,000 award, but upheld the $1
million award.
L. Defendants' Salary
Harry R. Defier Co. v. Kleeman, 243 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1963). Action against former
employees for injunction and damages arising from conspiracy to exploit, in
competition with plaintiff, confidential information disclosed to them for
purposes of their employment.
An employee whose actions are disloyal to the interests ofhis employer forfeits his right
to compensation for seroices rendered by him and ifhe is paid without knowledge ofhis
disloyalty he may be compelled to return lohat he has improperly received. Id. at 938.
M. Discovery Issues
1. People to interview:
a. Defendant's accounting personnel
b. Defendant's sales managers
c. Defendant's and plaintiff's research and development personnel
2. Relevant records:
a. Defendant's monthly financial statements
b. Defendant's sales reports and invoices
c. Defendant's management cost reports
d. Defendant's and plaintiff's research and development cost reports
V. Reasonable Royalty
A. When relevant
Vitro Corporation of America v. Hall Chemical Company, 202 F.2d 678 (6th Cir.
1961). Hall and Vitro discussed a proposed agreement for the use by Vitro of a
process constituting a trade secret of Hall and thereafter 1/agreed in principle" to
the terms of a proposed agreement. Later, after Hall disclosed its trade secrets to
Vitro, Vitro notified Hall that it no longer wished to purchase any rights in the
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Hall process and soon after commenced to use, with only slight variations, a
portion of the Hall process.
To adopt a reasonable royalty as a meaSllre ofdamages is to adopt and interpret as well as
may be the fiction that a license was to be granted at the time of the infringement and
then to detennine what the license price should have been. In effect, the Court assumes
the existence ab initio ofand declares the equitable tenns ofa supposititious license and
does this nunc pro tunc. It creates and applies retrospectively a compulsory license. The
primary inquiry is what the parties would have agreed upon if both were reasonably
trying to reach an agreement. Id. at 682 - 683.
Here, the master made findings to the effect not alone of the absence of prOOf of lost
profits, for there were no profits, but found there was no prOOfoflost sales (because oflost
invoices), and there were no standards ofcomparison. The proofs adequately support, as
an equitable measure ofdamages, established rOlJalties, the payments agreed upon in the
"agreement in prindple." This is the best evidence. It is but the utilization ofwhat was
agreed upon as compensation in the event that a firm contract would be executed. The
cases hold that a reasonable rOlJalhJ furnishes a basis for an award only when there are no
solid conditions governing the application ofan "agreement in prindple. Id. at 683.
Laurie Visual Etudes v. Chesebrough-Pond's, 432 N.Y.S.2d 457 (N.Y. 1980).
Plaintiff brought action for injunction and money damages based upon alleged
misappropriation of trade secrets.
As for the appropriate measure ofmoney damages, the cases have pernlitted recovery of
the investment made. Because of the intensive tnarketing efforts ofChesebrough together
with the additional improvements it provided, neither of these is proper here. Despite its
own efforts, Laurie never had the capadty or knowledge profitably to market its device.
Plaintiffs counsel conceded in summation that the fixation of a fair royalty would be
acceptable relief. The cou,rt agrees, and fixed the proper royalty at 10% ofgross sales. Id.
at 463.
B. Factors considered in Determining a Reasonable Royalty
Vitro Corporation of America v. Hall Chemical Company, 202 F.2d 678 (6th Cir.
1961). Pecuniary loss in any event can be determined only by reasonable approximation.
The actual value ofwhat has been appropriated is always tIle ultimate in appraisement. If
actual value can be ascertained by a reasonable apportionment of profits and damages
that course should be pursued. But if this cannot be accomplished the nature of the
invention, its utility and advantages and extent of use involved are elements to be
considered in detennining a reasonable royalty. Id. at 683.
Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Company, 452 F.2d 621 (Wi. 1971).
Action for misappropriation of Plaintiff's trade secret.
Both parties agree that the "reasonable royalty" method of computing damages was
properly invoked. According to that tllethod, the primary inquiry is fixing a reasonable
royalty is "what the parties would have agreed upon, if both were reasonably trying to
reach an agreement." Id. at 627
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The basis for an award of damages should be as explicit as the method ofcalculating the
damages perlnits, but the reasonable royalty method used in this case is not anlenable to a
completely mathenuztical articulation. Here the master considered tIle factors ofForest's
loss of profits, its profits prior 1964, and its claimed cost of developtuent, and to these
factors he assigned values supported by ample evidence. But the master also correctly
considered other factors not susceptible of precise valuation, such as Forest's ability to
continue in the tablet-producing business, the nature of the trade secret, its utility, and
advantages and extent ofuse. . .. And, of course, the commercial posture of the parties
must have entered into the master's picture. Because ofthe type offactors considered and
the necessarily judgnzental process involved in constructing a hypothetical business
agreement, we cannot fault any lack ofspecificity in arriving at what must necessarily be
a reasonable approximation. Id.
c. Discovery Issues
1. People to interview:
a. Plaintiff's and defendant's accounting personnel
b. Plaintiff's and defendant's sales managers
c. Plaintiff's and defendant's research and development personnel
d. Defendant's cu~tomers (survey)
e. Plaintiff's operations managers
2. Relevant records:
a. Plaintiff's and defendant's customer lists
b. Plaintiff's and defendant's monthly financial statements
c. Plaintiff's and defendant's sales reports and invoices
d. Defendant's management cost reports
e. Plaintiff's and defendant's research and development cost reports
f. Plaintiffs' manufacturing records and capacity reports
g. Plaintiff's and defendant's product literature
VI. Other Issues
}\. Interest
San Manuel Copper Corporation v. R. Redmond, 445 P.2d 162 (}\z. 1968).
The plaintiffcontends that he is entitled to interest on the amount and we agree, as a suit
for unjust enrichment is based on the theory that the defendant has obtained or retained
money that should have been paid over to the plaintiff. As part of the datnages interest
should ron from the time of the infringement on the amount and the jury may be so
instrocted. Id. at 169.
let Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 385 N.E.2d 1349 (Mass. 1979).
Here, the plaintiffs have been awarded the entirety oftlte defendants' net corporate prOfits
from 1964 to 1975. This award is nlade because it is impossible for the defendants to
segregate the portion of their prOfits which is attributable to the nlisappropriated trade
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secrets from the portion of their profits which may be attribl~table to other factors. Thus,
it is likely that Plaintiffs may recover more than his exact loss. In these drcunlstances,
we do not think that the plaintiffs will be unfairly deprived ofcompensation or th.at the
defendants will be "unjl-lstly enriched if they are not required to pay interest on the total
profits so awarded." Id. at 1363.
B. Punitive Damages
Mangren Research & Development v. National Chemical Co., 87 F.3d 937 (7th Cir.
1996) The ITSA authorizes exetnplary damages of up to twice the amount of
compensatory damages if there was a "willful and malicious misappropriation."
Although we have found no Illinois case interpreting that phrase, it surely must include
an intentional nzisappropriation as well as a misappropriation resulting from the
conscious disregard of the rights of others. The jury found a willful and malidous
lnisappropriation here and awarded exemplary damages to the full extent pernlitted
under the statute. Id. at 946.
Davis v. Eagle Products, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. App. 1986) Eagle's argument
is that since a breach of trust was involved in this case, public policy would favor the
imposition ofpunitive danmges. . .. Those cases involved breaches oftrust with members
of the public by a building contractor and an insurance contpany. By contrast, the
instant case did not involve a breach by one who occupies a position of trust with
members of the public rath.er it was restricted to tlte etnployee and enzployer context.
With that distinction in mind, the trial court's decision does not seem unreasonable,
hence we will not disturb it. Id. at 1109.
Fremont Oil Company v. Marathon Oil Company, 192 N.E.2d 123 (Ohio, 1963)
We are ofthe opinion that before the question ofpunitive damages may be sl~bmitted to a
Jury, the fraud, malice or insult connected with the tort must be actual and not
imaginative. ... In the case at bar, the Court cannot find that there is sufficient evidence
to indicate that the defendants acted through actual nzalice. And conseql~ently,
exemplary or punitive damages are not allowable and it further follows that Court
cannot, therefore, award any allowance/or attorney fees. Id. at 130 - 131.
c. Attorney's Fees
Carter Products, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Company, 214 F.Supp. 383 (D. Md.
1963). In actions for unfair competition, attorneys' fees are assessed as an element of
damages where the wrongdoers' action is unconsdonable, fraud-ulent, willful, in bad
faith, vexatious or exceptional. The many cases cited in the Local No. 149 opinion show
that these principles have been applied in various types ofcases. Id. at 414.
Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Company, 452 F.2d 621 (WI. 1971). Except
when averriding considerations ofjustice compel them, it is the policy offederal and state
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courts to deny attorneys' fees in the absence ofstatutory authorization or agreement. Id.
at 628.
Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., Inc., 378 F.Supp. 806 (E.D. PA. 1974) Thus, it
is unquestioned that a federal court may award counsel fees to a successful party when
his opponent has acted 'in bad faith, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. Id. at 817.
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SECTIOND
UNFAIR COMPETITION
Related Statutes and Common Law Business Torts}
I. UNFAIR COMPETITION:
A. Strict definition under Kentucky law: "passing off, or attempting to pass off,
upon the public the goods or business of one man as being the goods or
business or another." Newport Sand Bank Co. v. Monarch Sand Min. Co., 144
Ky. 7, 137 S.W. 784, 785 (1911); Acy v. Whaley, 281 Ky. 400, 136 S.W.2d 575
(1940).
1. Essentially, the law of trade mark and trade dress.
2. Purpose is "common business integrity"
a. "to prevent person from deceiving the people by passing off
on them some thing which they believe or might be led to
believe is another thing - an article of commerce or a business
ofprofessional service"
b. "to protect a developed property right and good will from
appropriation or injurious invasion by deceptive methods"
Acy v. Whaley, 281 Ky. 400, 402, 136 S.W.2d 575,577
(1940).
3. Limitations on "unfair competition" claims
a. Reverse engineering of non-patented items. Acy, 281 Ky. at
405, 136 S.W.2d at 578
b. Potential pre-emption of common law claims: K.R.S. 365.892:
KUTSA "replaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law
of this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a
trade secret." Auto Channel, Inc. v. Speedvision Network, LLC,
144 F. Supp. 2d 784 (W.D. Ky. 2001).
I © Copyright 2001, Jeffrey R. Teeters. This paper is presented for educational purposes to contribute to the
understanding ofthe law ofunfair competition. Neither the author, Frost Brown Todd, LLC, nor their present and future
clients, can be bound by the opinions, comments and interpretations expressed herein.
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• "idea misappropriation" pre-empted
• claims based solely on the misappropriation of trade
secret pre-empted
• disclosure/misuse of information under breach of contract
remains. K.R.S. 365.892(a)
B. "Unfair Competition" often used to describe broader common law concepts
1. Trade secrets
2. Duties of loyalty
3. Tortious Interference
4. Unfair Trade Practices
5. Consumer Protection Act
6. Antitrust
7. Non-competition covenants
8. Employee raiding
II. EMPLOYEE'S FIDUCIARY DUTY
A. Duty not to compete against employer.
1. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476
(1991 ):
a. Under Kentucky law, generally, in the absence of a contractual
provision to the contrary, corporation fiduciaries such as
directors and officers, are free to resign and form an enterprise
that competes with the corporation. However, directors and
officers may not set up, or attempt to set up, an enterprise
which is competitive with the business in which the
corporation is engaged while still serving as directors and
officers. See also DSG Corp. v. Anderson, 754 F.2d 678 (6th
Cir. 1985) (applying Kentucky law).
b. Role as an employee, officer, and director is "an established
basis of fiducial confidence." That duty includes a duty not to
"act against the employer's interest."
c. These findings were based upon policies of "honesty and fair
dealing" in commercial competition.
2. DSG Corp. v. Anderson, 754 F. 2d 678 (6th Cir. 1985) (applying
Kentucky law): employee must disclose to the employer any
information which could damage the company.
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3. Stewart v. Kentucky Paving Co. 557 S.W.2d 435 (Ky. App. 1977):
employee owes employer a duty of loyalty and faithfulness which
precludes the use of information obtained while an employee for
personal gain.
4. Aero Drapery ofKentucky, Inc. v. Engdahl, 507 S.W.2d 166 (Ky.
1974): employee cannot establish a competing business until after the
employment relationship is terminated.
5. Hoge v. Kentucky River Coal Co., 287 S.W. 226, 227 (Ky. 1926):
"everyone - whether designated agent, trustee, servant or whatnot -
who is under contract or other legal obligation to represent or act for
another in any particular business or for any valuable purpose must be
loyal and faithful to the interest of such other in respect to such
business . . . . He may not use any information that he may have
acquired by reason of his employment either for the purpose of
acquiring property or doing any act which is in opposition to his
principal's interest."
B. Duty of third parties
1. "a person who knowingly joins with or aid sand abets a fiduciary in an
enterprise constituting a breach of the fiduciary relationship becomes
jointly and severally liable with the fiduciary for any profits that may
accrue. Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 485.
• "a confidential relationship creates a fiduciary relationship."
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 486.
2. Attorneys advising employees, officers, directors: under some
circumstances, the attorney-client privilege may not be available to
shield discovery of materials related to an officer's for director's
activities to formulate a competing company in violation of the
officer/director's fiduciary duty. Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 487-88.
c. Potential Damages:
An employee may be liable to the employer for any gain derived by
establishing a competing interest without full disclosure to the employer,
even if the employer has suffered no loss. DSG Corp. v. Anderson, 754
F.2d 678, 682 (6th eire 1985) (applying Kentucky law).
D. Consider possible pre-emption by KUTSA
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III. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS AND CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS
A. Cause of action is recognized in Kentucky, following the elements set forth in
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 766B, 767, & 773.
• Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991).
• NCAA v." Hornung, 754 S.W.2d 855,857 (Ky. 1988).
• Cullen v. South East Coal Co., 865 S.W.2d 187 (Ky. App. 1983).
B. Elements: "interference with a known contractual relationship if the
interference is malicious or without justification, or is accomplished by some
unlawful means such as fraud, deceit, or coercion."
• Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc. 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991).
• Derby Road Building Co. v. Commonwealth, 317 S.W.2d 891 (1958).
• Brooks v. Patterson, 234 Ky. 757,29 S.W.2d 26 (1930).
C. Factors that Courts are to review in analyzing claims:
1. the nature of the actor's conduct,
2. the actor's motive,
3. the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,
4. the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
5. the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and
the contractual interests of the other,
6. the proximity or renl0teness of the actor's conduct to the interference,
and
7. the relations between the parties.,
4 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1979), §767; Hornung, 754
S.W.2d at 858.
D. "Intent" and "Wrongful"
1. Plaintiff must show malice or some significantly wrongful conduct.
Hornung, 754 S.W.2d at 859.
2. Breach of a fiduciary duty is equivalent to fraud for purposes of
determining if actions were wrongful. Steelvest, 807 S. W.2d at 487.
3. "Malice" may be inferred from proof of lack ofjustification.
Hornung, 754 S.W.2d at 859.
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E. Burdens of Proof:
1. Plaintiff must prove that the interference was improper.
2. Defendant has burden ofproof for defense that it acted in good faith to
assert a legally protected interest of its own. Hornung, 754 S.W.2d at
858.
IV. UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT
A. Price discrimination -- K.R.S. 365.020
1. Prohibition: No person engaged in the production, manufacture,
distribution or sale of any commodity, product, service, or output of a
service trade, with the intent to destroy competition, shall discriminate
in price between different sections, communities, cities, or portions or
locations therein
2. Intent to destroy competition is key element. Kentucky Utilities Co. v.
Carlisle Ice Co., 279 Ky. 585,131 S.W.2d 499 (1939).
3. Allowances in trade terms permitted for:
a. grade or quality
b. actual cost of transportation
B. Sales below cost - K.R.S. 365.030
1. Prohibition: No person engaged in business in Kentucky shall sell,
offer for sale, or advertise for sale any article or product, or service or
output of a service trade, at less then the cost thereof for the purpose of
injuring competitors and destroying competition.
V. CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT -- K.R.S. 367.110 et seq.
A. Prohibition: Unfair, false, misleading or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce. K.R.S.367.170(1).
1. Proof of actual deception is not required. Telcom Directories, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 848 (Ky. App. 1991).
2. Pyramid schemes. Date to Be Great, Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rei.
Hancock, 511 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1974).
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B. Key definitions
1. "Person" = natural person, corporation, trusts, partnerships,
incorporated or unincorporated association or any other legal entity.
K.R.S.367.110(1).
2. "Trade" or "commerce" = advertising, offering for sale, or distribution
ofany services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal
or mixed, an d any other article, commodity, or thing of value, and
shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the
people of this Commonwealth." 367.110 (2).
3. "Unfair" shall be construed to mean "unconscionable." K.R.S.
367.170(2).
VI. ANTITRUST
A. Prohibitions:
1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in this Commonwealth is
unlawful. K.R.S.367.175(1).
2. Monopolize or attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce of this Commonwealth. K.R.S.367.175(2).
B. Case law interpretation: statute has been interpreted to be identical to the
Sherman Antitrust Act.
• Borg-Warner Protective Services Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946
F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Ky. 1996), af!'d, 156 F.3d 1228 (6th Cir.
1998).
c. Limitations on scope:
1. Restrictive covenants on land
2. Employee restrictive covenants
3. Compare California approach, wherein essentially same statutory
language is used to void employee non-co~petes.
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VII. COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT -- 18 U.S.C. §1030 et seq.
A. Prohibitions: accessing, transmitting, or altering computer information
without authorization or in excess of the person's authorization. The computer
being accessed must be used in interstate or foreign commerce.
B. Key terms:
(1) The term "computer" means "an electronic, magnetic, optical,
electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device
performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any
data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or
operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not
include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held
calculator, or other similar device." 18 U.S.C. §1030(e)(I).
(2) The term "protected computer" includes "a computer ... (A)
exclusively for the use of a financial institution ... or (B) which is
used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication." 18 U.S.C.
§1030(e)(2).
(3) The term "exceeds authorized access" means "to access a computer
with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information
in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter."
18 U.S.C. §1030(e)(6).
(4) The term "damage" means "any impairment to the integrity or
availability of data, a program, a system, or information, that-
(A) causes loss aggregating at least $5,000 in value during any 1-
year period to one or more individuals;
(B) modifies or impairs, or potentially modifies or impairs, the
medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of one or more
individuals;
(C) causes physical injury to any person; or
(D) threatens public health or safety." 18 U.S.C. §1030(e)(8).
C. Remedies
1. Compensatory damages
2. Injunctions and "other equitable relief'
3. Criminal penalties include fines and up to 20 years in prison.
D. Recent case law interpretation:
1. United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2000): former
employee's access to and alteration of accounts, billing system, and
internal databases.
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2. Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard SelfStorage, Inc., 119 F.
Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000): employee, while planning to leave
for a competitor, collected and disseminated information including
sending e-mails with trade secret and proprietary information.
3. YourNetDating, LLC v. Mitchell, 88 F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. Ill. 2000):
temporary restraining order issued against a computer programmer
alleged to have hacked into his former employer's dating service
website to divert customers to a sexually explicit website of his new
employer.
VIII. OTHER RELATED CRIMINAL STATUTES
A. Unlawful access to computers -- K.R.S. 434.850
1. Prohibitions: "A person is guilty of unlawful access to a computer in
the second degree when he ,vithout authorization knowingly and
willfully, directly or indirectly accesses, caus~s to be accessed, or
attempts to access any computer software, computer program, data,
computer, computer system, computer network, or any part thereof."
K.R.S.434.850(1).
2. Private/civil cause of action not explicitly provided
3. Criminal penalties
4. Neighboring states have similar criminal statutes
a. Ohio = O.R.C. §2913.04
b. Tennessee = Tenn. Code Ann. §39-14-602.
B. Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §1831-39
1. Prohibitions:
(A) with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to or
included in a product
(B) that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce,
(C) to the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner tllereof,
and
(D) intending or knowing that the offense will injure any owner of
that trade secret,
knowingly--
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries
away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception
obtains such information;
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(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws,
photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys,
photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails,
communicates, or conveys such information;
(3) receives, buys, or possesses such information, knowing the
same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or
converted without authorization;
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1)
through (3); or
(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any
offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or
more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspIracy.
2. Remedies
A. Monetary fines or imprisonment of not more than 10 years, or both.
B. No private right of action is permitted.
C. The Attorney General has authority to seek injunctive relief.
IX. SOURCE AND RESEARCH MATERIALS
A. "Unfair Competition," by Business Laws, Inc. (loose leafbinder)
B. D. McClelland & J. Forgy, "Is Kentucky Law 'Pro-Business' in its Protection
of Trade Secrets, Confidential and Proprietary Information? A Practical
Guide for Kentucky Businesses and their Lawyers." 24 N. KY. L Rev. 229
(1997).
C. "Covenants Not to Compete, A State-by-State Survey," ABA Section of
Labor and Employment Law.
D. Pooley et aI, "Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996," 5 Tex.
Intellectual Prop. J. (1997).
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SECTIONE
PREFACE: Where Did Trademarks and Trademark Lalv Come From -
A. "A Page of History ..."
B. Trademark Law As a Part of the Greater Law ofUnfair Competition
And Who Cares, Anyway?
c. Impact Upon "General Business Practice"
1. Time is of the essence . . .
2. A rose is not a rose ...
D. Significance of Trademark Matters
1. In the business context
2. In the legal context
1. WHAT (EXACTLY) ARE "TRADEMARKS"?
A. Definitions (Short List)
1. "Trademark" - word, name, symbol, or device used to indicate the source
of goods (not the type or nature of the goods)
a. Examples: OLD GRAND DAD bourbon; DELL computers;
XEROX photocopiers; LUVS paper diapers; BEN & JERRY'S ice
cream
2. "Service Mark" - word, name, symbol, or device used to indicate the
source of services (not the type or nature of the services)
a. Examples: SHOWCASE cinemas; GREYHOUND bus lines;
CENTURY 21 real estate services; GIANT grocery stores;
CINCINNATI REDS baseball entertainment services
3. "Trademarks" come in a variety of types - two-dimensional (ordinary
formats or traditional packaging "trade dress"), three-dimensional
(traditional packaging "trade dress" or modem product configuration
"trade dress"), even non-dimensional (such as a single color, a particular
scent, or a series of sounds).
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4. "Trade Dress" - traditionally, the packaging and labeling of a product;
now extends to the shape/design of the product itself
a. The Metamorphosis to Modem Trade Dress
(1) Sears/Compco stunned modem product simulation
(2) The shifting sands ofLanham Act Section 43(a)
(3) The expansion to "Service Dress"
(4) The role of registration
(5) The role/rule of inherent distinctiveness
b. The Primacy of Functionality
(1) The great sea ofcompetition
(2) Exceptional islands afloat in the great sea
(3) Functionality as the equator
B. Functions of Trademarks/Service Marks
1. Identification of the source of goods and/or services
2. Guarantee of the constancy ,of the quality of goods/services sold under the
mark
3. Repository of the good will and springboard for advertising of
goods/services, including commercially significant collateral
merchandising (licensing)
c. Requirements for Establishing Trademarks/Service Marks
1. Select a strong mark at the outset
a. Consult with advertising personnel, name development firms, and,
preferably, with a knowledgeable trademark lawyer
b. Inherently strong marks are "fanciful" (coined): e.g., KODAK
film, KLEENEX tissues, HUMANA hospital; or "arbitrary"
(meaning is unrelated to chosen use): e.g., ARROW shirts,
DOMINO's pizza, APPLE computers; or "suggestive"
(imagination needed to be sure of meaning of reference): e.g.,
FRESHER COOKER restaurants, GREYHOUND bus lines,
COPPERTONE tanning lotion
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c. Initially weak marks are "descriptive" in one way or another:
THRIFTY RENT-A-CAR, CHAPSTICK lip balm; or surnames or
personal names: e.g., TAYLOR wine, FORD automobiles, JOE'S
BAR; or geographical terms: e.g., AMERICAN AIRLINES,
CINCINNATI INSURANCE, GEORGETOWN HOSPITAL;
these become protectible (if at all) only upon acquisition of
"secondary meaning" (acquired distinctiveness)
d. Generic terms directly name the product rather than its producer:
e.g., "Shredded Wheat" cereal, "PC," for personal computers,
"Murphy" beds; "Aspirin" analgesic; these are no good, either
initially or later on, regardless ofhow much effort is invested
2. "Clear" the mark early on
a. In-office computer database search, e.g., TRADEMARKSCAN
databaSe (federal and state)
b. Internet search; e.g., SITECOMBER database, or search engines
c. Outside professional company database search (Federal Register,
state registries, and/or common law and trade name searches)
d. Review and recommendation by a knowledgeable trademark
lawyer
3. "Adopt" the Mark and Either Use It (Intrastate or Interstate) or Apply to
Register It Federally
a. Apply the mark to labels on the goods (trademark) or include it in
advertisements for the services (service mark) and use the mark in a
true commercial fashion (at least intrastate) - it must be used "in
commerce" (interstate) in order to be federally registered; or
b. File an application to register the mark on the federal Principal
Register based on a "bona fide" intent to use the mark in
"commerce" in the foreseeable future
2. FEDERAL REGISTRATION OF TRADEMARKS
A. Why Is It Done?
1. "Constructive Use" - temporary and conditional nationwide effect resulting
from filing of an application for Principal Register in the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office - avoids claims of "innocent" later adoption by others
nationwide
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2. "Constructive Notice" - permanent nationwide effect occurring upon
issuance of a Principal Register registration - avoids claims of "innocent"
later adoption by others nationwide
3. Presumptions of validity, registration, ownership, and exclusive rights in
registrant upon issuance ofPrincipal Register registration
4. Increased ability to block registration of confusingly similar marks of
competitors
5. Ability to block importation of goods bearing the same or confusingly
similar marks
6. Eligibility for "incontestable" status (and resulting augmented
presumptions, etc.)
7. Protection against state dilution laws per § 43(c)(3): Ownership of a valid
federal registration completely bars an action, with respect to that mark,
under a state's dilution statute or common law.
8. Appearance in others' search reports
B. Ho,v Is It Done?
1. Application
a. heading information
b. applicant's name, etc.
c. mode of use
d. description of goods/services
e. dates of use (or statement of"bona fide" intent to use)
f. specimens (except for lTV applications)
g. power of attorney
h. verification
2. PTO examination: Office Actions
3. Trademark Attorney Interviews
4. Responses and Amendments
5. Appeal, ifnecessary, to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
6. Publication in Official Gazette
7. Opposition proceedings before Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, and
appeal, ifnecessary, to a federal court
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8. Notice ofAllowance (ITU applications only)
a. Amendment to Allege Use/Statement of Use
b. Specimens
9. Issuance ofregistration and certificate thereof
C. How Is It Maintained - Legally?
1. Use of registration symbol (® or "Reg. U.S.P.T.O·.")
2. Ten-year, renewable term (combined with AffidavitlDeclaration ofUse)
3. AffidavitlDeclaration of Use - in 6th year
4. Incontestability AffidavitlDeclaration - in 6th year or later
5.. PTO cancellation proceedings (on any basis for 5 years)
6. Litigation in the courts
D. Ho\v Is It Maintained - Practically?
1. Avoid non-use of the mark coupled with an intent not to resume ~se of it
2. Use mark as a proper adjective only; use a generic noun along with it
3. Contract for and exercise "quality control" over licensees' use of mark
and pertinent goods/services
4. Informally/formally police others' uses of mark/confusingly similar marks
3. ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERALLY REGISTERED MARKS
A. The Basic Standard - "Likelihood of Confusion"
1. Confusion of source or sponsorship is the focal point; confusion of
goods/services rarely is involved - except regarding counterfeiting
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2. Factors to be considered:
a. strength of senior user's mark (inherent and marketwise)
b. similarity of appearance, pronunciation, meaning and suggestion of
the parties' marks
c. similarity of the parties' goods/services
d. closeness ofuse and manner of the parties' marketing/advertising
e. degree of care likely to be exercised' in the purchasing decision
(herein of sophistication of purchases and speed/care of decision-
making)
f. similarity of "presentation" of the marks and of the trade dress
accompanying the marks
g. presence (or absence) of actual confusion - where relevant
h. intent of junior user - to take a free ride? - to imitate marketable
features? - to imitate functional features?
B. Geographical Overlap Situations
1. Complex common law rules still apply where constructive use or
constructive notice do not resolve the problem
a Basically, senior user prevails ("prior in time is prior in right")
b. Except as against a "remote and innocent" junior user
c. Remoteness is based on market presence
2. Federal registrant is entitled to entire country
a. Except where there's a prior user
b. Except for limited enforcement per Dawn Donut
3. Concurrent registrations possible under Lanham Act § 2(d)
4. Caveat: Internet may change everything!
c. Available Remedies
1. Injunctive relief (interlocutory and/or permanent)
2. Damages (possibly trebled)
3. Profits (possibly augmented)
4. Effect ofequitable defenses (even as against "incontestable" marks)
5. Attorney fees in "exceptional cases"
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6. Court costs typically awarded
7. Destruction of infringing labels, etc.
8. Extraordinary injunctive and monetary remedies for "counterfeiting"
4. HOW ABOUT OTHER RIGHTS?
A. Lanham Act § 43(a) - as clarified by Trademark Law Revision Act in 1989
1. So-called "federal unfair competition law" clearly includes protection
against infringement ofunregistered marks
2. "False designation oforigin" - broadly defined
3. Federal jurisdiction without "diversity" or minimum amount involved
4. Lanham Act test of"infringement" (likelihood ofconfusion) applies
5. Lanham Act remedies - injunctive and monetary; beware equitable defenses
6. No constructive notice, presumptions, incontestability, stoppage at borders
B. Federal Trademark Dilution Act - effective on January 16, 1996
1. New Lanham Act § 43(c); see also § 45, defining dilution as "the
lessening of the capacity of a famous mark'to identify and distinguish
goods and services"-
a. regardless ofpresence/absence ofcompetition
b. regardless of presence/absence of likelihood of confusion
2. "Famous" marks protected against blurring and tamishment
a. FTDA established factors for determining whether mark is
"famous"
(1) degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness
(2) duration and extent of use
(3) geographical extent of trading area
(4) channels of trade
(5) degree of recognition of the mark
(6) third party use
(7) registration
b. Factors frequently misconstrued as "dilution" factors
3. No registration required (remarkably)
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4. Not preemptive of state laws, but not hampered by them, either
5. State dilution laws preempted as against federal registrations
6. Not actionable under § 43(c):
a. fair use in comparative commercial advertising
b. noncommercial use
c. news reporting and commentary
C. State Statutory Law .
1. Model State Trademark Bill (U.S.T.A./I.N.T.A.)
a. spread: about 40 states
b. approach: like Lanham act, but without its real advantages
2. Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (N.C.C.U.L.)
a. spread: about 10 states
b. approach: somewhat like Lanham Act, but without its real
advantages .
c. remedies: injunctive only
3. Dilution Laws
a. spread: about 30 states by statute; only 1 state (Ollio), perhaps, by
common law
b. strength-based rather than confusion-based
c. only famous and very strong marks are protected
D. State Common La\v
1. "Old reliable"
2. Rarely relied upon
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Monetary Recovery in
Trademark Infringement Disputes
Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)
I. Statutory Language
. . . the plaintiff shall be entitled . . . subject to the principals of equity . . . to recover (1)
defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.
The court shall assess such profits and damages or cause the same to be assessed under its
direction. In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant's sales only;
defendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed. In assessing damages the court
may enter judgment, according to the circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount
found as actual damages, not exceeding three times such amount. ... If the court shall find that
the amount of the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the court may in its
discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the
circumstances of the case. Such sum in either of the above circumstances shall constitute
compensation and not a penalty. The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney
fees to the prevailing party.
II. Defendants' profits
A. Theories of recovery
1. Compensatory damages
2. Deterrence
3. Unjust enrichment
B. Equitable considerations for the award of defendants' profits
1. Are plaintiff's damages measurable and adequate?
BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 1081 (C.A.7 1994). BASF
brought action for false advertising for statements Old World Trading Co.
made concerning the alleged high quality of its antifreeze. The District
court awarded BASF $2.5 Million in lost profits, but refused to award
BASF the profits of Old World Trading Co.
Disgorgement initially developed as a remedy to provide a plaintiff relief in
equity, to serve as a proxy for damages, or to deter the wrongdoer from
continuing his violations. . .. The variety ofcircumstances in which a court may
award disgorgement by no means indicate that the district court is required to
award disgorgement. Contrary to BASF's assertions that disgorgement is the
"norm" in a Lanham Act case, disgorgement is most appropriate if damages are
otherwise nominal. . .. While damages directly measure the plaintiffs loss,
F -1
defendant's profits measure the defendant's gain. Thus, an accounting may
overcompensate for a plaintiffs actual injury and create a windfall judgment at
the [defendant'sl expense. ld. at 1095 -1096.
2. Is injunction a sufficient remedy?
Square D Co. v. Sorenson, 224 F2d 61 (C.A.7 1955). Action for damages and
injunction relief against Sorenson's use, in connection with certain
products, of a mark consisting of a capital D enclosed in a rectangle.
An accounting will not be ordered merely because there has been an
infringement. ... under the present act, an accounting has been denied where an
injunction will satisfy the equities of the case. The same is true in the case of
unfair competition. . .. From all the facts we find that the likelihood ofdamage to
plaintiff or profit to defendants due to any misrepresentation seems slight, and
that in view of these various circumstances the U injunction will satisfy the
equities of the case." Id. at 65 - 66.
3. Was infringement willful or were defendant's actions malicious?
WSM, Inc. v. Tennessee Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084 (C.A.6 1983). WSM
brought an action against a manufacturer of T-shirt transfers for
infringement of a registered trademark and for unfair competition.
Wrongful intent need not, and ordinary cannot, be established by direct evidence,
but may be inferred from defendant's acts. . .. Here, TS was aware of WSM's
mark, yet with an infinite variety of non-similar designs available, it chose a
virtually identical design, knowing that it intended to sell that design on
identical goods in the same channels of trade as that in which WSM's mark
moved. It is reasonable to infer therefrom that TS intended to deceive the public
concerning the origin of the goods. The district court thus properly awarded
profits to WSM. Id. at 1087.
Georze Basch Co., Inc. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532 (C.A.2 1992),
certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 510, 506 U.S. 991, 121 L.Ed.2d 445. George
Basch Co., a manufacturer of metal polish brought action alleging trade
dress infringement. The district court awarded the plaintiff $200,000 in
defendant's profits and injunctive relief.
Compensatory Damages: [Ulnder the "damages" theory of profits, a
plaintiff typically has been required to show consumer confusion resulting from
the infringement. . .. Whether a plaintiff also had to show willfully deceptive
conduct on the part of the defendant is not so clear. While some courts "reject
good faith as a defense to an accounting for profits," ... others have concluded
that a defendant'S bad faith is the touchstone ofaccounting liability. Id. at 1539.
Deterrence: [Al court may award a defendant'S profits solely upon a finding
that a defendant fraudulently used the plaintiffs mark. . .. The rationale
underlying this holding is not compensatory in nature, but rather seeks to
protect the public at large. By awarding the profits ofa bad faith infringer to the
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rightful owner of a mark, we promote the secondary effect of deterring public
fraud regarding the source and quality ofconsumer goods and services. Id.
Unjust Enrichment: [AJ defendant becomes accountable for its profits when the
plaintiff can show that, were it not for defendant's infringement, the defendant's
sales would otherwise have gone to the plaintiff. At bottom, this is simply
another way offormulating the element ofconsumer confusion required to justify
a damage award under the Lanham Act. As such, it follows that a profits award,
premised upon a theory of unjust enrichment, requires a showing of actual
consumer confusion - or at least proof of deceptive intent so as to raise the
rebuttable presumption ofconsumer confusion. Id. at 1538.
Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportman's Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (C.A.2 2000),
certiorari denied 120 S.Ct. 2719, 147 L.Ed.2d 984. Sporty's Farm brought
declaratory judgment action against Sportman's Market, a catalog
company, seeking a declaration of its right to use the "sportys.com"
domain name. Sportman's Market brought counterclaims for a number
of actions including trademark infringement under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA).
Under the FTDA, "[tJhe owner of the famous mark shall be entitled only to
injunctive relief unless the person against whom the injunction is sought
willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the
famous mark." . .. Accordingly, where willful intent to dilute is demonstrated,
the owner of the famous mark is - subject to the principles ofequity - entitled to
recover (1) damages (2) the dilutor's profits, and (3) costs. Id. at 500.
4. Did trademark create demand for defendant's sales?
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. 5.5. Kresze Co., U.S. 1942, 62 S.Ct.
1022, 316 U.S. 203, 86 L.Ed. 1381, rehearing denied 62 S.Ct. 1287, 316 U.S.
712, 86 L.Ed. 1777. Plaintiff brought a trademark infringement action
against defendant in connection with defendant's use of a red circular
plug embedded into the heel of shoes.
If it can be shown that the infringement had no relation to profits made by the
defendant, that some purchasers bought goods bearing the infringing mark
because of the defendant's recommendation or his reputation or for any reason
other than a response to the diffused appeal of the plaintiffs symbol, the burden
of showing this is upon the poacher. The plaintiff of course is not entitled to
profits demonstrably not attributable to the unlawful use of his mark. . .. The
burden is the infringer's to prove that his infringement had no cash value in sales
made by him. If he does not do so, the profits made on sales ofgoods bearing the
infringing mark properly belong to the owner of the mark. Id. at 1024 - 1025.
5. Were parties competitors?
Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Perfect Fit Products Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389 (C.A.2
1965), certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 1195, 383 U.S. 942, 15 L.Ed.2d 206.
Monsanto Chemical Co. produces an acrylic fiber, which it marketed
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under the registered trademark "Acrilan." The defendant deliberately
infringed this mark by selling mattress pads falsely labeled as Acrilan-
filled.
We do not hold that it is irrelevant whether the parties are in direct competition;
compensation for diverted trade is one important purpose which an accounting
may serve. To restrict accountings to this single purpose, however, fails to take
account of the other purposes served by the trademark law. Under the
circumstances of this case, a judgment limited to an injunction is clearly
inadequate to deter those who deliberately engage in commercial piracy which
defrauds thousands of consumers and injures a trade name built up at
considerable cost by legitimate means. Id. at 397.
6. Were sales in same geographic market?
Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refininz Co., 213 F.2d 354 (C.A.I0 1954). Frontier
Refining Co. brought a trademark infringement action against Blue Bell
for its unauthorized use of such trademarks as "Rarin' To Go," "Frontier"
and "Gas."
Out of the welter of confusion occasioned by the judicial effort to fashion a
remedy which would satisfy both legal and equitable concepts ofappropriate relief
for patent and trademark infringements, the courts have now settled on the
theory that a trademark infringer is liable as a trustee for profits accruing from
his illegal acts, even though the owner of the mark was not doing business in the
consuming market where the infringement occurred. Id. at 362 - 363.
7. Did Plaintiff abandoned market?
Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co., 213 F.2d 354 (C.A.I0 1954). Frontier
Refining Co. brought a trademark infringement action against Blue Bell
for its unauthorized use of such trademarks as "Rarin' To Go," "Frontier"
and "Gas."
Recovery is predicated upon the equitable principle ofunjust enrichment, not the
legal theory of provable damages. In the exercise of its discretion, the trial court
may refuse to award prOfits of the infringer in unusual circumstances where the
owner has abandoned the trade territory in which the profits were realized, and
has shown no disposition to enter the field. Id. at 363.
C. Burdens of Proof
1. Plaintiffs: Defendants' sales
2. Defendants:
a. No casual connection
b. Apportionment
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c. Cost allocations and deductions
D. Apportionment
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen M&. Co. v. 5.5. Kresge Co., U.S. 1942, 62 S.Ct. 1022,
316 U.S. 203, 86 L.Ed. 1381, rehearing denied 62 S.Ct. 1287, 316 U.S. 712, 86 L.Ed.
1777. Plaintiff brought a trademark infringement action against defendant in
connection with the use of a red circular plug embedded into the heel of shoes
sold by defendant.
There may well be a windfall to the trademark owner where it is impossible to isolate the
prOfits which are attributable to the use of the infringing mark. But to hold otherwise
would give the windfall to the wrongdoer. In the absence ofhis proving the contrary, it
promotes honesty and comports with experience to assume that the wrongdoer who makes
profits from the sales ofgoods bearing a mark belonging to another was enabled to do so
because he was drawing upon the good will generated by that mark. Id. at 1025.
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., U.S. 1916, 36 S.Ct. 269, 240 U.S. 251,
60 L.Ed. 629. Plaintiff, a manufacturer of shoes, brought a trademark
infringement action against defendant for its use of the phrase IIAmerican Lady."
ITlhe profits recoverable should be limited to such amount as may be shown by direct and
positive evidence to be the increment ofdefendant's income by reason of the infringement,
and that the burden ofprOOf is upon complainant to show what part ofdefendant's profits
were attributable to the use of the infringing mark. . .. But, ... there is a recognized
exception where the plaintiff carries the burden of proof to the extent of showing the
entire profits, but is unable to apportion them, either because of the action of the
wrongdoer in confusing his own gains with those which belong to plaintiff, or because of
the inherent impossibility of making an approximate apportionment. There, "on
established principles ofequity, and on the plainest principles ofjustice, the guilty trustee
cannot take advantage ofhis own wrong." Id. at 272.
Anchor Stove & Range Co. v. Rymer, 97 F.2d 689 (C.A.6 1938), certiorari denied 59
S.Ct. 246, 305 U.S. 653, 83 L.Ed. 422, rehearing denied 59 S.Ct. 357, 305 U.S. 676,
83 L.Ed. 438. Plaintiff brought an unfair competition claim against defendant in
connection with sales of heaters to Montgomery Ward & Company of Chicago.
As are pointed out, when equity jurisdiction is rested upon some equitable ground, such
as the right to injunction, the court will retain it for the purpose of administering
complete relief rather than send the injured party to a court of law for damages, and the
infringer's profits are then allowed as an equitable measure ofcompensation on the theory
of a trust ex maleficio, and it is not fatal that the plaintiff is unable to show what
proportion of the prOfit is due to the trademark or the patent and what to the intrinsic
value of the commodity, for ... "it is more consonant with reason and justice that the
owner of the trademark should have the whole profit than that he should be deprived of
any part of it by the fraudulent act of the defendant." ld. at 690.
F-5
E. Cost Deductions
1. Cost of goods sold - deductions at prices paid
Dickinson v. O.&W. Thum Co., 8 F.2d 570 (C.A.6 1925). Dickinson brought
an unfair trade and competition action against Thum Company relating
to such marks as "Tanglefoot."
Certain costs were deducted as to which no question arises. These consist of
manufacturing costs, salesmen traveling expenses, commissions, discount, office
salaries, collection expense, lost accounts, and rebates. Whether the method of
ascertaining these costs or the amount thereof is correct is therefore immaterial.
The master, however, wholly disallowed certain claimed items, viz. indirect labor,
fuel, building repairs, cartage, storage, insurance, general expense, taxes,
destroyed goods, and depreciation ofbuildings. Id. at 573 - 574.
He cast on the defendant the duty of proving these items and refused to allow
them, because defendant had wrongfully and unnecessarily confused the goods on
hand and the cost and expense ofmarketing them with its new goods and the cost
and expense of its general manufacturing and selling operations during the
accounting period. ... By failing to ... keep any records or accounts whereby the
selling cost and expense attributable to these goods could be separated from his
other operations, he brought himself with the principles of Westinghouse v.
Wagner. ... All the inconvenience and loss from the confusion is thrown upon
the party who produces it; and this rule applies, even though the innocent
victim I s share in the property wrongfully and inextricably commingled may
apparently be a small part of the total. Id. at 574.
2. Exception - internal transfer prices adjusted
3. Selling, general and administrative costs
a. Rules of thumb
1) All products infringe - full absorption approach
2) Some products infringe - cost allocation
3) Few products infringe - no deduction at all
b. Allocation approaches
1) "Sales ratio" method
Wolf v. National Lead Co., 272 F.2d 867 (C.A.9 1959)
certiorari denied 80 S.Ct. 860, 362 U.S. 950, 4 L.Ed.2d 868,
rehearing denied 80 S.Ct. 1235, 363 U.S. 809, 4 L.Ed.2d
1151. National Lead sued Wolf for trademark
infringement in connection with Wolf's use of the
trademark "Dutch."
F·6
The records kept by Wolfe and made available to appellee did not
contain data from which an accurate apportionment could be
made. Appellee, in ·the District Court, therefore proposed the
"sales-ratio" method: applying to the joint expense the ratio of
receipts from the sale of infringing goods to the total receipts.
Application of this ratio showed 64% of costs to be attributed to
"Dutch" products. This method is recognized as proper where a
more exact basis of apportionment is not available. Id. at 871 -
872.
2) The Tremolo line of cases
W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656 (C.A.2 1970).
Action for trademark infringement and unfair competition
in which plaintiff Bassett claims that defendant Revlon
violated the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 ... and the
laws of New York by using the mark "Cuti-Trim" for its
cuticle trimmer.
Subject to a determination of the reasonableness of the claimed
deductions, Revlon should be able to deduct from its net sales its
overhead, most of its operating expenses, and the federal income
taxes on the "Cuti-Trim" items. The only one of the claimed
deductions which Revlon should not be allowed is the over-
labeling expense, because Revlon should have to bear the cost of
correcting its own wrongdoing. Id. at 665.
fohn B. Stetson Co. v. Stephen L. Stetson Co., 58 F.Supp. 586
(S.D.N.Y. 1944). This was a suit to enjoin trademark
infringement and unfair competition. A final injunction
decree was entered in favor of plaintiff, and thereafter,
defendants were found in contempt of the decree.
As discussed hereafter, I find that defendant is entitled to a
reasonable deduction for salary paid to a reasonable deduction for
salary paid to Stephen L. Stetson, regardless of the fact that he is
responsible for the violation of the decree. . .. It also appeared
that the money paid to D. Bindelglass, aggregating $120, ...
was for services as an accountant and went, in part, into the
production of profits. . .. And certainly some part of the
expressage of$184.54 was similarly expended. Id. at 591.
Regis v. [aynes, 77 N.E. 774 (Mass. 1906). Regis brought a
trademark action against Jaynes for its use of the words
"Rex" and "Rexall" in connection with the sale of
medication.
The defendants in the case at bar appear to have been carrying on
a large business, and they did not offer to show that their general
expenses have been at all increased by their taking up the sale of
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"Rexall" goods. Since the filing of the plaintiffs' bill, as we have
already stated, their sale of these goods has been unlawful. To
allow them to charge upon the gross profits from these goods any
portion of the general expenses, which were not increased
thereby, would be to allow them to derive a direct advantage
from their own wrong. Id. at 777 - 778.
4. Cost of Capital
Lawrenceo-Williams Co. v. Societe Enfants Gombault Et Cie, 52 F.2d 774
(C.A.6 1931), certiorari denied 52 S.Ct. 406, 285 U.S. 549, 76 L.Ed. 940.
Gombault brought a trademark action against Lawrenceo-Williams Co.
The master's report does not segregate this three months' period, and with one
exception the criticisms made upon the whole accounting are, when restricted to
this three months' period, not of enough importance to justify discussion. The
exception is as to interest on capital. Under the facts interest should be allowed
as an expense of operation. The entire invested capital was used in the unitary
business which produced the profits. Id. at 778.
F. Setoff
1. Separate sales to separate customers
Tones Apparel Group, Inc. v. Steinman, 466 F.Supp. 560 (E.D.Pa. 1979).
Plaintiff sued defendant for infringement of plaintiff's registered
trademark "Jones New York."
It would be inequitable to saddle plaintiff with defendant's loss on the Singer
transaction, for the reason that defendant sold at a loss to Signer in order to
unload his inventory after belatedly realizing that the garments he had bought
from May were probably not authentic Jones pantsuits. ... And since a plaintiff
in a trademark action "is not looked upon as a 'quasi-partner of the infringer;'"
Jones should recover Steinman's $320 profit on the Dress Barn transaction
without having to set offany party of Steinman's loss on the Singer transaction.
Id. at 563.
2. Separate sales in different years
Wolf v. National Lead Co., 272 F.2d 867 (C.A.9 1959), certiorari denied 80
S.Ct. 860, 362 U.S. 950, 4 L.Ed.2d 868, rehearing denied 80 S.Ct. 1235, 363
U.S. 809, 4 L.Ed.2d 1151. National Lead sued Wolf for trademark
infringement in connection with Wolf's use of the trademark "Dutch."
It is clear, however that in the making of an accounting an infringer is not
permitted such a setoff. Mr. Justice Cardozo, in a case ofa patent infringement .
. . stated the principle as follows:
"The owner of the patent, in holding the infringers to an accounting, is
not confined to all or nothing. There may be an acceptance of
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transactions resulting in a gain with a rejection of transactions resulting
in a loss. Upon a statement ofan account, a patentee is not looked upon
as a 'quasi-partner of the infringers,' under a duty to contribute to the
cost of the infringing business as a whole. ... He is the victim ofa tort,
free at his own election to adopt what will help and discard what will
harm. Id. at 870.
G. Recovery Period
1. Deterrence theory
W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656 (C.A.2 1970). Action for
trademark infringement and unfair competition in which plaintiff Bassett
claims that defendant Revlon violated the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946
... and the laws of New York by using the mark "Cuti-Trim" for its
cuticle trimmer.
Revlon was found to have deliberately and fraudulently infringed Bassett's mark
. .. Accordingly, a full accounting is proper as a deterrent . .. and since Judge
Frankel did find deliberate infringement here, he should have granted Bassett an
accounting for all ofRevlon's profits on the "Cuti-Trim /I items, not just on those
sold after the preliminary injunction. It is essential to deter companies from
willfully infringing a competitor's mark, and the only way the courts can fashion
a strong enough deterrent is to see to it that a company found guilty of willful
infringement shall lose all its profits from its use of the infringing mark. Id. at
664.
2. Unjust enrichment theory
Stark Bros. Nurseries & Orchards Co. v. Start, U.s. 1921, 41 S.Ct. 221, 255
U.S. 50, 65 L.Ed. 496. Plaintiff brought trademark infringement action
against defendant for the use of the mark "Stark Trees."
The District Court found infringement and unfair competition, granted an
injunction, and made a decree for an account of profits from March 11, 1914,
when the infringement began, limiting the damages, however, to those suffered
after August 26, 1916, that being the date when the plaintiffgave the defendant
notice of the registration of the mark. Decree affirmed. Id.
H. Profits increased at courts' discretion.
III. Compensatory damages
A. Entitlement and equity
Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738 (C.A.7 1985). Otis
Clapp & Son, a seller of non-prescription pharmaceuticals in the institutional
medical market, brought an action for trademark infringement and unfair
competition.
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The award of lost profits in the face of evidence that the defendant lost money was an
exercise of the court's discretion and furthers the statute's goals by removing the profit
trademark infringements. The plaintiff fails to cite authority for his proposition that,
when increasing an award oflost profits to ensure that the aims ofjustice are fulfilled, the
district court must follow a particular mathematical formula for determining the amount
due. Id. at 744 -745.
Broan Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Associated Distributors, Inc., 923 F.2d 1232 (C.A.6 1991).
Broan Manufacturing Co., a manufacturer of trademarked bathroom fans
brought trademark infringement action against alleged infringers.
The decision whether to grant a declaratory judgment and more generally the decision
regarding the appropriate recovery to be afforded under the Lanham Act rests in the
sound discretion of the District Court. Id. at 1241.
1. State of mind of defendant
Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584 (C.A.7 1989). Louis Vuitton brought
action against retailer and its owners for trademark infringement, false
designation of origin, and unfair competition. The district court denied
Louis Vuitton's claim for monetary relief and Louis Vuitton appealed.
The principles of equity referred to in section 1117(a) do not in our view justify
withholding all monetary relief from the victim of a trademark infringement
merely because the infringement was innocent. . .. There is no evidence the
Vuitton or Gucci engaged in predatory discovery or otherwise abused the
litigation process. In these circumstances a plaintiff is entitled at the very least
to simple damages or to the defendants' profits. "Equity" is not a roving
commission to redistribute wealth from large companies to small ones. The
Lanham Act was not written by Robin Hood. Id. at 588 - 589.
Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America, 116 F.2d 708 (C.A.71941).
Aladdin Manufacturing Co. brought an action against Mantle for alleged
infringement of the trademark 1/Aladdin" upon portable electric lamps.
Courts have, in cases in which the action of the infringer was deliberate,
fraudulent and wanton, allowed damages in addition to profits. .. In the present
case the master concluded and we agree that the acts of the infringer were
wanton, willful and intentionally fraudulent, not only in infringement but also
in unfair competition. Id. at 716.
Nalpac, Ltd. v. Cornins Glass Works, 784 F.2d 752 (C.A.6 1986). Nalpac
brought a trademark infringement action against Corning Glass Works
for its use of the trademark "Common Scents."
Defendant now has agreed to cease using the mark, has not distributed the jars
for sometime and it seems to me that equity, subject to equity, the equitable
principles here weigh in favor ofgranting the permanent injunction but denying
monetary relief Id. at 755.
F ·10
2. Nature of goods.
Lambda· Electronics Corp. v. Lambda Technology, Inc., 515 F.Supp. 915
(D.C.N.Y. 1981). Senior user brought suit against junior user alleging that
the use of its trade names and logo constituted trademark infringement,
false designation of origin and diluted the distinctive quality of its marks.
[Al more stringent standard must be satisfied to justify the Court's ordering an
accounting or awarding damages or attorney's fees. In [citel, the Court of
Appeals for this Circuit held that neither damages nor an accounting are proper
in a case where the goods are noncompetitive unless (1) there was a diversion of
trade, and (2) the junior user acted in bad faith. . .. There is nothing in the
record to indicate that the requisite diversion of trade occurred here. Nor, as ...
does the Court find that Lambda Technology acted in bad faith or willfully.
Accordingly, there is no basis for the Court to order an accounting or to award
damages. Id. at 931.
B. Burden of Proof on Plaintiff
Anchor Stove & Ranze Co. v. Rymer, 97 F.2d 689 (C.A.6 1938), certiorari denied 59
S.Ct. 246, 305 U.S. 653, 83 L.Ed. 422, rehearing denied 59 S.Ct. 357, 305 U.S. 676,
83 L.Ed. 438. Plaintiff brought an unfair competition claim against defendant in
connection with sales of heaters to Montgomery Ward & Company of Chicago.
"When a plaintiff in a trademark or unfair competition case seeks to recover damages, the
burden is on him to prove by competent and sufficient evidence his lost sales, or that he
was compelled to reduce prices as the result ofhis competitor's wrongful conduct. There
is no presumption of law or of fact that a plaintiff would have made the sales that the
defendant made." ... Especially is this true when the alleged infringer sells his product
at a substantially lower price, for "It does not follow, because a party makes a purchase at
a lower price, that he would have bought the same article at a higher price." Id. at 691.
C. Components of Lost Profits
1. Lost unit sales
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. P.K. Sorren Export Co. Inc. of Florida, 546 F.Supp.
987 (S.D.Fla. 1982). Playboy Enterprises, Inc. (PEl) brought trademark
infringement action agai~st defendant for its dealing in counterfeit and
genuine wearing apparel bearing or sold under the PLAYBOY and the
RABBIT HEAD design marks.
In order to recover damages ... the plaintiff must show that it suffered actual
damages. . .. The mark owner's royalties are normally used as the measure of
damages, ... but the plaintiff must prove both lost sales and that the loss was
caused by defendant's actions. . .. Loss of reputation alone is insufficient to
justify a separate award ofdamages. . .. PEl has not demonstrated that it would
have made any of the sales which defendants made, or that defendants would
themselves have purchased authentic rabbit design shirts had they not acquired
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counterfeit shirts. Thus, PEl is not entitled to an award of damages separate
from an accounting for defendants' profits. Id. at 998.
Borg-Warner Corp. v. York-Shipley, Inc., 2932 F.2d 88 (C.A.71961), certiorari
denied 82 S.Ct. 381, 368 U.S. 939, 7 L.Ed.2d 338. Borg-Warner brought an
action on account against York-Shipley. York-Shipley counterclaimed for
trademark infringement for Borg-Warner's use of the term "York."
When defendant made its calculations as to damages, it gave no consideration as
to the great proportionate increase in the sale ofgas-fired furnaces. From 1948 to
1959, the period under consideration, sales of gas-fired units rapidly increased,
while the sale ofoiljired furnaces remained relatively stable. . .. There is also on
the record, evidence of several intervening causes of defendant's decline in
business in 1953 attributable to defendant or to causes other than plaintiff.
Consideration should be given to these factors. ld. at 95.
2. Lost market share
BASF Corp. v. Old World Tradin~ Co., 41 F3d 1081 (C.A.7 1994). BASF, a
producer of antifreeze, brought a claim against Old World Trading for
false advertising under the Lanham Act.
The district court's choice of market share analysis logically follows from its
findings that although prices drove some customers away from BASF, ordinary
market forces would have pulled some sales back had Old World competed fairly
in the market. We cannot conclude that the court erred by determining lost
profits according to market share. ld. at 1094.
3. Price erosion
4. Incremental costs
5. Increased operating costs
Century Distillin~ Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 86 F.Supp. 503
(D.C.Pa. 1949), adhered to 89 F.Supp. 684. Continental Distilling Corp.
sued Century Distilling Co. for trademark infringement.
However, Continental may be able to show that there was some additional
margin of expenditure for advertising which was made necessary or advisable
and was carried on for the purpose of counteracting the effect of the Dixie Dew
infringement. This would be an element of damage and it may be shown. Id. at
505 -506.
D. Period of Recovery
1. The first knowing infringing act for intentional infringement
2. The institution of the suit
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Bulova Watch Co. v. Allerton Co., 328 F.2d 20 (C.A.7 1964). Bulova Watch
company brought an action against Allerton for infringement of the
trademark "Bulova."
Whatever infirmity might be urged as to the record in so far as a showing of
defendants' awareness of plaintiffs objections to the use of the trademark
"Bulova" in defendants' recasing and merchandising activities is concerned, it is
clear that defendants were put on such notice by service of plaintiff's complaint
in the instant action. . .. It was error for the District Court to limit plaintiffs
claim to post-decree damages. It is entitled to proceed to trial on its claim of
damages limited only to the post-complaint period. Id. at 24.
3. The registration of the trademark
City Messenger of Hollywood, Inc. v. City Bonded Messenger Service, Inc., 254
F.2d 531 (C.A.7 1958), certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 45, 358 U.S. 827, 3 L.Ed.2d
66, 119 U.S.P.Q. 501. Plaintiff sued Defendant for unfair competition.
Defendant filed four counterclaims on different dates. Count III was filed
August 12, 1955 and alleged an infringement of a trademark, the
registration of which had been issued a few days previous on July 26,
1955.
Count III of the counterclaim was filed August 12, 1955, eleven weeks after the
commencement of the instant suit, and seventeen days after the date of the
registration ofdefendant's mark. Paragraph 1 thereof re-alleged paragraphs 1, 2
and 3 ofCount I of the counterclaim. ... Id. at 534.
Count I alleges unfair competition by plaintiff with reference to defendant's
unregistered mark, and the principal emphasis ofCount III is as to the registered
trademark. With such overlapping of claims we hold that the allowance for
damages, ifany, under Count I should extend no further than July 26, 1955, the
date of the registration ofdefendants' mark. A cut-ffat this point is necessary to
prevent a duplication of compensatory damages, if any are awarded. On the
other hand, damages, if any, for the infringement of defendants' registered
trademark, and the related claim for unfair competition, cannot extend further
back than July 26, 1955. Id. at 535.
[Dlamages, if any, for the infringement ofdefendants' registered trademark, and
the related claim for unfair competition, cannot extend further back than July 26,
1955. . .. Also pertinent on the question of damages is 15 U.S.C.A. § 1111,
which provides that unless a registrant gives notice that his mark is registered,
no proceeds or damages shall be recovered unless the alleged infringer had actual
notice of the registration. Id. at 535 - 536.
E. Royalties and license fees
KFC Corp. v. Lilleoren, 821 F.Supp. 1191 (W.D.Ky. 1993). KFC brought an action
against Lilleoren for unauthorized use of its trademark after the termination of a
franchise agreement.
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[Tlhis court holds that KFC is entitled to recover the amount of royalties it would have
received during the holdover period by the defendants. Defendants claim that as they
paid 2.8 percent of the 4.0 percent ofgross revenues owed KFC, the remaining balance is
$8,815.20. Id. at 1193.
Sands, Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 34 F.3d 1340 (C.A.7 1994), on rehearing
in part 44 F.3d 579. Sands, Taylor & Woods (STW), the holder of the registered
trademark "Thirst-Aid," sued Quaker Oats for its use of the protected term in
connection with advertisements for "Gatorade."
Accordingly, we held that the district court ought to begin with the one measure ofactual
damages that, if ascertained with reasonable certainty, could be sajd to reflect the actual
loss of STW - the cost ofa reasonable royalty. Id. at 1350.
More specifically, two aspects of an award of a reasonable royalty make it difficult to
ensure that the Act's policy concern of deterrence had been adequately addressed. First,
because the award seeks to mirror the bargain at which the parties would have arrived
had negotiations taken place, it becomes for the malefactor simply the cost of doing
business. There is no incentive to engage in protracted, expensive, and perhaps
unsuccessful licensing negotiations when the consequence of getting caught for trade
piracy is simply to pay what should have been paid earlier. Nunc pro tunc payment of
the royalty fee becomes simply th "judicial expense" ofdoing business. Id. at 1351.
[Iln fashioning relief based on royalty payments, a court take special care to ensure that
the royalty payment has not undercompensated the victim. Enhancement of the damages
attributable to a lost royalty in order to ensure that the malefactor, and not the victim,
bears the burden of any uncertainty in its calculation is a permissible way of achieving
that goal. Id. at 1351.
A & H Sportswear Co., Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 967 F.Supp. 1457 (E.D.Pa.
1997), remanded 166 F.3d 197, on remand 57 F.Supp.2d 155. A & H Sportswear
Co., a manufacture that used the trademark "Miraclesuit", brought trademark
infringement action against Victoria's Secret Stores for use of liThe Miracle Bra."
Under the circumstances of this case we believe the most appropriate and accurate
damages remedy would be to award Plaintiffs a reasonable royalty. ... In calculating a
reasonable royalty a district court may also consider:
1) royalty rates received in prior licenses by the licensor;
2) prior rates paid by the licensee;
3) the licensor's licensing policies;
4) the nature and scope of the infringer's infringing use;
5) the special value of the mark to the infringer;
6) the profitability of the infringer's use;
7) the lack ofviable alternatives;
8) the opinion ofexpert witnesses; and
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9) the amount that the licensor and licensee would have agreed upon in
voluntary negotiations.
The court's approach should take into account "what the parties 'would have agreed
upon, if both were reasonably trying to reach an agreement." . . . "In applying the
formulation, the Court must take into account the realities of the bargaining table and
subject the proofs to a dissective scrutiny." Id. at 1479 -1480.
F. Increased Damages
u.s. Structures, Inc. v. l.P. Structures, Inc. , 130 F.3d 1185 (C.A.6 1997). U.S.
Structures brought a trademark infringement action against J.P. Structures for
defendant's continued use of trademarks after the termination of a franchise
agreement.
[Dlefendants argue that the district court erred when it awarded plaintiff $6,465.00 in
treble damages . .. in addition to the $2,155.00 based upon defendants' profits, because
§1117 limits the overall potential recovery to three times the amount of profits. Id. at
1191. This section should be read as vesting the district court with discretion to increase
a damages award up to three times the actual damages sustained. Thus, the district court
did not err in computing damages as an amount equal to four times actual damages. Id.
at 1191.
Gorenstein Enterprises, Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431 (C.A.7 1989).
Gorenstein Enterprises sued Quality Care-USA for rescission of a franchise
agreement. Quality care brought a counterclaim for breach of contract and
trademark infringement.
There is considerable evidence that the Gorensteins were holding the trademark hostage
as a bargaining tactic to pressure Quality Care into renegotiating the franchise or
settling the suit. . .. So weak are the Gorensteins' arguments regarding their
infringement of Quality Care's trademark, and so deliberate the infringement, that it
might have been an abuse ofdiscretion for the district judge not to have awarded Quality
Care treble damages, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest. Id. at 435.
BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading- Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 108 (C.A.7 1994). BASF, a
producer of antifreeze, brought a claim against Old World Trading for false
advertising under the Lanham Act.
BASF argues that the district court erred in refusing to enhance the damages award
pursuant to the Lanham Act's provision allowing a district court to triple the amount of
damages. . .. [Tlhis one equitable factor in BASF's favor does not require a conclusion
that the district court's decision was an abuse of discretion. An in any event, the Act
specifically provides the enhancement is only available to ensure that the plaintiff receive
compensation, ... and the district court found that BASF was adequately compensated
by the damage award. Id. at 1095.
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Badfer Meter, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 13 F.3d 1145 (C.A.7 1994). Badger Meter
brought trade dress infringement action against Grinnell Corporation with
respect to a redesigned water meter.
The first discretionary method is to award up to three times the damages plaintiff can
actually prove. This ofcourse requires that the plaintiffbe able to prove some damages. ..
Second, the court determined that Badger could not recover under the first discretionary
method ofcalculating an award because this method is premised on the plaintiffs proving
some amount ofactual damages. Id. at 1158.
IV. Costs
A. Court costs recoverable
B. Expert fees not recoverable
C. Plaintiffs' attorney fees
Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's BiZ Boy ofSteubenville, Ohio, 849 F.2d 1012 (C.A.6
1988), rehearing denied. Frish's Restaurant brought trademark infringement
action against Elby's for its use of the term "Big Boy" within the state of Ohio.
Despite the refusal of the District Court to award damages, Frisch's prevailed in this
litigation by showing its entitlement to injunctive relief However, we do not think this
case is "exceptional" within the meaning of the statute. The District Court held that the
infringement was not malicious, willful, fraudulent, or deliberate. Therefore, the Court
was correct to deny an award ofattorneys' fees. Id. at 1017.
. Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738 (C.A.7 1985). Otis
Clapp & Son, a seller of non-prescription pharmaceuticals in the institutional
medical market, brought an action for trademark infringement and unfair
competition.
Exceptional cases that would justify an award ofattorney's fees are ones in which the acts
of infringement can be characterized as malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful. Id. at
746.
BASF Corp. v. Old World Tradinz Co., 839 F.Supp. 528 (N.D.III. 1993), affirmed 41
F.3d 1081. BASF, a producer of antifreeze, brought a claim against Old World
Trading for false advertising under the Lanham Act.
A decision to award attorneys' fees under the Lanham Act is firmly committed to the
district court's discretion, . . . and we do not find that the district court abused its
discretion here. Old World, ... argues that a plaintiff must show "willfulness or bad
faith" to be entitled to a fee award, and that the defendant'S conduct "targeted" the
plaintiff. But the law of this Circuit clearly allows the district court to award attorney's
fees based upon the defendant'S IImalicious, fraudulent, deliberate or willful"
infringement. ... The district court concluded that although Old World's conduct was
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not malicious, it was deliberate. ... We will not disturb the district court's finding that
BASF is entitled to "some" attorneys' fees. Id. at 1099.
Hindu Incense v. Meadows, 692 F.2d 1048 (C.A.6 1982). Hindu Incense brought a
trademark infringement action concerning the federally registered mark "Genie."
[T]he present case does not meet the requisite showing of intentional infringement for
malicious,fraudulent, deliberate or willful purposes within the meaning of§ 1117. Judge
Boyle found that the conduct of appellant did not warrant an award of attorney fees.
This holding does not constitute an abuse of discretion and we decline to overturn the
ruling of the district court. Id. at 1052.
Sovereign Order of Saint fohn of ferusalem, Inc. v. Grady, 119 F.3d 1236 (C.A.6 1997)
amended on rehearing in part, certiorari denied 118 S.Ct. 1163, 522 U.S. 1147, 140
L.Ed.2d 174. Organization which held collective trademark "Sovereign Order of
Saint John of Jerusalem" brought trademark infringement action against
organization which used similar language in its title.
The Lanham Act authorizes the award of attorney fees to a prevailing party "in
exceptional cases." . .. The primary purpose of this provision is to make plaintiffs whole
in trademark cases where "the infringement was malicious, fraudulent, willful, or
deliberate." Trial judges have considerable discretion in handling § 1117 motions for
attorney fees In the present case, the district court ruled that an award of attorney
fees would not be appropriate despite the jury's explicit finding that the defendant had
intentionally infringed the collective membership mark. . .. The court did not abuse its
discretion. Id. at 1244.
D. Defendant's attorney fees
Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738 (C.A.7 1985). Otis
Clapp & Son, a seller of non-prescription pharmaceuticals in the institutional
medical market, brought an action for trademark infringement and unfair
competition.
Prevailing defendants may all recover attorney's fees in exceptional cases. ... Provision
was made for the recovery of defendant's attorney's fees to "provide protection against
unfounded suits brought by trademark owners for harassment and the like." Id. at 746.
Dorr-Oliver Inc. v. Fluid Quip, Inc., 966 F.Supp. 718 (N.D.III. 1997), affirmed 132
F.3d 36. Dorr-Oliver brought trademark action against Fluid Quip in connection
with the use of the term "clamshell."
Section [1117(a)] allows a possible exception to the "American Rule" if the court in the
exercise of its discretion agrees to award fees. Just as this court deemed it inappropriate-
when deciding to enter judgment for plaintiff on its trade dress claim - to award
attorney's fees to plaintiff, it deems inappropriate any such award to defendants now that
they have succeeded in their defense. In this court's judgment there would be no purpose
served other than to penalize by hindsight a party that pursued its position aggressively
but in good faith. Id. at 722.
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Blau Plumbinz, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604 (C.A.7 1986). Blau Plumbing
brought trademark infringement action concerning its "location box" in yellow
pages' advertisement.
First, if the "exceptional cases" standard of section [1117J is not applicable in a case
under section [1125J(a) - if such a case is governed by common law rather than statutory
standards for shifting attorney fees - it would mean ofcourse that the judge could award
attorney fees to a prevailing defendant only if the plaintiffs case were frivolous. . . .
Although Blau's case is weak, the resolution of the case on S.O.S.'s motion for summary
judgment, while proper, was sufficiently debatable to prevent us from deeming the appeal
frivolous. Id. at 612.
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Counterfeiting -15 U.S.C. § 1117 (b) and (c)
I. Statutory Language
(b) ... the court shall, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances, enter judgment for
three times such profits or damages, whichever is greater, together with a reasonable attorney fee,
in the case of any violation of section 1114(1)(a) of this title . .. that consists of intentionally
using a mark or designation, knowing such mark or designation is a counterfeit mark . . . in
connection with the sale, offeringfor sale, or distribution ofgoods or services. ...
(c) ... the plaintiff may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered by the trial court, to
recover, instead of actual damages and profits under subsection (a) of this section, an award of
statutory damages for any such use . .. in the amount of-
(1) not less than $500 or more than $100,000 per counterfeit mark per type of goods or
services sold ...
(2) if the court finds that the use of the counterfeit mark was willful, not more than
$1,000,000 per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or
distributed, as the court considers just.
II. Increased damages and profits
A. Mandatory Nature of Statute
Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584 (C.A.7 1989). Louis Vuitton brought action
against retailer and its owners for trademark infringement, false designation of
origin, and unfair competition. The district court denied Louis Vuitton's claim
for monetary relief and Louis Vuitton appealed.
To stop counterfeiting, a trademark owner must be able to invoke section 1117(b), the
treble-damage (alternatively, at the plaintiff's option, treble-profit) provision that
Congress added to the trademark law in 1984. Section 1117(b) is a severe statute. The
trebling of the plaintiff's damages or the defendant's profits - whichever is greater - is
mandatory . .. subject only to the statute's exception for "extenuating circumstances,"
which as we shall see is extremely narrow. ... It is [limited toJ cases in which "the
imposition of treble damages would mean that [the defendantJ would be unable to support
his or her family. Id. at 588 - 589.
B. State of Mind of Infringer - Intent
General Electric Co. v. Speicher, 877 F.2d 531 (C.A.7 1989). General Electric brought
trademark infringement action against Speicher, an industrial cutting tool insert
fabricator. Speicher had sold its own low-quality inserts in G. E. boxes with
"570" (a G. E. designation) etched on the inserts.
Apart from what we said earlier on this score, notice that all that good faith means in this
context is that the infringer didn't know he was infringing someone's trademark. This
means rather little. Suppose that the infringer, although acting in good faith, was also
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acting negligently - a reasonable person in his position would have realized he was
infringing~ though he, being unreasonable, did not. Speicher was at least negligent, and
probably grossly negligent or even reckless, in believing . .. that General Electric had
authorized him to etch 1/570" on any old insert he decided to supply. Elementary
prudence should have sparked inquiry on his part. Id. at 536.
Whether Speicher's counterfeiting was intentional within the meaning ofsection 1117(b)
is not foreclosed by the district judge's inadequate analysis of the issue ofSpeicher's good
faith. This, together with the question whether there were any extenuating
circumstances for his conduct, is a matter to be determined in the new trial that we are
ordering on remand. Id. at 537.
Sadler-Cisar, Inc. v. Commercial Sales Network, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 1287 (N.D.Ohio
1991). Plaintiffs, whose patent, trade dress, and trademark concerning the device
"Medi-Dot" were infringed, brought action seeking damages for corrective
advertising, harm to business reputation, attorney fees, actual and exemplary
damages, and costs.
Plaintiffs are entitled to damages for corrective advertising . .. the intentional copying of
Plaintiffs' trade dress and palming off of its AccuTRAK product . .. harm to business
reputation . . . actual and exemplary damages together with costs associated with this
action. Id. at 1301.
Lindy Pen Co., Inc. v. Ric Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400 (C.A.9 1993). Lindy Pen brought
trademark infringement action against Bic Pen for Bic Pen's unauthorized use of
its"Auditor" mark.
Bic's infringement was not intentional. . .. Even assuming this court were somehow to
find that Bic demonstrated the requisite intent, an award under § 1117(b) is never
automatic and may be limited by equitable considerations. The statute specifically states
that the district court may refrain from imposing the mandatory sanctions of § 1117(b)
upon afinding ofextenuating circumstances. Although the district court did not make a
finding on this point other than to note that the record as a whole did not justify an
award under § 1117(b), extenuating circumstances may be inferred. Id. at 1409.
Babbit Electronics, Inc. v. Dynascan Corp., 828 F.Supp. 944 (S.D.Fla. 1993). Babbit
brought a fraudulent misrepresentation and a tortuous interference action
against Dynascan. Dynascan filed a counterclaim for trademark infringement
relating to Babbits unauthorized sale of cordless telephones bearing Dynascan's
"Cobra" mark.
If the infringement is intentional, however, and the use of a counterfeit trademark has
been proven, then § 1117(b) governs, and the Court is required to treble damages and
award attorney's fees unless the Court finds extenuating circumstances. Dynascan has
demonstrated . . . that Babbit intentionally infringed the Cobra trademark and used a
counterfeit Cobra trademark. Consequently, the Court finds that a trebling ofdamages is
required. Id. at 959.
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. P.K. Sorren Export Co. Inc. of Florida, 546 F.Supp. 987
(S.D.Fla. 1982). Playboy Enterprises, Inc. (PEl) brought trademark infringement
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action against defendant for its dealing in counterfeit and genuine wearing
apparel bearing or sold under the PLAYBOY and the RABBIT HEAD design
marks. (This case was decided prior to the enactment of § 1117 (b).)
PEl has demonstrated that the defendants deliberately infringed its trademark.
Inevitably, there must have been some harm to PEl's goodwill and reputation, but this
has not been sufficiently demonstrated or quantified to justify an award on that basis. In
addition, defendants' records of their infringing sales are incomplete, and one could infer
from the records of AIS and Rolex that the defendants actually sold more infringing
shirts than can be shown from defendants' records. . .. I find that plaintiff is entitled to
twice the amount of profits shown to have been made by defendants in the sale of
counterfeit goods. Id. at 998 - 999.
C. Knowledge of Counterfeit Mark
Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, (C.A.7 1989). Louis Vuitton brought action
against retailer and its owners for trademark infringement, false designation of
origin, and unfair competition. The district court denied Louis Vuitton's claim
for monetary relief and Louis Vuitton appealed.
A further point is hat although section 1117(b) requires a showing that the defendant'S
violation involved "knowing such mark . .. is counterfeit," it is enough for these
purposes that the defendant failed to inquire further because he was afraid of what the
inquiry would yield. Willful blindness is knowledge enough. Id. at 590.
III. Attorneys Fees
Babbit Electronics, Inc. v. Dynascan Corp., 828 F.Supp. 944 (S.D.Fla. 1993). Babbit brought
a fraudulent misrepresentation and a tortuous interference action against Dynascan.
Dynascan filed a counterclaim for trademark infringement relating to Babbits
unauthorized sale of cordless telephones bearing Dynascan's "Cobra" mark.
This is an exceptional case because Babbit intentionally arranged to obtain counterfeit goods from
Hyundai, intentionally avoided contractual obligations, and intentionally passed off such goods
as Cobra products. Consequently, attorney's fees are awarded to Dynascan. Id. at 959.
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. P.K. Sorren Export Co. Inc. of Florida, 546 F.Supp. 987 (S.D.Fla.
1982). Playboy Enterprises, Inc. (PEl) brought trademark infringement action against
defendant for its dealing in counterfeit and genuine wearing apparel bearing or sold
under the PLAYBOY and the RABBIT HEAD design marks. (This case was decided
prior to the enactment of § 1117 (b).)
In an exceptional case, this Court may award attorneys' fees . ... This is an exceptional case as
defendants have deliberately arranged to obtain counterfeit goods and to pass off such goods as
genuine PEl goods. Attorney fees are awarded to to plaintiff. Id. at 999.
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Domain Names -15 U.S.C. § 1117 (d)
I. Statutory Language
In a case involving a violation of section 1125(d)(1) of this title, the plaintiff may elect, at any
time before final judgment is rendered by the trial court, to recover, instead ofactual damages and
profits, an award of statutory damages in the amount of not less than $1,000 and not more than
$100,000 per domain name, as the court considers just.
II. Recent Cases
Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportman's Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (C.A.2 2000) certiorari denied
120 S.Ct. 2719, 147 L.Ed.2d 984. Sporty's Farm brought a declaratory judgment action
against Sportman's Market, a catalog company, seeking a declaration of its right to use
the "sportys.com" domain name. Sportman's Market brought counterclaim for
trademark infringment and other actions. Sporty's Farm registered the subject domain
name prior to the enactment of the ACPA.
The statute provides that a party "shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark" if it
meets the statutory requirements. . . . Although the statute uses the term "liable," it does not
follow that damages will be assessed. As we discuss below, damages can be awarded for violations
of the Act but they are not "available with respect to the registration, trafficking, or use of a
domain name that occurs [, as in this case,] before the date of the enactment of this Act." Id. at
500.
Morrison & Foerster, LLP, v. Wick, 94 F Supp.2d 1125 (D.Colo. 2000). Morrison & Foerster
brought an action for injunctive relief against the owner of an Internet website domain
names similar to the firm's trademarked names, alleging violation of Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) among other legal theories.
The ACPA permits a court to "order the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the
transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark." ... I then direct Mr. Wick to transfer, at
his own cost, the two domain names with the correct spelling of the firm . .. to Morrison &
Foerster. Id. at 1134. Morrison & Foerster failed to present any evidence or testimony regarding
actual damages it incurred as a result ofMr. Wick's use of the domain names and web pages. ...
Although the ACPA contains a provision allowingfor a statutory award ofdamages for violation,
Morrison & Foerster never "elected" this remedy as required by the statute. Id. at 1136.
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The telephone call is never convenient. It may come on a Friday afternoon, but not
before 6:15 p.m.... Something bad is about to happen (or is already happening), and the
client needs it stopped quickly - very quickly. ... Even the wait for a preliminary
injunction is too long. So cancel your weekend plans. The sense of relaxation that was
beginning to creep over you, the draining of adrenaline, must be put in full reverse. Call
in the overtime secretary. Find as much help as you can. It is TRO time. ...
Jack L.B. Gohn and Michael D. Oliver
In Pursuit of the Elusive TRO, Litigation
Vol. 19 No.4 (Summer 1993)
Q.... [T]hat cutoff between employees who sign noncompetes and those who don't,
those employees who fall below that line, who don't sign a noncompetes, do you have
them sign confidentiality agreements?
A. No. It's probably a good idea, though. Would you draft one for me.
Q. I think I have a conflict.
Recent deposition of plaintiff
in trade secret/non-compete case.
In war, you win or lose, live or die - and the difference is just an eyelash.
Gen. Douglas MacArthur, U.S. Army
In posthumous memoirs, "Reminiscences" ib 10 Jul64
1 This paper is presented for educational purposes only, to contribute to the understanding of this particular
area of law. Neither the author, Frost Brown Todd, nor their present or future clients can be bound by the
comments and interpretations expressed herein.
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I. Introduction
The test of all the efforts to protect a company's confidential information and
business are tested when a "misappropriation" occurs. Theft of trade secrets is a
growing problem and litigation in this area is on the rise.
Those misappropriating the information are much more sophisticated and the
means by which the information can be taken have dramatically increased. The
web offers individuals a wealth of knowledge regarding the complexity of law
and the methods to avoid trouble. One web site, www.breakyournoncompete.conl
comes right to the point and illustrates the flood of information available to those
previously thought by companies to be easily intimidated. With major
employment placement companies advertising that changing jobs is a great way to
improve your personal and professional life, and offering assistance to make a
move happen, departing employees are a constant threat.
On the other side, web sites directed to employers make available form non-
compete and confidentiality agreements. This easy access to these forms have
created a substantial upward swing in the number of companies using
employment agreements as means to protect confidential information. It is not
difficult to conclude that the increase in agreements has in turn caused an increase
in litigation.
This litigation in not limited to small companies and their sales or account
representatives, but have recently involved high level corporate officers. In either
scenario, litigation of this kind has tremendous consequences for both sides.
Enforcement of the agreement means that the defendant individual will often
mean dramatic change in short term income and corresponding life changes, that
may include finding a new job, relocating and loss of income. If the agreement is
not enforced, competitive advantages and corresponding profits may be lost by
the company, other employees might take a chance and leave and recruiting future
employees may be impaired.
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These consequences, and pressure of litigating under substantial time constraints,
will test the attorney and the client alike. The fight over injunctive relief that
occurs very early on in the case is "where the rubber meets the road." The
momentum enjoyed by the party who wins this first confrontation may often be
enjoyed for the remainder of the case.
II. Pre-Litigation Considerations
Success in trade secret and non-compete litigation may be determined well before
the alleged misappropriation or breach has occurred. Many key decisions are
made before the complaint is ever filed.
A. Know Your Client and The Business
1. Client Expectations
Clients often express their situation as "He took my stuff and you
must stop him from using it." Or "There is nothing secret about
what I do, everybody does it." While the expressions are concise,
counsel must inquire carefully into the desires and motivations of
the client.
Whether representing the plaintiff or defendant, counsel should
advise the client that these cases turn on a particular judge's view
of the situation and are dependant on the manner in which the
judge exercises his discretionary and equitable powers. For that
reason, predictions regarding the outcome of these cases, while
requested by all clients, are difficult for counsel.
An important issue for plaintiffs is whether they desire monetary
damages ~n addition to injunctive relief. Substantial costs can be
incurred in connection with receiving injunctive relief and the goal
is to do so before any real harm occurs. If the client expects to
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receive a monetary award, they will be disappointed when counsel
delivers an injunction (a 2 or 3 page document) and a sizable legal
bill. The pursuit of injunctive relief should not obstruct the
standard cost/benefit evaluation of the case to avoid any surprises
for the client.
2. Other Employees
The potential impact of litigation between an employer and a
former employee on other employees cannot be ignored. These
cases often dominate the conversations around the water cooler.
The corporation should consider that the other similarly situated
employees will be watching the litigation carefully, most likely
with their own agreement in hand. If the court denies a request to
enforce the agreement, others may jump ship believing that they
are certain to receive the same result.
There are also the potential for "leaks," friends of the former
employee who may provide information. While tight control must
be maintained over disclosure of the company's intentions, often
lower level employees must be interviewed. Who to interview and
the explanation of why the interview is necessary are touchy issues
that require substantial client involvement.
Once the lawsuit is filed, a formal announcement, carefully crafted
by counsel and preferably delivered orally may be appropriate
depending on the size of the company and the seriousness of the
litigation. Counsel should expect that whatever is said will come
out in depositions in the case.
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3. Customers
It is possible to win the battle and lose the war in a non-compete
case. The former employer may be enjoined from contacting
customers, but the customers may be lost to either the plaintiff or
the defendant. Discovery from customers may be critical to the
development of damages. At the same time, the customer may be
offended by the litigation or may be put off by the need to respond
to discovery.
The plaintiff may attempt to quash the subpoena and argue that the
same information is available from it and that the burden placed on
the customers by subpoenas is unnecessary and serves only to
harass plaintiff. In Native American Arts, Inc. et aI. v. I.C. Penny,
Inc. et aI., 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18181 (N.D.llI. 1999), the court
looked critically on a party's attempt to subpoena records without
availing itself of other means of discovery from the other party in
the case. In I.C. Penny, defendant I.C.Penny sought to depose the
plaintiffs suppliers. Although the court found that the information
sough was relevant, the court granted plaintiffs motion for a
protective order under F.R.Civ.Pro. 26(b)(2) that provides that the
court may limit discovery if the discovery sought is "obtainable
from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome,
or less expensive." The court stated:
However, at this point, I.C. Penny has not even deposed
[plaintiff] NAA in regards to its alleged injuries. It may
be that by deposing [plaintiff] NAA, I.C. Penny may
find the answer it needs from a more convenient, less
burdensome source. F.R.Civ.Pro. 26(b)(2). Deposing
[plaintiff] NAA's suppliers at this point will be
burdensome for the plaintiffs, and may needlessly
interfere with [plaintiff] NAA's business relationships.
However, if the necessary information is not
forthcoming from the other means, I.C. Penny may then
ask for leave to depose [plaintiff] NAA's suppliers.
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The court went o.n to hold that I.C. Penny was obligated to exhaust
its discovery options from the plaintiff, before unnecessarily
burdening the plaintiffs suppliers and interfering with the
plaintiffs business relationships.
4. Be An Expert In Your Client's Business
Counsel must know the intimate details of the client's business.
Often, the lawyer who knows the business the best will win the
case. At the first hearing in the case, the judge will want to hear
about the business at issue to decide whether the claimed
information is worthy of the designation of trade secret or justifies
the protection of a "legitimate business interest" through
enforcement of a non-compete agreement.
The significance of the defendant's actions must be understood in
the context of the business at issue. For example, some industries
have sales cycles dictated by buying seasons and the time it takes
to bring new product to market. A former employee may take
trade secrets to a competitor, but because of the business' sales
cycle, the competing product created from the misappropriated
information may not make it to market for several months. That
explanation better role off counsel's tongue when the judge asks if
plaintiff has lost any sales or customers.
B. The Cease and Desist Letter
Their usefulness is limited. If the conduct of the offending party is
causing real damages, then a letter will most likely have little impact.
Often, it will allow the other party retain counsel and be more prepared to
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respond to litigation. Most often, the best approach is to move as fast as
possible and initiate the litigation.
A cease and desist letter (sample attached) can be helpful in cases that do
not involve significant monetary value. In such cases, it is often helpful
that the potential defendant get counsel making settlement discussions
more productive.
C. Choice of Law and Forum Selection
If the agreement has no choice of law provision, Kentucky courts will
apply the most significant relationship test. Lewis v. American Family
Insurance Group, Ky., 555 S.W.2d 579 (1977).
If the agreement has a choice of law provision, the first attack on a choice
of law provision is whether it covers the claims asserted by the plaintiff.
A narrow choice of law provision2 typically is held by courts to apply only
to construction of the terms of the contract and may not be held to apply to
tort claims or all contract claims. Conversely, broader language in the
provision3 has been found to apply to all claims between the parties to the
contract, including fraud and negligent claims. Baneck, Inc. v. Yogurt
Ventures, USA, Inc., 6 F.3d 357, 363 (6th Cir. 1993) (choice of law clause
found to apply to fraud and misrepresentation claims); Moses v. Business
Card Express, Inc., 929 F.2d 1131, 1139-40 (6th Cir. 1991) (choice of law
clause found to apply to fraud and misrepresentation claims); American
Advertising Distributors v. American Cooperative Advertising, Inc., 639
S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1982) (narrowly drawn form selection clause did not
apply in action alleging fraud in the inducement to contract, as opposed to
a claim arising out of the contract itself). See also, Restatement Second of
2 "This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth ofKentucky"
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Conflict of Laws, Section 187 (1988). It is important to note that claims
against the new employer are not subject to the choice of law provision
since the new employer would not have been a party to the agreement.
The same is true for forum selection clauses. The clause should provide
that the selected forum is exclusive, selects a forum which necessarily
would have jurisdiction over the dispute, and precludes removal or
transfer to another jurisdiction after the action is filed in selected forum. It
should also include an express consent to jurisdiction selected forum. MIS
Brenen v. Supada Off Shore Company, 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (Seminal
case establishing in federal court that a form selection clause is "prima
facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the
resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances.") Prezocki v.
Bullock Garages, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. 1997) (enforcing a forum
selection clause as prima facie valid absent circumstances that would
render the clause "unreasonable"); Prudential Resources Corporation v.
Plunkett, 583 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (similar case holding that
Kentucky would follow Section 80 of the Restatement (2nd) of Conflict of
Laws and force of form selection clause provided that suit in the agreed
forum is not unfair or unreasonable.)
D. Arbitration
Arbitration agreements within non-competes can be very effective. The
advantage is that the proceedings are not part of the public record. While
documents may be filed with the court under seal, your client's secrets are
at the mercy of the local court clerk and the potential for an inadvertent
disclosure. This risk is eliminated by arbitration.
3 "This Agreement, the construction ofthis Agreement, all rights and obligations between the parties to this
Agreement, and any or all claims arising out of or relating to the subject matter of this Agreement
(including all tort claims), shall be governed by the laws ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky."
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The drawbacks to arbitration include speed and cost. The court· system,
not known for its speed, can generally handle expedited requests for
injunctive relief. While the American Arbitration Association has
procedures and rules for injunctive relief, the process can be cumbersome.
The other drawback is the cost. The filing fees for arbitration are
substantially higher than court filings. A significant cost is also imposed
on the defendant. This favors financial well off clients that can afford the
fees and will place a significant burden on individual employees who
choose to break their agreement.
III. The Complaint
A. Verification
Most often the complaint is verified by the client. This is recommended
because of the time pressures associated with preparation of the materials.
The client should review the complaint carefully with the understanding
that he adopts the statements in the complaint as his own testimony. The
Court will often expect that the complaint be verified by the plaintiff when
considering a request for injunctive relief.
B. Not Too Vague, But Not To Specific
The complaint should have enough specificity to persuade the court that
the plaintiff will prevail on trial of the merits (discussed below).
Nevertheless, the verified complaint is not the place to speculate, presume
or guess. Often clients, blinded by anger towards the departed employee,
will try to blame the former employee for every lost sale or related
problem that occurred since their departure. The complaint need only
include a sample of the defendants actions and should include only those
that are supported by objective proof. Clients often want to air all their
differences in the Complaint, but that is not always the place to do it. A
sample short complaint is attached.
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If the defendant's actions are particularly egregious, and the client has
gathered significant evidenced to support the claims, a more detailed
complaint may be favored. A detailed complaint will show the judge that
the plaintiff has done a significant investigation before seeking relief from
the courts and may persuade it that injunctive relief is appropriate. An
example of a detailed complaint is also attached. The danger with the
detailed complaint is that the plaintiff is locked into the facts contained
therein. Credibility is a key issue in these cases, and any attempt to amend
the complaint to change the facts may' cause damage to the plaintiff's
credibility with the court.
IV. Getting Injunctive Relief
Simultaneously with filing the complaint, the plaintiff should file a motion for
injunctive relief. The motion should be accompanied by an affidavit to
supplement the verified complaint. The affidavit often mirrors the key allegations
in the complaint but includes additional facts relating to the elements that must be
established to obtain an injunction.
A. Kentucky State Court
The Kentucky Code of Civil Procedure speaks in terms of an "Restraining
Order" and a "Temporary Injunction." CR 65.03 and 65.04. A restraining
order can be obtained without notice but the plaintiffs attorney must
certify to the court in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to
give notice and the reasons supporting his claims that notice should not be
required. A Temporary Injunction will usually issue after an evidentiary
hearing and, if granted, may remain in place during the remainder of the
lawsuit or until dissolved by the court.
Kentucky courts apply a three-part test to determine if injunctive relief is
appropriate.
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[Flirst, the trial court should determine whether the plaintiff has
complied with CR 65.04 by showing irreparable injury. This is a
mandatory prerequisite to the issuance of an injunction. Secondly, the
trial court should weigh the various equities involved. Although not
an exclusive list, the court should consider such things as possible
detriment to the public interest, harm to the defendant, and whether the
injunction will merely preserve the status quo. Finally, the complaint
should be evaluated to see whether a substantial question has been
presented.
Maupin v. Stansbury, Ky., 575 S.W.2d 695, 699 (1978). In trade secret
cases, actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. KRS
365.882(1).
The court will focus its attention on whether the plaintiff can show
immediate and irreparable harm. In Lareau v. o 'Nan, Ky. App., 355
S.W.2d 679 (1962), the court held that damages from a breach of a non-
compete agreement were sufficient to merit injunctive relief.
B. Kentucky Federal Court
The vocabulary is different in federal court. F.R.Civ.Pro. 65 speaks in
terms of Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Injunction. A
Temporary Restraining Order may be issued without notice but may not
last for more than 10 days. F.R.Civ.Pro. 65(b). The court may not issue a
Preliminary Injunction without notice to the adverse party and may last for
the remainder of the litigation. A hearing on a motion for preliminary
injunction may be combined with a trial on the merits. This is particularly
useful in smaller cases.
The federal court looks to four factors, similar to those described in
Maupin:
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Applying the test set forth in Itl re DeLoreal1 Motor Co., 755 F.2d
1223, 1228 (1985), four factors are important in determining whether a
preliminary injunction is proper. Those factors are: (1) the likelihood
of defendant's success on the merits; (2) whether the injunction will
save the defendant from irreparable harm; (3) whether the injunction
would harm the plaintiff; and (4) whether the public interest would be
served by the injunction. As stated by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, these four considerations are factors to be balanced, not
prerequisites that must be met. The likelihood of success on the merits
that needs to be shown will vary inversely with the degree of
irreparable injury that the Defendant will suffer absent an injunction.
Id. at 1229.
Wells v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 919 F.Supp. 1047,
1051 (E.D.Ky.,1994). Again, the issue of irreparable harm will be the
most important.
V. Dot Each "i" And Cross Each "t"
A. The Injunction
The Single Most Important Piece of Paper In The Case
The injunction must be clear and concise and describe in detail the activity
restrained. The injunction should be no broader than absolutely necessary.
A restraining order issued under Kentucky CR 65.03 without notice must
"define the injury and state why it is irreparable and why the order was
granted without notice." CR 65.03(3). CR 65.04(5) provides that every
Temporary Injunction shall set forth findings of fact and conclusions of
law which constitute the grounds for the injunction.
The federal rules has a similar requirement that Temporary Restraining
Orders issues without notice must include a statement as to the nature of
the injury and why the order was granted: without notice. F.R.Civ.Pro.
65(b). F.R.Civ.Pro. 65(d) requires that other details be included in all
Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Injunctions.
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B. The Bond
Both the federal and state court rules require that an injunction be secured
by a bond. Arrangements with a bonding company should be arranged
before a hearing for injunctive relief so that the injunction and the bond
can be filed soon after the hearing.
c. Notice of the Order
,The Restraining Order must be served on the party enjoined. CR.
65.03(4). Temporary Restraining Order should be served on the parties,
although F.R.Civ.Pro. does not specifically require it. It is also important
to remember who is bound by the order. Under the Kentucky Civil Rules,
the order is binding on the party enjoined. CR. 65.03(5) and CR 65.04(4).
However, under the federal rules, a Temporary Restraining Order is
binding on "the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys and upon those persons in active concert or
participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal
service or otherwise." F.R.Civ.Pro.65(d).
VI. The Defense
A. The Leaks
If the defendant can demonstrate that the information that the plaintiff
seeks to protect in the lawsuit has been previously released to the public or
has leaked out, then the defendant can argue that the information does not
qualify as a trade secret under the Uniform Trade Secret Act. Further, the
defendant may argue that there is no legitimate business interest for the
plaintiff to enforce the non-compete agreement because all the information
that the non-compete was designed to protect has been released and the
defendant poses no threat of unfair competition.
1. Web Sites
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The same company that files suit to protect its customer list may
have voluntarily disclosed the same list to everyone and anyone
who wants to see it. The internet is an amazingly powerful tool to
distribute information. Many companies rushed to get a web site
and get the company "on line." In an effort to demonstrate the
successes of the company, a web page will include customer
comments, recent client success stories using the company's
product, and even a list of customers and pricing information.
2. Customers
Customers also receive significant confidential information and are
never required to sign a confidentiality agreement. Customers may
even tell competitor's the price another company has offered a
product and discount schedules. These facts all undermine the
plaintiff s claim that a customer list or pricing information
qualifies as a trade secret.
3. Trade Associations
Often overlooked is the customer information that is available
through trade associations. Plaintiff's will claim that while the
individual names of the customers are not a trade secret, a list of
the customers compiled in one place creates a economic benefit
and qualifies as a trade secret. That same list of "customers" may
be compiled by a local, or national, trade association. The trade
association may also have other information about its members.
Defendants may argue that the availability of the information to the
public destroys any chance of the "customer list" qualifying as a
trade secret.
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4. Former Employees
The plaintiffs former employees also present a significant possible
leak of information. If other employees with knowledge of the
same information have left and the plaintiff did not pursue them to
prevent disclosure, then the defendant may argue the information is
already in the public domain and not a trade secret. This argument
is especially persuasive if the other employee signed a non-
compete or confidentiality agreement the same or similar as the
one signed by the defendant.
B. "We Are Not Competing"
Any business can be sliced into different parts. For example, automobile
sales can be divided into new and used car sales, any construction trade
can be divided into residential and commercial, and insurance sales can be
divided into commercial and personal lines. Any distinction between the
exact nature of the plaintiff and defendant's business can form a defense
of "we are not competing."
C. Declaratory Judgment
One tactic is to beat the former employer to the punch and file a
declaratory judgment action. This can be done once a new job offer is
made to the employee. The employee alleges that an actual controversy
exists as to whether acceptance of the offered position would violate the
non-compete agreement with the old employer. Naturally, this choice
should be reserved for those cases where the chance of a court enforcing
the non-compete agreement is very slim.
VII. Discovery
A. Motion for Expedited Discovery
Simultaneous with the request for an injunction hearing, the plaintiff
should request an expedited discovery schedule. The plaintiff is often in
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the dark as to the full extent of the defendant's activities. That void
should be filled before the evidentiary hearing on continued injunctive
relief. The motion to expedite discovery should ask for production of
documents within 7 days and that depositions proceed as soon as possible.
.Various courts and scholars have recognized that expedited discovery is
important in an action where injunctive relief is sought. See Albert Sauter
Company, Inc. v. Richard S. Sauter Company, Irlc., 57 F.R.D. 537
(E.D.Pa. 1972); Wright & 11iller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil,
Section 2104.
B. Document Requests and Interrogatories
Document Requests should be as narrow and precise as possible. Client
participation in the preparation of the requests is often very helpful
because the client knows the vocabulary and can identify specific
documents that may be helpful. Interrogatories are often little help in the
initial stage of the case. The depositions usually occur quickly and the
limited number of interrogatories are better used for the remaining issue of
the case, such as monetary damages.
c. Discovery From Third Parties
Discovery from non-litigants is especially helpful. Former employees are
particularly useful, principally those who occupied a similar position as
the defendant and left with the same or similar information but were not
sued.
D. Get Your Expert Early
Like all commercial cases, retain an expert early. This is particularly
important where substantial damages will be at issue. Experts can be
particularly helpful with focusing discovery efforts. If settlement becomes
an option, an expert already familiar with case will be critical with the
valuation of the case and either forming or responding to a settlement
offer.
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VIII. The Evidentiary Hearing
The hearing on the Temporary Injunction or Preliminary Injunction is like a trial.
Preparation should be similar and every effort should be made to ensure success.
Many cases will settle after the issue of injunctive relief is resolved by the court,
especially if denied. The ruling from the court may support adding defendants,
additional claims for damages or eviscerate plaintiffs hopes and expectations.
While of critical importance, it is not quite as formal as a trial. As one court
stated:
The Court has concluded that the objections do not warrant exclusion of the
evidence. The Court has, however, carefully considered the reliability of all the
disputed evidence and will separately discuss the evidence as to which
objections were made. The strict rules of evidence do not apply to a hearing on
a motion for a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Securities al'ld E.:tch. Com,m'n
v. Cherie 933 F.2d 403,412 n.8 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 u.s. 1071
(1992); Asseo v. Pall Anlerican Grain Co.! 805 F.2d 23,25-26 (1st Cir.1986);
, COl'nln-odity Futures Trading COI'nln-'n v. Anlerican Metal E.:tch. Corp.! 693
F.Supp. 168, 173 (D.N.J.1988); Delman Fabrics Inc. v. Holland Fabrics, Inc.,
84 Civ. 2512, 1984 WL 367, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 17,1984). The Court has,
nevertheless, applied the Federal Rules of Evidence in determining the weight
to be accorded the evidence that was introduced and has also assessed whether
the evidence would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Zeneca Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 1999 WL 509471 (S.D.N.Y.,1999). Despite the
relaxed rules, counsel should make every effort to admit into evidence all key
documents and build the basis for injunctive relief from competent evidence.
Doing so will only benefit the case and increase the chance of success should the
injunction be appealed.
G-17
G-IS
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CIVIL ACTION NO. 98- _
PREFERRED CREDIT, INCORPORATED
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EQUITABLE
AND OTHER RELIEF
PC HOLDINGS GROUP CORPORATION,
PC MORTGAGE CORPORATION, PC
COMMERCIAL LENDING CORPORATION,
MICHAEL LIEBERMAN, JAMES R. TURNER,
JASON TURNER, JERRY J. TIDMORE,
ALETHA CONNER, and
OTHER UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS.
DEFENDANTS
PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff Preferred Credit, Incorporated, by its attorneys, complains against
Defendants PC Holdings Group Corporation, PC Mortgage Corporation, PC Commercial
Lending Corporation, Michael Lieberman, James R. Turner, Jason Turner, Jerry J.
Tidmore, Alethea Conner, and other unknown defendants as follows:
JURISDICTION
1. This Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1332(a), 1338(a) and (b) and 1367, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1121 and 1125(a). Venue is proper in
this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1400.
PARTIES
2. Plaintiff Preferred Credit, Incorporated ("Preferred Credit") is a Kentucky
corporation with its principal place of business in Lexington, Kentucky.
3. Upon information and belief, PC Holdings Group Corporation and the
other corporate defendants are Delaware corporations. On information and belief, all of
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the corporate defendants have offices in both Lexington, Kentucky and Dallas, Texas.
4. On information and belief, Michael Lieberman ("Lieberman") is a resident
of Lexington, Kentucky.
5. On information and belief, James R. Turner ("J.R. Turner") and Alethea
Conner ("Conner") are also residents of Lexington, Kentucky, and Jason Turner ("J.
Turner") is a resident of Lawrenceburg, Kentucky.
6. .On information and belief, Defendant Jerry J. Tidmore ("Tidmore") is a
resident of Dallas, Texas.
FACTS
7. Plaintiff Preferred Credit was incorporated in 1994 by Paulette Klein.
Preferred Credit has two officers: President - Paulette Klein; Vice President - Ken Klein.
8. Preferred Credit's main office is located in Lexington, Kentucky at 3650
Boston Road, Suite E, Lexington, Kentucky. Preferred Credit also has offices in
Columbus, Ohio and Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina.
9. Since its inception, Preferred Credit has been in the business of brokering
residential mortgage loans. Preferred Credit has never brokered a commercial loan.
Preferred Credit is now licensed to broker loans in Kentucky, Indiana, Ohio, Georgia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, Virginia and
Louisiana. Pre~erred Credit also brokers mortgage loans in Colorado, West Virginia and
Alabama, as these states do not require a mortgage brokerage license. Preferred Credit
expends substantial sums of money to maintain its loan broker licenses.
10. Over the years, Preferred Credit has expended great time and effort to
develop relationships with lenders through which it brokers loans. Preferred Credit's
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ability to grow and expand the number of lenders through which it may broker loans is
essential to Preferred Credit's ability to service its customers and its financial well-being.
11. Preferred Credit also expends a substantial amount of money each year to
locate, identify, contact and develop potential customers for whom it may broker a loan.
Preferred Credit does substantial repeat business for those customers for whom it brokers
a loan. Preferred Credit repeatedly contacts the same customers to determine if their
financial condition or situation has changed. These repeated efforts generate a significant
portion of Preferred Credit's business. In addition, Preferred Credit engages in
advertising, including radio and print media, and other marketing efforts.
12. As a result of many years of doing business, including servicing
customers, working with lenders, as well as its advertising efforts, Preferred Credit's
name has gained widespread and favorable public acceptance in Kentucky and many
other states in which it does business. Preferred Credit now owns the valuable good will
associated with its name and services it provides.
13. In or about May 1996, Defendant James R. Turner ("J.R. Turner") was
hired by Preferred Credit as a loan producer in its Columbus office. While a producer in
Columbus, J.R. Turner received a 36 percent commission on all revenues generated by
loans he closed.
14. On or about August 26, 1997, Preferred Credit offered J.R. Turner the
position of manager of its Lexington, Kentucky office. J.R. Turner accepted the offer and
began work in the Lexington office the next day.
15. As a manager of the Lexington office, J.R. Turner received a 45 percent
commission on revenues from all loans he closed, 5 percent commission on revenues
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from all other loans closed in the Lexington office, and 20 percent of all profits realized
by Preferred Credit in the Lexington office.
16. As a manager, Preferred Credit placed J.R. Turner in a position of trust
and granted him the freedom to make certain decisions that impacted the entire Lexington
office. Further, J.R. Turner received access to confidential and proprietary information of
Preferred Credit.
17. .Upon information and belief, J.R. Turner signed an employee non-
compete agreement with Preferred Credit. The terms and provisions of the non-compete
agreement executed by J.R. Turner are substantially the same to those in the form non-
compete employment agreement regularly used by Preferred Credit attached hereto as
Exhibit 1. Preferred Credit has searched for, but has been unable to locate, an executed
non-compete employment agreement for J.R. Turner.
18. On or about November 24, 1997, Defendant Lieberman was hired by
Preferred Credit in its Lexington office as a loan producer. As a loan producer,
Lieberman had access to corporate information, including the lenders with whom
Preferred Credit did business, how it generated new business and the methods by which
Preferred Credit worked to close loans. Lieberman received $600.00/week draw against
36 percent commission on all revenue received from loans Lieberman closed.
19. Currently, Lieberman owes Preferred Credit $3,800 for draws that
exceeded his earned commissions.
20. At the time Lieberman began to work for Preferred Credit, Lieberman
executed a non-compete employment agreement. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true
and correct copy of Lieberman's non-compete employment agreement.
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21. Prior to working for Preferred Credit, Lieberman was employed at Frisco
Diversified Company in Dallas, Texas. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct
copy of Lieberman's resume.
22. On or about December 31,1997, J. R. Turner, as manager of Preferred
Credit's Lexington office, hired his brother, Defendant Jason Turner, as a loan producer
in the Lexington office. Preferred Credit paid J. Turner a 36 percent commission on all
revenues from the loans that he closed as a loan producer. At that time, J. Turner
executed a non-compete employment agreement. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true
and correct copy of J. Turner's non-compete employment agreement.
23. In or about February 1998, J. R. Turner, as manager of Preferred Credit,
hired Defendant Alethea Conner ("Conner"). Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a true and
correct copy of the new hire salary confirmation sheet executed by Conner.
24. Between January 1, 1998 and the end of March 1998, the Lexington office
generated less and less revenues, while its expenses steadily climbed. Between January 1,
1998 and the end of March 1998, the Lexington office suffered losses in excess of
$20,000.00. The great majority of these losses resulted from draws paid to loan
producers who failed to generate revenue for Preferred Credit.
25. In response to the downsizing in the Lexington office profits, on March
11, 1998, Preferred Credit changed J.R. Turner's compensation, which now included a
guaranteed salary of $2,800.00Imonth plus a 30 percent commission on all profits from
the Lexington office (the "March 11, 1998 Agreement"). On that same day, J.R. Turner
accepted the offer.
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26. On or about March 26,1998, J.R. Turner requested an advance from
Preferred Credit against his future commissions. When Preferred Credit rejected the
request for an advance, Defendant J.R. Turner stated that he would not continue to work
under the March 11, 1998 Agreement.
27. Preferred Credit offered Defendant J.R. Turner $3,000.00/month plus 35
percent commissions on the profits from the Lexington office. Defendant J.R. Turner
accepted the offer from Preferred Credit ("March 26, 1998 Agreement"). Preferred
Credit and J.R. Turner agreed that the new compensation terms would begin on April 1,
1998.
28. On April 15, 1998, Defendant J.R. Turner told Preferred Credit that he
would not continue to work under the March 20, 1998 Agreement. Defendant J.R. Turner
offered to continue to work for Preferred Credit as a loan producer only for 36 percent
commission on all loans he closed and 9 percent commissions on all loans closed by his
brother, J. Turner. Preferred Credit accepted Defendant J.R. Turner's offer ("April 15,
1998 Agreement").
29. On April 15, 1998, Preferred Credit's regional secretary, Linda Windish,
noticed that telemarketing sheets and labels for 1,500 leads were missing.
30. On April 16, 1998, Defendant J.R. Turner admitted to officers of Preferred
Credit that he had removed the telemarketing sheets and labels from Preferred Credit's
office. He returned Preferred Credit's leads and corresponding labels later that afternoon.
31. On the evening of April 16, 1998, officers of Preferred Credit and other
employees conducted a search of its Lexington office. During that search and several
subsequent searches thereafter, Preferred Credit found documents which indicate, upon
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information and belief, that employees of Preferred Credit, Defendants Lieberman, J.R.
Turner, J. Turner and Conner committed the following acts:
(a) created new and competing companies under the name of PC
Holdings Group Corporation, PC Mortgage Corporation, PC
Commercial Lending Corporation and possibly others;
(b) rented office space in Lexington, Kentucky at 2250 Regency Road,
Suite 100 under the name of PC Mortgage Corporation and
negotiated with GTE for a telephone system for the office;
(c) attempted to broker commercial loans, using Preferred Credit's
name, in states wherein Preferred Credit was not licensed;
(d) negotiated with GTE for a new phone system for their office;
(e) conducted regular and on-going business with individuals in Texas
through a company called PC Holding Group Corp., d/b/a
Preferred Credit with Defendant Jerry J. Tidmore including
consulting and commercial loan brokering;
(0 copied and distributed business forms and marketing fliers created
and used by Preferred Credit with other company names;
(g) distributed correspondence and other documents under another
company's name with Preferred Credit's address and toll-free
telephone numbers;
(h) distributed correspondence and other documents throughout the
loan brokering industry which included "Preferred Credit" next to
and alongside the names of other companies established by the
Defendants creating an inference of association;
(i) solicited, accepted and diverted funds advanced by customers in
direct contravention of Preferred Credit's established policies and
business methods;
(j) issued a "loan commitment" in the name of Preferred Credit;
(k) misused, diverted and/or converted Preferred Credit funds to issue
advances to other Preferred Credit employees, for activities
believed to be associated with Defendant's new compensation [to
employees of the] Defendants' new companies, pay expenses such
as shipping and copying charges, and purchase supplies for their
new companies while still employed at Preferred Credit;
(1) placed false advertisements in a local Lexington newspaper which
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misrepresented that Preferred Credit was "under new ownership;"
(m) Otherwise committed acts which jeopardize Preferred Credit's
reputation in the residential loan brokerage industry, its licenses
and business relationships.
32. On Monday, April 20, 1998, Preferred Credit terminated J.R. Turner and J.
Turner.
33. On April 21, 1998 Preferred Credit terminated Lieberman.
34. .Since that time numerous other employees have left their employment
with Preferred Credit in Lexington.
35. On information and belief, some of Preferred Credits' former employees
are working for the Defendants and/or the corporate defendants.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty)
36. Plaintiff Preferred Credit hereby realleges and incorporates by reference
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 35 in this Verified Complaint.
37. Defendants Lieberman, J.R. Turner, J. Turner and Conner were placed in a
positio~ of trust with access to confidential and proprietary information belonging to
Plaintiff Preferred Credit.
38. While employed by Preferred Credit and continuing thereafter, Defendants
owed a fiduciary duty to Preferred Credit.
39. By the actions set forth herein, Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to
Plaintiff by and through, among other things:
A. wrongfully using funds, assets, information, resources, and
business relationships to begin their own competing companies
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while still employed with Preferred Credit;
B. wrongfully distributing materials which create a false association
between Preferred Credit and the corporate defendants created and
operated by Lieberman, J.R. Turner, J. Turner and Conner;
C. made numerous material misrepresentations of fact to officers of
Preferred Credit.
40. ·Such breaches by Defendants have and will proximately cause substantial
damages to Preferred Credit, including, but not limited to, lost profits. Further,
Defendants have been and will be unjustly enriched by their breaches insofar as they have
received compensation training and services from Preferred Credit for the period of their
employment during which they engaged in acts constituting breaches of their fiduciary
duties to Preferred Credit.
41. Defendants' breaches of their fiduciary duties were malicious, willful,
wanton and done with intent to injure Preferred Credit and its business.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Fraud and Conversion)
42. Preferred Credit hereby realleges and incorporates by references the
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 41 of this Verified Complaint.
43. Defendants Lieberman, J.R. Turner, J. Turner and Conner have converted
property of Preferred Credit to their own use and economic advantage and to the
detriment of Preferred Credit through their unauthorized use of various business services
including, but not limited to, Kinko's copy services, long distance telephone charges,
Airborne Express delivery services, and credit reporting systems of Preferred Credit for
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the use and development of their own company while in the employ of Preferred Credit.
44. Defendants made material misrepresentations of fact to officers of the
corporation that they would fulfill their obligations as employees of Preferred Credit with
integrity and honesty. Preferred Credit reasonably relied, to its detriment, on
Defendants' misrepresentations as stated above. Preferred Credit's justifiable reliance on
the Defendants' material misrepresentations of fact resulted in injury to Preferred Credit
in the form of lost profits, conversion of property, and damage to its business name and
reputation.
45. Defendants acts of fraud and conversion were malicious, willful, wanton
and done with intent to injury Preferred Credit and its business. As set forth herein,
Defendants executed a scheme to defraud Preferred Credit to convert business assets and
information for their own benefit and to gain an unfair business advantage for the
corporate defendants named herein.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Unfair Competition in Violation of KRS 365.880, et seq.)
46. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of
paragraphs 1 through 45 of this Verified Complaint.
47. The activities of Defendants' Lieberman, J.R. Turner, J. Turner and
Conner, as described above, constitute unfair competition and are in violation of KRS §
365.880, et seq., Kentucky's Trade Secret Act.
48. Unless Defendants are temporarily restrained, and preliminarily and
permanently enjoined, from continuing to engage in unfair competition in violating
Kentucky's Trade Secret Act, Preferred Credit will suffer immediate and continued
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irreparable injury, loss or damage for which there is no adequate remedy at law.
49. Preferred Credit has been and will continue to be damaged by Defendants'
unfair competition and usurpation of Preferred Credit's trade secrets in an amount to be
determined at trial.
50. Defendants' unfair competition and usurpation of Preferred Credit's trade
secrets is malicious, willful, wanton and done with intent to injure Preferred Credit and
its business. The receipt of Preferred Credit's trade secrets by Defendants Lieberman,
J.R. Turner, J. Turner, Conner, PC Holdings Group Corporation, Mortgage Corporation
and PC Commercial Lending Corporation constitutes misappropriation under Kentucky's
Trade Secret Act, KRS 365.880, et seq. Pursuant to KRS 365.882, Preferred Credit is
entitled to injunctive relief. In addition, pursuant to KRS 365.884, Preferred Credit is
entitled to damages for any profits or benefits received by the Defendants from their
misappropriation of Preferred Credit's trade secrets.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of ConfidentialitylNon-Compete Agreements)
51. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of
paragraphs 1 through 50 of this Verified Complaint.
52. The Non-Compete Employment Agreements attached hereto as Exhibits 1,
2, 4 constitute valid, and binding agreements upon the Defendants J.R. Turner, J. Turner
and Lieberman.
53. The Employee Non-Compete Agreements expressly provide that the
Defendants agree not to disclose Preferred Credit's proprietary information and not to
accept employment or serve in any other capacity either directly or indirectly with any
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organization engaged in any activities related to mortgage business or compete with
Preferred Credit, Inc. in any loan origination capacity with any other employer, including
self employment, for a period of five (5) years following their termination from Preferred
Credit.
54. J.R. Turner, J. Turner and Lieberman have breached their Non-Compete
Employment Agreements as a direct and proximate result of their misuse, misdirection,
and conversion of Preferred Credit proprietary information and other business services in
connection with their creation of, and business conducted under the name of, PC
Holdings Group Corporation, PC Mortgage Corporation, and PC Commercial Lending
Corporation.
55. Unless Defendants J.R. Turner, J. Turner and Lieberman are temporarily
restrained, and preliminarily and permanently enjoined from continuing to breach their
Non-Compete Employment Agreements, Preferred Credit will suffer immediate and
continued irreparable injury, loss, or damages for which there is no adequate remedy at
law.
56. Preferred Credit has been and will continue to be damaged by Defendants
J.R. Turner, J. Turner and Lieberman's breach of their Confidentiality Agreements in an
amount to be determined at trial, but which is in excess of this Court's jurisdictional
minimum requirements.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty)
57. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of
paragraphs 1 through 56 of this Verified Complaint.
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58. Tidmore conspired with Lieberman, J.R. Turner, J. Turner and Conner to
convert Preferred Credit assets and business opportunities.
59. At the time Tidmore engaged in the brokering of loans and other business
activities with Lieberman, J.R. Turner, J. Turner and Conner and the corporate
defendants, Tidmore knew that defendants Lieberman and Turner were acting in breach
of their fiduciary duties owed to Preferred Credit.
60. .Defendant Tidmore's actions induced and/or aided and abetted then
current employees of Preferred Credit to breach their fiduciary duties owed to Preferred
Credit. Specifically, Tidmore aided, abetted and otherwise induced Lieberman, J.R.
Turner, J. Turner and Conner to convert Preferred Credit's confidential and proprietary
information, other information or other business services, and business opportunities for
the use of the corporate defendants and for themselves individually.
61. As a result of Tidmore's aiding and abetting the breaches of fiduciary duty
by Lieberman, J.R. Turner, J. Turner and Conner, Preferred Credit has been and will
continue to be damaged by their breaches of fiduciary duty and other agreements in an
amount to be determined at trial, but in excess of this Court's minimum jurisdictional
requirements..
62. As a direct and proximate result of Tidmore's aiding and abetting the
breaches of fiduciary duties of Defendants' Lieberman, J.R. Turner, J. Turner and
Conner, Preferred Credit will continue to suffer immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damages for which there is no adequate remedy at law.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Intentional Interference with Existing and/or Prospective Contractual Relations)
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63. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 62 in this Verified Complaint.
64. Through the actions alleged herein, defendants Lieberman, Tidmore, J.R.
Turner, J. Turner and Conner intentionally interfered with Preferred Credit's existing and
prospective contractual and business relationships with existing and prospective
customers of Preferred Credit, lenders and others involved in the residential mortgage
brokering industry.
65. As a result of the defendants tortious conduct and the continuation of their
activities, customers and potential customers were induced not to enter into or continue
their relationship with Preferred Credit.
66. As a result of the defendants tortious conduct and the continuation of their
activities, the defendants prevented customers and potential customers from entering into
or continuing their relationship with Preferred Credit.
67. As a direct and proximate result of Tidmore's aiding and abetting the
breaches of fiduciary duties of Defendants' Lieberman, J.R. Turner, J. Turner and
Conner, Preferred Credit will continue to suffer immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damages for which there is no adequate remedy at law.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing)
68. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 67 in this Verified Complaint.
69. Under Kentucky law, every contract imposes upon each party a duty of
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good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.
70. The actions by Defendants Lieberman, J.R. Turner, and J. Turner,
constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing included by
Kentucky law in their respective Non-Compete Employment Agreements attached hereto
as Exhibits 1, 2 and 4.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Violation of § 43(a) of the LanhamAct)
71. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 70 of this Verified Complaint.
72. Since at least 1990, and long prior to the acts of the Defendats described
herein, Preferred Credit has continuously used (and continues to use) in interstate
commerce its name in connection with its business of brokering residential mortgage
loans to individuals in numerous states.
73. Since long prior to the acts of the Defendants as alleged herein, Preferred
Credit has expended substantial sums of money promoting and advertising its services
throughout the numerous states in which it brokers loans.
74. As a result of Preferred Credit's long and continuous use of its name in
interstate commerce, its extensive promotion and advertisements of its mortgage
brokering services under the its name, the care and skill exercised by Preferred Credit in
its industry, and its outstanding reputation with lenders and other service providers in the
residential mortgage brokering industry, its name has gained widespread and favorable
public acceptance and association with Preferred Credit in this district and throughout the
other states in which Preferred Credit does business.
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75. As a result of the aforementioned use, promotion and advertisements of its
name and services, Preferred Credit has built up and now owns valuable goodwill which
is recognized by its name. By their use of its name, toll-free telephone numbers and
Lexington office address; in association with illegal and unlicensed activities in various
states, including but not limited to, Texas, Tennessee, Indiana, Nevada and
Massachusetts, and in association with the names and marks of PC Holdings Group
Corporation, PC Mortgage Corporation, and PC Commercial Lending Corporation, and in
association with commercial loan brokering and other activities in which Preferred Credit
does not do business, the Defendants have, or are likely to, cause confusion or mistake or
deceive consumers as to the affiliation, connection or association of the Defendants and
their illegal corporations with Preferred Credit.
76. As a result of the aforesaid acts, Preferred Credit has suffered, and will
continue to suffer, irreparable damage to its name, good will, and numerous business
relations, lost sales, lost profits, and market confusion and loss of market. Unless
Defendants are temporarily restrained and preliminarily and permanently enjoined from
continuing their violations of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, Preferred Credit will suffer
immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damages for which there is no adequate remedy
at law.
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Action for an Accounting)
77. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 76 of this Verified Complaint.
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78. Upon information and belief, Defendants continue to receive revenue
and/or commissions from leads, customer relations, and business contacts established
while employees for·Preferred Credit.
79. Upon information and belief, Defendants have in their possession loan file
folders which were created while they were employed with Preferred Credit. Further,
upon information and belief, Defendants continue to work on, develop, or process loans
which originated while they were employed with Preferred Credit.
80. Defendants possess all documentation which is needed to calculate any
profits that Defendants may have gained as a result of misappropriation of trade secrets,
proprietary information, and other business information and services while employed at
Preferred Credit.
81. Monetary damages are inadequate in this case without a complete
accounting of profits received by Defendants as a result of their breach of fiduciary duties
and other activities as alleged herein. Without such a determination by the Court based
upon the documents and other records which Defendants now control, Preferred Credit
has no method of calculating the true amount of damages owed to it.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
THEREFORE, Plaintiff Preferred Credit, Incorporated demands judgment against
Defendants PC Holding Group Corporation, PC Mortgage Corporate, PC
Commercial Lending Corporation, Michael Lieberman, James R. Turner, Jason
Turner, Jerry Tidmore, Aletha Conner and other unknown defendants, as follows:
A. A complete accounting of, and an award against all defendants, jointly and
severally, for all profits or income obtained by the Defendants earned
through their use of information, funds, or services wrongfully converted
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from Plaintiff;
B. An award of damages against defendants Michael Lieberman, James
Turner and Jimmy Turner for all compensation received from Plaintiff
during the period that they engaged in acts which constitute a breach of
their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff in an amount to be determined at
trial, but in excess of this Court's jurisdictional limits ofthis Court;
C. An award of punitive damages against all defendants for their malicious,
willful and wanton activities complained of in this Verified Complaint in
an amount to be determined at trial, but in excess of this Court's
jurisdictional limits of this Court;
D. 'An award of damages in an amount as may be determined at trial to
reimburse Plaintiff for all damages including lost revenues and profits,
loss of goodwill, market, all costs associated with defendants' breach of
their fiduciary duties, and customer confusion and the cost of all remedial
advertising, suffered by reason of the violation by Defendants of the
Lanham Act, to be trebled in accordance with 15 U.S.C. §1117;
E. An award against all defendants for all costs of this action, together with
reasonable attorneys' fees and disbursements incurred by Plaintiff herein
pursuant to the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1117(b), Section 7 of the Non-
Compete Employment Agreements, and applicable Kentucky statutes and
common law;
F. And an award for injunctive relief as set forth in Plaintiff's Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order filed in conjunction with the Verified
Complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
GREG E. MITCHELL
SUSAN C. SEARS
THOMAS G. GRACE
FROST & JACOBS
1100 Vine Center Tower
333 West Vine Street
Lexington, Kentucky 40507-1634
(606) 254-1100
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COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
VERIFICATION
I, Paulette Klein, under oath, state that I am President of Preferred Credit,
Incorporation, and that I have read the foregoing Verified Complaint and that the facts set
forth in the Verified Complaint are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and
information.
PAULETTE KLEIN
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA )
COUNTY OF )
The foregoing was subscribed and sworn to before me by Paulette Klein this
day of May, 1998.
(SEAL)
Notary Public
My commission expires
39778.01
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CODlm.onwealth of Kentucky
Fayette circuit court
Division
Case No.: - _
COMPANY
Plaintiff,
v.
Ex-Employee,
Defendant.
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
For its Complaint against Defendant Ex-Employee ("Ex-Employee"), Company
states as follows:
1. Company brings this action to enforce Ex-Employee's Agreement dated
October 15, 1993 that includes non-competition and non-disclosure provisions
("Agreement") (attached as Exhibit A) and to prevent Ex-Employee from unfairly
competing against Company through his disclosure and/or misappropriation of
Company's confidential and proprietary information and trade secrets.
THE PARTIES
2. Company is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Ohio with its headquarters and principal place of business in Cincinnati, Ohio.
3. Ex-Employee currently resides in and is a citizen of Hamilton County,
Ohio and is a former employee of Company.
4. Through his employment with Company, Ex-Employee acquired extensive
knowledge of Company's confidential and proprietary information and trade secrets.
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5. Ex-Employee left his employment with Company.
6. This Court has jurisdiction over all parties to this litigation.
7. Venue of this litigation is properly lodged in this Court.
8. Ex-Employee's breach of his Agreement and his disclosure and
misappropriation of Company's trade secrets have resulted in both irreparable harm as
well as damages.
9. .Company designs, manufactures and distributes important stuff. Company
maintains it manufacturing facility and main offices in Lexington, Kentucky. Central to
Company's b'usiness are its: (1) innovative and well-developed computer-aided methods
of designing and manufacturing its stuff; and (2) methods for manufacturing other stuff.
10. Ex-Employee began his employment with Company in March 1977.
11. During the course of his employment, Ex-Employee received, developed
on behalf of Company and regularly used a significant amount of confidential, proprietary
information and trade secrets, including but not limited to information concerning
computer-aided design of the stuff.
12. On or about October 15, 1993, Ex-Employee signed the Agreement dated
October 15, 1993.
13. As consideration for the Agreement, in an effort to further support Ex-
Employee's efforts at Company and the computer aided design area in which Ex-
Employee worked, Company agreed to continue investing capital into that area, raise Ex-
Employee's salary, and allow him to participate in Company's bonus program.
14. Pursuant to the Agreement, Ex-Employee agreed to keep confidential
certain information to which he had access at Company. The Agreement provided as
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follows:
[Quote Agreement]
15. Pursuant to the Agreement, Ex-Employee agreed to certain non-compete
provisions. The Agreement provides as follows:
[Quote Agreement]
16. Company fully performed under the Agreement.
17. While at Company and after execution of the Agreement, Ex-Employee
worked with models and molds of the stuff with the aid of computers at Company.
18. Company has undertaken efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain the secrecy of its confidential and proprietary information and
trade secrets. Company gains a competitive advantage because of its confidential and
proprietary information and trade secrets.
19. Throughout his employment with Company, Ex-Employee was permitted
access to and gained intimate, detailed and comprehensive knowledge of Company's
confidential and proprietary information and trade secrets.
20. In August 1999, Ex-Employee left the employ of Company.
21. Ex-Employee has and continues to violate the confidentiality and non-
competition portions of his Agreement. More specifically, Ex-Employee has:
a. First bad act
b. Second bad act.
c. Third bad act.
COUNT I - BREACH OF CONTRACT
22. Company incorporates by reference the allegations contained in
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Paragraphs 1 through 21 above as if fully rewritten herein.
23. Ex-Employee's actions and threatened actions as described above
constitute material breaches of his Agreement.
24. As a result of the intentional and willful breaches of Ex-Employee's
Agreement, Company is entitled to damages and injunctive relief.
COUNT II • MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS
25. .Company incorporates by reference the allegations contained in
Paragraphs 1 through 24 above as if fully rewritten here.
26. Ex-Employee's activities described above constitute actual and/or
threatened misappropriation of Company's trade secrets, in violation of the Kentucky
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, KRS 365.880, et seq., and the common law of Kentucky, and
for which Company is entitled to injunctive and monetary relief.
27. Ex-Employee's actual or threatened misappropriation of Company's trade
secrets was willful and malicious, done with intent to injure Company and its business.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands the following relief:
1. Enter a preliminary and permanent injunction:
a. Enjoining Ex-Employee from disclosing any of Company's
confidential and proprietary business information and trade secrets
to any third party;
b. Enjoining Ex-Employee misappropriating or threatening to
misappropriate any of Company's confidential and proprietary
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business information and trade secrets;
c. Ordering Ex-Employee to return all of Company's confidential and
proprietary business information and trade secrets, and all copies,
thereof, to Company immediately;
d. Enjoining Ex-Employee from further breaching his Agreement.
2. An award of compensatory damages of more than $25,000 against Ex-
Employee; and
3. An award of punitive and exemplary damages against Ex-Employee for his
willful and malicious conduct; and
4. An award of prejudgment and post-judgment interest; and
5. An award of Company's reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in
this matter; and
6. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
VERIFICATION OF COMPLAINT
STATE OF OHIO )
) ss:
COUNTY OF HAMILTON )
I, Company President, being duly cautioned and sworn, state that I am President
of the Company., the Plaintiff in this action, and that I am authorized to act as an agent of
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Plaintiff for the purpose of verifying the Complaint herein. To the extent I have personal
knowledge of the matters alleged in the Complaint, the information is true and accurate to
the best of my knowledge and belief. As to any matters for which I do not have personal
knowledge, I am authorized by Plaintiff to state that Plaintiff is informed and believe that
the allegations of the Complaint are true and accurat~ to the best of its knowledge and
belief.
President _
Subscribed and sworn to before me this _ day of , 2001.
Notary Public
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THOMAS G. GRACE Tgrace@fbtlaw.com (502) 568-0227 400 West Market Street
32nd Floor Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3363 (502) 589-5400 Facsimile (502) 581-1087
www.frostbrowntodd.com October 10, 2001
President George W. Bush
600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500
RE: Company
Dear President Bush:
This office represents Company.
We understand that New Employer recently hired one of Company's former
employees, Mr. John Doe. We are informed, however, after Mr. Doe left Company, he
did not return all of the Company's property, including its confidential and proprietary
information. In addition, we understand that Mr. Doe has recently been soliciting
Company's customers on behalf of New Employer.
We are writing to demand that New Company immediately intervene here and Mr.
Doe to cease and desist from soliciting Company's customers. We also request New
Company's assistance in requiring Mr. Doe to return all of the Company's property,
including its confidential and proprietary information, and mandating that he not disclose
or use Company's confidential and proprietary information in connection with his duties
for New Company.
In July 1998, while Mr. Doe was employed by Company, he signed an Agreement
Concerning Non-Disclosure of Company Information (the "July 1998 Agreement"),
pursuant to which he agreed "to hold in strictest confidence, and not to use, except for the
benefit of Company, or to disclose, transfer or reveal, directly or indirectly to any person
or entity, any Confidential Information without the prior written authorization of
Company." The July 1998 Agreement defined "Confidential Information" to mean, "any
and all information which is not generally known and which is proprietary to Company or
any of its clients, consultants, licensors, licensed dealers or distributors" including
"business plans, customer lists, consultants, financial information, and trade secrets about
Company[.]"
Mr. Doe also agreed in the July 1998 Agreement that, upon the termination of his
employment with the Company, he would "immediately deliver to [his] immediate
.supervisor at Company all papers, notes, data, reference materials, sketches, drawings,
memoranda, documentation, software, tools, apparatus and any other materials furnished
to [him] by Company or which were prepared or made, in whole or in part, by [him] at
any time during [his] ~ssociation with or employment by Company[.]" In July 2000, Mr.
Doe signed an AT-Will Employment and Confidentiality Agreement (the "July 2000
Agreement"), pursuant to which he agreed to preserve the Company's confidences, to
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return the Company's property and not to solicit the Company's customers.
In addition to his obligation under the July 1998 and July 2000 Agreements, Mr.
Doe is required to adhere to obligations imposed by applicable state law regarding,
among other things, returning the Company's property, maintaining the confidentiality of
the Company's proprietary information, including its trade secrets, and refraining from
soliciting or interfering with the Company's customers.
Although Mr. Doe returned some of the Company's property upon termination,
we are informed that he has not returned all of Company's property. However, he is not
and was not authorized to retain any of the Company's property and he certainly was not
permitted to retain, disclose or use any of the Company's software or its confidential
information including Company's customer database that was maintained on the
Goldmine software or any information obtained or derived from that database.
Mr. Doe's wrongful retention of/refusal to return this property and confidential
information to the Company and his use and/or disclosure of this property and
confidential information violates the July 1998 and July 2000 Agreements as well as his
obligations under applicable state law. Likewise, Mr. Doe's improper solicitations of the
Company's customers also violates the July 1998 and July 2000 Agreements and
applicable state law, including the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Because Mr. Doe appears
to be acting on behalf of New Company, New Company may be held liable here too.
This situation must be immediately corrected and Mr. Doe must immediately
return all of the Company's property to Company, affirm in writing that he has done so,
permit the Company to inspect his computer(s) to ensure that he has retained no copies
(or any part thereot) of such information, and cease and desist from soliciting and
interfering with the Company's customers. Furthermore, Mr. Doe and New Company
must take appropriate measures to ensure that he does not disclose or use Company's
confidential and proprietary information in the future.
While Company has no intention or desire to interfere with Mr. Doe's
employment or other relationships with New Company, this situation must be remedied
immediately. If New Company and Mr. Doe immediately agree to the foregoing,
Company is willing to amicably resolve this matter. If, however, Mr. Doe and New
Company fail or refuse to do so, Company reserves the right to pursue all available legal
remedies including, without limitation, filing a lawsuit in the United States District Court,
seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. In this regard, if the
Company is forced to commence litigation here, Company will not only seek an
injunction barring his unlawful disclosure or use of the Company's confidential
information, including its customer information, and the return of its property, but
Company will also seek to recover damages and attorney's fees.
After you have received and reviewed this letter, please call me at your earliest
convenience to discuss this matter further.
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Sincerely,
Thomas G. Grace
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1. Types of intangible assets
a. Marketing and sales related - Trademarks, trade names, brand names, logos,
customer lists, customer relationships, backlog, open purchase orders
b. Technological - Patents, technical know-how, proprietary software, trade secrets,
proprietary processes
c. Artistic -literary works, copyrights, compositions, maps, engravings
d. Contractual - Licenses, franchise agreements, noncompete agreements, supplier
contracts
e. Geographical - Leasehold interests, easements, air rights, water rights
f. Human resources - assembled workforce
g. Goodwill - Going concern value
2. Intellectual property - Intangible asset with legal protection
a. Marketing - Trademarks and service marks
b. Technology - Patents, industrial designs and trade secrets, computer software
copyrights
c. Artistic - literary and musical copyrights
3. Reasons for valuation of intangible assets
a. Purchase price allocation for financial accounting - Statements on Financial
Accounting Standards number 141 & 142
b. Purchase price allocation for income tax accounting - Internal Revenue Code
Sections 1060 & 197
c. Preacquisition planning
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d. Financing
e. Reorganization and Bankruptcy analysis
f. Establishment of royalty rates
g. Intercompany transfer pricing - internal revenue code section 482
h. Income tax planning and compliance - Charitable donations, S corporation
elections, Intangible property holding company royalty rates
i. Ad Valorem Property Taxes
j. Litigation Support
k. Business Formations
1. General business planning
4. Defining the Appraisal Assignment
a. Objective
i. Asset to be appraised
ii. Ownership interest to be appraised
iii. Standard and premise of value
iv. The as of date of the appraisal
b. Purpose
i. Use of the appraisal
ii. Parties relying on the appraisal
c. Description of the assets to be appraised
i. Physical description
ii. Functional description
iii. Technical description
iv. Legal description
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5. Valuation approaches - Basically the same as for any business appraisal
a. Cost approach
b. 11arketapproach
c. Income approach
6. Cost approach -
a. Principle of substitution - An investor would pay no more for an intangible asset
that what it would cost to obtain an asset with comparable utility.
i. Reproduction cos~ - developing, constructing or purchasing an exact
replica
ii. Replacement cost - recreate the utility of the intangible asset
b. Adjusted for obsolescence
7. Market approach
a. Comparable transactions selected
i. Asset type
ii. Asset use
iii. Industry in which the asset is applied
iv. Timeliness of transactions
b. Analysis of market condition
c. Pricing multiples developed (price per unit)
i. Physical units such as
1. per customer
2. per unit of production
3. per line of computer code
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ii. Financial units such as
1. per revenue
2. per net income
3. per dollar invested
d. Methods
i. Sales transactions method
ii. Relief from royalty method
iii. Comparative income- additional income generated over and above a
comparable company as a result of the intangible
iv. Rules of Thumb
8. Income approach
a. Expected benefits or cash flow from the intangible asset
i. Excludes income from other tangible or intangible assets
ii. Excludes income from goodwill
b. Required rate of return
c. Estimated projection period - remaining useful life considerations
i. Legallife
ii. Contractual life
iii. Physical life
iv. Functional analysis - Changes in technology
v. Operational analysis - Changes in management or regulations
vi. Economic analysis - Changes in demand
vii. Analytical/statistical
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d. Methods for measuring income
i. Incremental levels of income because of the intangible asset
1. Increased revenue based on price
2. Increased revenue based on volume
3. Increased period of revenue recognition
4. Decreased costs based on efficiency
5. Decreased cost based on production levels
6. Other decreased costs
ii. Amount by which income would decline without the intangible asset
iii. Relief from royalty because the intangible asset was owned and not
licensed
iv. Difference in value of a business with and without the intangible
v. Residual value of a business over other tangible and intangible assets
e. Valuation methods
i. Incremental Income Analyses
ii. Profit Split Analyses
iii. Royalty Rate Analyses
9. Valuation adjustments
a. Marketability -Since intangible assets are not readily traded on an open
exchange, there is little empirical data to support adjustments, however, the
liquidity of the asset must be considered
b. Minority or Frac~onal interests - unlike valuations of closely held stock, there
are very few transactions of intangible assets on a minority or fractional interest
basis.
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c. Other adjustments - When comparable transactions are located, adjustments
may be warranted when the price paid is in terms other than a cash equivalent
price.
10. Differences between business valuation and intangible asset valuation
a. Intangibles generally have a finite ~e
b. Generally, risk is higher for a single intangible asset than for an entire business
enterprise.
c. Only income associated with the intangible asset is considered net of related cost.
H-6
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Summary of Statement No. 141
Business Combinations
(Issued 6/01)
Summary
This Statement addresses financial accounting and reporting for
business combinations and supersedes APB Opinion No. 16,
Business Combinations, and FASB Statement No. 38, Accounting
for Preacquisition Contingencies of Purchased Enterprises. All
business combinations in the scope of this Statement are to be
accounted for using one method, the purchase method.
Reasons for Issuing This Statement
Under Opinion 16, business combinations were accounted for using
one of two methods, the pooling-of-interests method (pooling
method) or the purchase method. Use of the pooling method was
required whenever 12 criteria were met; otherwise, the purchase
method was to be used. Because those 12 criteria did not
distinguish economically dissimilar transactions, similar business
combinations were accounted for using different methods that
produced dramatically different financial statement results.
Consequently:
• Analysts and other users of financial statements indicated
that it was difficult to compare the financial results of entities
because different methods of accounting for business
combinations were used.
• Users of financial statements also indicated a need for better
information about intangible assets because those assets are
an increasingly important economic resource for many
entities and are an increasing proportion of the assets
acquired in many business combinations. While the purchase
method recognizes all intangible assets acquired in a
business combination (either separately or as goodwill), only
those intangible assets previously recorded by the acquired
entity are recognized when the pooling method is used.
• Company managements indicated that the differences
between the pooling and purchase methods of accounting for
business combinations affected competition in markets for
mergers and acquisitions.
Differences between This Statement and Opinion 16
The provisions of this Statement reflect a fundamentally different
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approach to accounting for business combinations than was taken
in Opinion 16. The single-method approach used in this Statement
reflects the conclusion that virtually all business combinations are
acquisitions and, thus, all business combinations should be
accounted for in the same way that other asset acquisitions are
accounted for-based on the values exchanged.
This Statement changes the accounting for business combinations
in Opinion 16 in the following significant respects:
• This Statement requires that all business combinations be
accounted for by a single method-the purchase method.
• In contrast to Opinion 16, which required separate recognition
of intangible assets that can be identified and named, this
Statement requires that they be recognized as assets apart
from goodwill if they meet one of two criteria-the
contractual-legal criterion or the separability criterion. To
assist in identifying acquired intangible assets, this Statement
also provides an illustrative list of intangible assets that meet
either of those criteria.
• In addition to the disclosure requirements in Opinion 16, this
Statement requires disclosure of the primary reasons for a
business combination and the allocation of the purchase
price paid to the assets acquired and liabilities assumed by
major balance sheet caption. When the amounts of goodwill
and intangible assets acquired are significant in relation to
the purchase price paid, disclosure of other information about
those assets is required, such as the amount of goodwill by
reportable segment and the amount of the purchase price
assigned to each major intangible asset class.
This Statement does not change many of the provisions of Opinion
16 and Statement 38 related to the application of the purchase
method. For example, this Statement does not fundamentally
change the guidance for determining the cost of an acquired entity
and allocating that cost to the assets acquired and liabilities
assumed, the accounting for contingent consideration, and the
accounting for preacquisition contingencies. That guidance is
carried forward in this Statement (but was not reconsidered by the
Board). Also, this Statement does not change the requirement to
write off certain research and development assets acquired in a
business combination as required by FASB Interpretation No.4,
Applicability of FASB Statement No.2 to Business Combinations
Accounted for by the Purchase Method.
How the Changes in This Statement Improve Financial
Reporting
The changes to accounting for business combinations required by
this Statement improve financial reporting because the financial
statements of entities that engage in business combinations will
better reflect the underlying economics of those transactions. In
particular, application of this Statement will result in financial
statements that:
• Better reflect the investment made in an acquired entity-the
purchase method records a business combination based on
the values exchanged, thus users are provided information
about the total purchase price paid to acquire another entity,
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which allows for more meaningful evaluation of the
subsequent performance of that investment. Similar
information is not provided when the pooling method is used.
• Improve the comparability of reported financial
information-all business combinations are accounted for
using a single method, thus, users are able to compare the
financial results of entities that engage in business
combinations on an apples-to-apples basis. That is because
the assets acquired and liabilities assumed in all business
combinations are recognized and measured in the same way
regardless of the nature of the consideration exchanged for
them.
• Provide more complete financial information-the explicit
criteria for recognition of intangible assets apart from goodwill
and the expanded disclosure requirements of this Statement
provide more information about the assets acquired and
liabilities assumed in business combinations. That additional
information should, among other things, provide users with a
better understanding of the resources acquired and improve
their ability to assess future profitability and cash flows.
Requiring one method of accounting reduces the costs of
accounting for business combinations. For example, it eliminates
the costs incurred by entities in positioning themselves to meet the
criteria for using the pooling method, such as the monetary and
nonmonetary costs of taking actions they might not otherwise have
taken or refraining from actions they might otherwise have taken.
How the Conclusions in This Statement Relate to the
Conceptual Framework
The Board concluded that because virtually all business
combinations are acquisitions, requiring one method of accounting
for economically similar transactions is consistent with the concepts
of representational faithfulness and comparability as discussed in
FASB Concepts Statement No.2, Qualitative Characteristics of
Accounting Information. In developing this Statement, the Board
also concluded that goodwill should be recognized as an asset
because it meets the assets definition in FASB Concepts Statement
No.6, Elements ofFinancial Statements, and the asset recognition
criteria in FASB Concepts Statement No.5, Recognition and
Measurement in Financial Statements of Business Enterprises.
The Board also noted that FASB Concepts Statement No.1,
Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises, states
that financial reporting should provide information that helps in
assessing the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of prospective net
cash inflows to an entity. The Board noted that because the
purchase method records the net assets acquired in a business
combination at their fair values, the information provided by that
method is more useful in assessing the cash-generating abilities of
the net assets acquired than the information provided by the pooling
method.
Some of the Board's constituents indicated that the pooling method
should be retained for public policy reasons. For example, some
argued that eliminating the pooling method would impede
consolidation of certain industries, reduce the amount of capital
flowing into certain industries, and slow the development of new
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technology. Concepts Statement 2 states that a necessary and
important characteristic of accounting information is neutrality. In the
context of business combinations, neutrality means that the
accounting standards should neither encourage nor discourage
business combinations but rather, provide information about those
combinations that is fair and evenhanded. The Board concluded that
its public policy goal is to issue accounting standards that result in
neutral and representatiQnally faithful financial information and that
eliminating the pooling method is consistent with that goal.
The Effective Date of This Statement
The provisions of this Statement apply to all business combinations
initiated after June 30, 2001. This Statement also applies to all
business combinations accounted for using the purchase method
for which the date of acquisition is July 1, 2001, or later.
This Statement does not apply, however, to combinations of two or
more not-for-profit organizations, the acquisition of a for-profit
business entity by a not-for-profit organization, and combinations of
two or more mutual enterprises.
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Summary of Statement No. 142
Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets
(Issued 6/01)
Summary
This Statement addresses financial accounting and reporting for
acquired goodwill and other intangible assets and supersedes APB
Opinion No. 17, Intangible Assets. It addresses how intangible
assets that are acquired individually or with a group of other assets
(but not those acquired in a business combination) should be
accounted for in financial statements upon their acquisition. This
Statement also addresses how goodwill and other intangible assets
should be accounted for after they have been initially recognized in
the financial statements.
Reasons for Issuing This Statement
Analysts and other users of financial statements, as well as
company managements, noted that intangible assets are an
increasingly important economic resource for many entities and are
an increasing proportion of the assets acquired in many
transactions. As a result, better information about intangible assets
was needed. Financial statement users also indicated that they did
not regard goodwill amortization expense as being useful
information in analyzing investments.
Differences between This Statement and Opinion.17
This Statement changes the unit of account for goodwill and takes a
very different approach to how goodwill and other intangible assets
are accounted for subsequent to their initial recognition. Because
goodwill and some intangible assets will no longer be amortized, the
reported amounts of goodwill and intangible assets (as well as total
assets) will not decrease at the same time and in the same manner
as under previous standards. There may be more volatility in
reported income than under previous standards because
impairment losses are likely to occur irregularly and in varying
amounts.
This Statement changes the subsequent accounting for goodwill
and other intangible assets in the following significant respects:
• Acquiring entities usually integrate acquired entities into their
operations, and thus the acquirers' expectations of benefits
from the resulting synergies usually are reflected in the
premium that they pay to acquire those entities. However, the
transaction-based approach to accounting for goodwill under
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Opinion 17 treated the acquired entity as if it remained a
stand-alone entity rather than being integrated with the
acquiring entity; as a result, the portion of the premium
related to expected synergies (goodwill) was not accounted
for appropriately. This Statement adopts a more aggregate
view of goodwill and bases the accounting for goodwill on the
units of the combined entity into which an acquired entity is
integrated (those units are referred to as reporting units).
• Opinion 17 presumed that goodwill and all other intangible
assets were wasting assets (that is, finite lived), and thus the
amounts assigned to them should be amortized in
determining net income; Opinion 17 also mandated an
arbitrary ceiling of 40 years for that amortization. This
Statement does not presume that those assets are wasting
assets. Instead, goodwill and intangible assets that have
indefinite useful lives will not be amortized but rather will be
tested at least annually for impairment. Intangible assets that
have finite usefu.1 lives will continue to be amortized over their
useful lives, but without the constraint of an arbitrary ceiling.
• Previous standards prOVided little guidance about how to
determine and measure goodwill impairment; as a result, the
accounting for goodwill impairments was not consistent and
not comparable and yielded information of questionable
usefulness. This Statement provides specific guidance for
testing goodwill for impairment. Goodwill will be tested for
impairment at least annually using a two-step process that
begins with an estimation of the fair value of a reporting unit.
The first step is a screen for potential impairment, and the
second step measures the amount of impairment, if any.
However, if certain criteria are met, the requirement to test
goodwill for impairment annually can be satisfied without a
remeasurement of the fair value of a reporting unit.
• In addition, this Statement provides specific guidance on
testing intangible assets that will not be amortized for
impairment and thus removes those intangible assets from
the scope of other impairment guidance. Intangible assets
that are not amortized will be tested for impairment at least
annually by comparing the fair values of those assets with
their recorded amounts.
• This Statement requires disclosure of information about
goodwill and other intangible assets in the years subsequent
to their acquisition that was not previously required. Required
disclosures include information about the changes in the
carrying amount of goodwill from period to period (in the
aggregate and by reportable segment), the carrying amount
of intangible assets by major intangible asset class for those
assets subject to amortization and for those not subject to
amortization, and the estimated intangible asset amortization
expense for the next five years.
This Statement carries forward without reconsideration the
provisions of Opinion 17 related to the accounting for internally
developed intangible assets. This Statement also does not change
the requirement to expense the cost of certain acquired research
and development assets at the date of acquisition as required by
FASB Statement No.2, Accounting for Research and Development
Costs, and FASB Interpretation No.4, Applicability of FASB
Statement No. 2 to Business Combinations Accounted for by the
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Purchase Method.
How the Changes in This Statement Improve Financi·al
Reporting
The changes included in this Statement will improve financial
reporting because the financial statements of entities that acquire
goodwill and other intangible assets will better reflect the underlying
economics of those assets. As a result, financial statement users
will be better able to understand the investments made in those
assets and the SUbsequent performance of those investments. The
enhanced disclosures about goodwill and intangible assets
subsequent to their acquisition also will provide users with a better
understanding of the expectations about and changes in those
assets over time, thereby improving their ability to assess future
profitability and cash flows.
How the Conclusions in This Statement Relate to the
Conceptual Framework
The Board concluded that amortization of goodwill was not
consistent with the concept of representational faithfulness, as
discussed in FASB Concepts Statement No.2, Qualitative
Characteristics ofAccounting Information. The Board concluded that
nonamortization of goodwill coupled with impairment testing is
consistent with that concept. The appropriate balance of both
relevance and reliability and costs and benefits also was central to
the Board's conclusion that this Statement will improve financial
reporting.
This Statement utilizes the guidance in FASB Concepts Statement
No.7, Using Cash Flow Information and Present Value in
Accounting Measurements, for estimating the fair values used in
testing both goodwill and other intangible assets that are not being
amortized for impairment.
The Effective Date of This Statement
The provisions of this Statement are required to be applied starting
with fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2001. Early
application is permitted for entities with fiscal years beginning after
March 15, 2001, provided that the first interim financial statements
have not previously been issued. This Statement is required to be
applied at the beginning of an entity's fiscal year and to be applied to
all goodwill and other intangible assets recognized in its financial
statements at that date. Impairment losses for goodwill and
indefinite-lived intangible assets that arise due to the initial
application of this Statement (resulting from a transitional
impairment test) are to be reported as reSUlting from a change in
accounting principle.
There are two exceptions to the date at which this Statement
becomes effective:
• Goodwill and intangible assets acquired after June 30, 2001 t
will be subject immediately to the nonamortization and
amortization provisions of this Statement.
• The provisions of this Statement will not be applicable to
goodwill and other intangible assets arising from
combinations between mutual enterprises or to not-far-profit
H·13
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organizations until the Board completes its deliberations with
respect to application of the purchase method by those
entities.
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§ 1060. Special allocation rules for certain asset acquisitions
(a) General rule.-In the case of any applicable asset acquisition, for purposes of
determining both-
(1) the transferee's basis in such assets, and
(2) the gain or loss of the transferor with respect to such acquisition,
the consideration received for such assets shall be allocated among such assets acquired
in such acquisition in the same manner as amounts are allocated to assets under section
338(bX5). If in connection with an applicable asset acquisition, the transferee and
transferor agree in writing as to the allocation of any consideration, or as to the fair
market value of any of the assets, such agreement shall be binding on both the
transferee and transferor unless the Secretary detennines that such allocation (or fair
market value) is not appropriate.
(b) Information required to be furnished to Secretary.-Under regulations, the
transferor and transferee in an applicable asset acquisition shall, at such times and in
such manner as may be provided in such regulations, furnish to the Secretary the
following infonnation:
(1) The amount of the consideration received for the assets which is allocated to
section 197 intangibles.
(2) Any modification of the amount described in paragraph, (1).
(3) Any other infonnation with respect to other assets transferred in· such
acquisition as the Secretary deems necessary to carry out the provisions of this
section.
(e) Applicable asset acquisition.-For, purposes of this section, the term "applicable
asset acquisition" means any transfer (whether directly or indirectly)-
(1) of assets which constitute a trade or business, and
(2) with respect to which the transferee's basis in such assets is determined
wholly by reference to the consideration paid for such assets.
A transfer shall not be treated as failing to be an applicable asset acquisition merely
because section 1031 applies to a portion of the assets transferred.
(d) Treatment of certain partnership transactions.-In the case of a distribution of
partnership property or a transfer of an interest in a partnership-
(1) the roles of subsection (a) shall apply but onlY,for purposes of detennining
the value of section 197 intangibles for purposes of applying section 755, and
(2) if section 755 applies, such distribution or transfer (as the case may be) shall
be treated as an applicable asset acquisition for purposes of subsection (b).
(e) Information required in case of certain transfers of interests in entities.-
(1) In general.-If-
(A) a person who is a lo-percent owner with respect to any entity transfers
an interest in such entity, and
(B) in connection with such transfer, such owner (or & related person) enters
. into an employment contract, covenant not to compete, royalty or lease
agreement, or other agreement V\ith the transferee, ,.
such owner and the transferee shall, at such time and in such manner as the
Secretary may prescribe, furnish such infonnation as the Secretary may require.
(2) 10-perce~t owner.-For purposes of this subsection-
(A) In general.-The term "lo-percent owner" means, with reSpect to any
entity, any person who holds 10 percent or more (by value) of the interests in
such entity immediately before the transfer.
(B) Constructive ownership.-8ection 318 shall apply in detennining own-
ership' of stock in a corporation. Similar principles shall 'apply in detennining
the ownership of interests in any other entity.
(3) Related person.-For purposes of this subsection, the term "related person"
means any person who is related (within the meaning of section 267(b) or 707(b)(l»
to the IO-percent owner.
(0 Cross Reference.-
For provisions relating to penalties for failure to file a return required by this section,
see section 6721.
(Added Pub.L. 99-514, Title VI, § 64l(a), Oct. 22, 1986, 100 Stat. 2282, and amended Pub.L. 100-647,
Title I, § l006(h)(I), (2), (3)(B), Nov. 10, 1988, 102 Stat. 3410; Pub.L. 101-508, Title XI, § 11323(a),
(b)(I), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1388-464; Pub.L. 1~, Title XIII, § 13261{e), Aug. 10, 1993, 107
Stat. 539.)
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§ 197. Amortization of goodwill and certain other intangibles '
(a) General rule.-A taxpayer shall be entitled to an amortization deduction with
respect to any amortizable section 197 intangible. The amount of such deduction shall
be detennined by amortizing the adjusted basis (for purposes of detennining gain) of
such intangible ratably over the 15-year period beginning with the month in which such
intangible was acquired.
(b) No other depreciation or amortization deduction allowable.-Except as pro-
vided in subsection (a), no depreciation or amortization deduction shall be allowable with .
respect to anY,amortizable section 197 intangible.
(c) Amortizable section 197 intangible.-For purposes of this section-
(1) In generaI.-Except as otherwise provided in this section, the tenn "amortiz-
able section 197 intangible" means any section 197 intanglole-
(A) wlticll is acqut-ecl b~- thf; taA-paj-er after tl:e C&t€ of the en~ctmentof trJe
section, and -
(B) which is held in connection with the conduct of a trade or business or an
activity described in section 212.
(2) 'Exclusion of self-created intangibles, etc.-The tenn "amortizable section
197 intangible" shall not include any section 197 intangible-
(A) which is not described in subparagraph (D), (E), or (F) of subsection
(d)(I), and
(B) which is created by the taxpayer.
This paragraph shall not apply if the intangible is created in connection with a
transaction (or series of related transactions) involving the acquisition of assets
constituting a trade or business or substantial portion thereof.
(3) Anti-chuming rules.-
For exclusion of intangibles acquired in certain transactions, see subsection (0(9).
(d) Section 197intangible.-For purposes of this section-
(I) In generaI.-Except as otherwise provided in this section, the tenn "section
197 intangible" means-
(A) goodwill,
(B) going concern value,
(C) any of the following intangible items:
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(i) workforce in place including its eomposition and terms and condi-
tions (contractual or otherwise) of its employment,
(ii) business books and records, operating systems, or any other infor-
mation base (including lists or other infonnation with respect to current or
prospective customers),
(iii) any patent, copyright, fonnula, process, design, pattern, kn~whow,
format, or, other similar item,
(iv) any customer-based intangible,
(v) any supplier-based, intangible~ and
(vi) any other similar item,
(D) any license, pennit, or other right granted by a governmental unit or an
agency or instrumentality thereof,
(E) any covenant not to compete (or other arrangement to the extent such
arrangement has substantially the same effect as a covenant not to compete)
entered into in connection with an acquisition (directly ·or indirectly) of an
interest in a trade or business or substantial portion thereof, and
(F) any franchise, trademark, or trade name. '.
(2) .Customer-based intan'gible.-
(A) In generat.-The tenn "customer-based intangible" means-
(i) composition of market,
(ii) market share, and
(iii) any other value resulting from future provision of goods or services
pursuant to relationships (contractual or otherwise) in the ordinary course
of business with customers.
(B) Special rule for financial institutions....:·-In the case of a financial
institution, the term "customer-based intangible" includes deposit base and
similar items.
(3) Supplier-based intangible.-The tenn "supplier-based intangible" means
any value resulting from future acquisitions of goods or services pursuant to
relationships (contractual or otherwise) in the ordinary course of business with
suppliers of goods or services to be UE~d or sold by the taxpayer. .
(e) Exceptions.-For purposes of this section, t}1e term "section 197 intangible" shall
not include any of the following:
(1) Financial interests.-Any interest-
(A) in a corporation, partnership, tnlst, or estate, or
(B) under an existing futures conv-aet, foreign currency contract, notional
principal contract, or other similar financial contract.
(2) LaneL-Any interest in land.
(3) Computer software.-
(A) In generaI.-Any-"
(i) computer software which is readily available for purchase by the
general public, is subject to a nonexclusive license, and has not been
substantially modified, and
(ii) other computer soft\\yare which is not acquired in a transaction (or
series of related transactions) involving the acquisition of assets constitut-
ing a trade or business or substantial portion thereof.
(B) Computer soft\\yare defined.-For purposes of subparagraph (A), the
tenn "computer software" means any program designed to cause a computer to
perfonn a desired function. Such term shall not include any data base or
similar item unless the data base or item is in the public domain and is
incidental to the operation of othernise qualifying computer software.
(4) Certain interests or rights acquired separately.-Any of the following not
acquired in a transaction (or series of related transactions) involving the acquisition
of assets constituting a trade business Clr substantial portion thereof:
(A) Any inte:i~est in a film, sound recording, video tape, book, or similar
property.
(B) Any right to receive tangible property or services under a contract or
granted by a governmental unit or agency or instrumentality thereof.
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(C) Any interest in a patent or copyright. .
(D)' To the extent provided in regulations, any right under a contract (or
granted by a governmental unit or an agency or instrumentality thereof) if such
right-
(i) has a fixed duration of less th~ 15 years, or, :
(ii) is fIXed as to amount and, without regard to this. section, would be
recoverable under a method, similar to the unit-of-production method.
(6) Interests under leaaes and debt'lnstruments.-Any interest under- '
(A) an existing.lease of tangible property, or,
(B) except as 'provided insubseetion (dX2)(B);any existing indebtedness.
(6) Treatment of sports franchises.-A franchise to engage in' professional
football, basketball, baseball, or other professional sport, and any item acquired in
connection with such a franchise.
(7) Mortgage senricfng.-Any right to service indebtedness which is secured by
residential real property unless such tight is acquired in a transaction (or series of
related transactions) involving the acquisition of assets (other than rights described
in this paragraph) constituting a trade or business or substantial portion thereof.
(8) Certain transaction costs.-Any fees for professional services, and any
transaction costs, inCUlTed by parties to a transaction with respect to which any
portion of the gain or loss is not recognized under part III of subchapter C.
(f) Special rules.-
(1) Treatment of certain dispositions, etc.-
(A) In general.-If there is a disposition of any amortizable section 197
intangible acquired in a transaction or series of related transactions (or any
such intangible becomes worthless) and one or more other amortizable section
197 intangibles acquired in such transaction or series of related transactions
art! retained-
, (i, no 'loss shall be recognized by reason of such disposition (or such
worthlessness), and
(ii) appropriate adjustments to the adjusted bases of such retained
intangibles shall be made for any loss not recognized under clause (i).
(B) Special rule tCor covenants not to compete.-In the case of any sdon
197 intangible which is a covenant not to compete (or other arrangement)
descn1>ed in subsection (d)(l)(E), in no event shall such covenant or other
arrangement be treated as disposed of (or becoming worthless> before the
disposition 01' the entire interest described in such subseCtion in connection with
which such covenant (or other arrangement) was entered into. ,
(C) Special rule.-All persons treated as a single taxpayer under section
41(f)(1) shall be so treated for purposes of this paragraph.
(2) Treatment of certain transfers.-
(A) In generaI.-In the case of any section 197 intangible transferred in a
transaction described in subparagraph (B), the transferee shall be treated as
the transferor for purposes of applying this section with respect to so much of
the adjusted basis in the hands of the transferee as does not exceed the
adjusted basis in the hands of the transferor.
(B) Transactions co,·ered.-The transactions described in this subpara-
graph are-
(i) any transaction described in section 332, 351, 361, 721, 731, 1031, or
1033, and
(ii) any transaction between members of the same affiliated group
during any taxable year for which a consolidated return is made by such
group.
(3) Treatment of amounts paid pursuant to covenants not to compete, etc.-
Any amount paid Dr incurred pursuant to a covenant or an'al1gement referred to in
subsection (d)(l)(E) shall be treated as an amount chargeable to capital account.
(4) iI'reatment of franchises, etc.-
(A) Franchise.-The term "franchise" has the meaning given t.o such tenn
by section 1253(b)(1).
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(B) Treatment of renewals.-Any renewal of a franchise, trademark, or
trade name (or of a license, ~ pennit, or other right referred to in subsection
(d)(I)(D» shall be treated as an acquisition. The preceding sentence shall only
appl;y with respect to costs incurred in connection with such rene\val.
(C) Certain amounts not taken into account.-Any amount to which
section 1253(d)(I) applies shall not .be taken into account under this section.
(5) Treatment of certain reinsurance transactions.-In the case of any amor-
tizable section 197 intangible resulting from an assumption reinsurance. transaction,
the amount taken into account as the· adjusted basis of such intangible under this
section shall be the excess of-
(A) the amount paid or incurred by the acquirer under the assumption
reinsurance transaction, over ,
. (B) the amount required to be capitalized under section 848 in connection
with such transaction.
Subsection (b) shall not apply to any amount required to be capitalized under
section 848.
(6) Treatment of certain subleases.-For purposes of this section, a sublease
shall be treated in the same manner as a lease of the underlying property involved.
(7) Treatment as depreciable.-For purposes of this chapter, any amortizable
section 197 intangible shall be treated as property which is of a character subject to
the allowance for depreciation provided in 'section 167.
(8) Treatment of certain increments in '·alue.-This section shall not apply to
any increment in value if, without regard to this section, such increment is properly
taken into account in determining the cost of property which is not a section 197
intangible. .
(9) Anti~hurning rules.-For purposes of this section-
(A) In general.-The tenn "amortizable section 197 intangible" shall not
include any section 197 intangible which is described in subparagraph (A) or
(B) of subsection (d)(l) (or for which depreciation or anlortization would not
have been allowable but for this section) and which is acquired by the taxpayer
after the date of the enactment of this section, if-
(i). the intangible was held or used at any time on or after July 25, 1991,
and on or before such date of enactment by the ~llayer or a related
person, .
(ii) the intangible was acquired from a person who held such intangible
,at any time on or 8fter July 25, 1991, and on or before such date of
enactment, and, as part of the transaction, the user of such intangible does
.. not change, or
(iii) the taxpayer grants the right to use such intangible to a person (or
a person related to such person) who held or used such intangible at any
time on or after July 25, 1991, and on or before such date of enactment.
For purposes of this subparagraph, the determination of whether the user of
property changes as part of a transaction shall be detennined in accordance
with regulations prescribed by the Secretary. For purposes of this subpara-
graph, deductions allowable under section 1253(d) shall be treated as deduc-
tions allowable for amortization.
(B) Exception where gain recognized.-If-
(i) subparagraph (A) would not apply to an intangible acquired by the
taxpayer but for the last sentence of subparagraph (C)(i), and
Oi) the person from whom the taxpayer acquired the intangible elects,
notwithstanding any other provision of this title-
(I) to recognize gain on the disposition of the inUingible, and
(II) to pay a tax on such gain which, when added to any other
income tax on such gain under this title, equals such gain multiplied
by the highest rate of income tax applicable to such person under this
title,
then subparagraph (A) shall apply to the intangible only to· the extent that the
taxpayer's adjusted basis in the intangible exceeds the gain recognized under
clause (ii)(I).
(C) Related person defined-For purposes of this paragraph-
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(I) Related penon.-A person (hereinafter in this paragraph referred
to as the "related person") is related to any person if-
(I) the related person bears a relationship to such person specified
in section 267(b) or section 707(b)(1), or
(II) the related person and such person are engaged in trades or
businesses under common control (within the meaning of subpara-
graphs (A) and (B) of section 41(f)(1».
For purposes of subclause (1), in applying section 267(b) or 707(b)(1), "20
percent" shall be substituted for "50 percent".
(II) Time for maklnr determlnation.-A person shall be treated as
related to another person if such relationship exists immediately before or
immediately after the acquisition of the intangible involved.
(D) Acquisitions by reason of death.-Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to
the acquisition of any property by the taxpayer if the basis of the property in
the hands of the taxpayer is determined under section 1014(a).
(E) Special rule for partnerships.-With respect to' any increase in the
basis of partnership property under section 732, 734, or 743, determinations
under this paragraph shall be made at the partner level and each partner shall
be treated as having owned and used such partner's proportionate share of the
partnership assets.
(F) Anti-abuse rules.-The tenn "amortizable section 197 intangible" does
not include any section 197 intangible acquired in a transaction, one of the
principal purposes of which is to avoid the requirement of subsection (c)(l) that
the intangible be acquired after the date of the enactment of this section or to
avoid the provisions of subparagraph (A).
(g) Regulations.-The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be appro-
priate to carry out the purposes of this section, including such regulations as may be
appropriate to prevent avoidance. of the purposes of this section through related persons
or otherwise. .
(Added Pub.L. 103-66, Title XIII, § 13261(a), Aug. 10, 1993, 107 Stat. 532.)
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§ 482. Allocation of income and deductions among taxpayers
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses
(whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the
United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Sec;retary may
distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits,
or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or
businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment,
or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or
clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, or
businesses. In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible
property (within the meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B», the income
with respect to such transfer or license shall be commensurate with
the income attributable to the intangible.
(Aug. 16, 1954, c. 736, 68A Stat. 162; Oct. 4, 1976, Pub.L. 94-455, Title XIX,
§ 1906(b) (13) (A), 90 Stat. 1834; Oct. 22~ 19.86, Pub.L. 99-514, Title XII,
§ 1231(e)(1), 100 Stat. 2562.) .
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